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SUMMARY 
The right to freedom of religion is one of the oldest of the internationally recognised 
freedoms and is entrenched in section 15(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”). It is the hallmark of an open and democratic society and 
provides everyone with the right to practise their religion in the public sphere and to manifest 
their beliefs by way of religious dress, teaching, or the conducting of religious observances. 
Section 15(2) of the Constitution makes specific provision for religious observances to be 
conducted at state and state-aided institutions provided that (a) those observances follow rules 
made by the appropriate public authorities, (b) they are conducted on an equitable basis, and 
(c) attendance at them is free and voluntary. The Constitution has created a peculiar tension 
with the inclusion of section 15(2). On the one hand, it allows for the practice of religion in 
the public sphere, while on the other hand guaranteeing the right to religious freedom and 
freedom from religious coercion.  
In South Africa, religious observances are often conducted in the public school system. 
Public schools make provision for religious observances like prayer, worship, or the reading 
and interpretation of religious texts, while some schools even identify themselves as having a 
particular religious character or religious ethos. The South African Schools Act 84 of 1997 
(“Schools Act”) delegates the power to determine rules on religious observances in public 
schools to the governing body of the school.  In a country with a diverse citizenry it is often 
difficult for governing bodies to formulate rules that afford all learners an equitable right to 
religious observances, while being free from any religious coercion. What, from one 
perspective, would constitute a school community’s legitimate practice of their 
constitutionally guaranteed right to religion, might, from another, amount  to a limitation of 
an individual learner’s right to be free to choose and practise his own religion or abstain from 
religious observances at all.  
The object of this study is to determine how the requirements for religious observances in 
state and state-aided institutions, as stipulated in section 15(2) of the Constitution and 
reiterated in section 7 of the Schools Act, must be interpreted within the context of public 
schools, to strike a constitutionally appropriate balance between the powers of school 
governing bodies and the right of learners to be free from religious coercion.  
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OPSOMMING 
Die reg op vryheid van godsdiens is een van die oudste van die internasionaal erkende 
menseregte en is verskans in artikel 15(1) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-
Afrika, 1996 (“Grondwet”). Dit is ’n kernbepaling in ’n oop en demokratiese samelewing en 
waarborg aan elkeen die reg om hul godsdiens in die publieke sfeer te beoefen deur middel 
van godsdienstige kleredrag, onderrig of godsdiensbeoefening. Artikel 15(2) van die 
Grondwet maak spesifiek voorsiening vir godsdiensbeoefening by staats- of 
staatsondersteunde instellings, mits (a) daardie beoefening reëls nakom wat deur die 
tersaaklike openbare gesag gemaak is, (b) dit op ’n billike grondslag geskied, en (c) die 
bywoning daarvan vry en vrywillig is. Die invoeging van artikel 15(2) in die Grondwet skep 
’n besondere spanning. Aan die een kant maak dit voorsiening vir godsdiensbeoefening in die 
publieke sfeer, en aan die ander kant waarborg dit die reg op vryheid van godsdiens en om 
nie aan godsdienstige dwang onderwerp te word nie.  
In Suid-Afrika vind godsdiensbeoefening dikwels in openbare skole plaas. Hierdie skole 
maak voorsiening vir godsdienstige gebruike soos gebed, aanbidding, of die bestudering van 
religieuse tekste. Sommige skole neem  selfs ’n bepaalde godsdienstige karakter of etos aan. 
Die South African Schools Act 84 of 1997 (“Schools Act”) delegeer die mag om reëls oor 
godsdiensbeoefening in die skool te maak aan die skoolbeheerliggaam. Dit is moeilik vir 
beheerliggame om in ’n diverse samelewing reëls te formuleer wat aan alle leerders ’n billike 
reg op godsdiensbeoefening gee, en terselfdertyd niemand aan godsdienstige dwang 
onderwerp nie. Vorme van godsdiensbeoefening wat, vanuit ŉ bepaalde perspektief neerkom 
op die uitoefening van ŉ skoolgemeenskap se grondwetlike reg op godsdiensvryheid, mag 
vanuit ŉ ander perspektief gesien word as ŉ skending van ŉ individuele leerder se reg om sy 
eie godsdiens te beoefen of geensins aan godsdiensbeoefening deel te neem nie.  
Die doel van hierdie studie is om te bepaal hoe die vereistes vir godsdiensbeoefening by 
staats- en staatsondersteunde instellings, soos bepaal deur artikel 15(2) van die Grondwet en 
artikel 7 van die Schools Act, uitgelê moet word om ’n gepaste grondwetlike balans te skep 
tussen die magte van skoolbeheerliggame en die regte van leerders om vry te wees van 
godsdienstige dwang. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Background to the research problem: religious observances in South Africa 
The right to freedom of religion is considered to be one of the oldest of the internationally 
recognised human freedoms.1 Most democratic states provide a constitutional guarantee of 
religious freedom, while others promulgate legislation or set policies to give effect to this 
right.2 Religious freedom is also afforded recognition in many international legal documents 
and conventions.3 In South Africa, freedom of religion is entrenched as a fundamental right in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”).4 The Constitutional 
Court of South Africa has described the practice of religion as one of the hallmarks of an 
open, democratic and free society5 that awakens “concepts of self-worth and human dignity 
which form the cornerstone of human rights.”6 
According to the 2001 census figures,7 over 80% of South Africans regard themselves as 
Christians, spread over 34 groupings and numerous denominations.8 Islam, Hinduism, 
Judaism and African traditional beliefs comprise almost 5% of believers, with around 15% of 
the population adhering either to traditional indigenous religions or no religion at all.9 It is 
thus clear that South Africa is a fairly religious society with a majority of the population 
holding at least some form of religious conviction. It is, however, also a religiously diverse 
society, with even the majority religion encompassing a large array of different 
denominations. Part of the right to religious freedom is the right to participate in, and conduct 
                                                                 
1
 P Farlam “Freedom of religion, belief and opinion” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2
nd
 ed (2009) 41-12. 
2
 B Bekink “The intrins ic uneasy triangle between constitutionalism, secularism and the right to freedom of 
religion – a South African perspective” (2008) 3 Tydskrif van die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 481 482. 
3
 This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 
2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (“CRC”), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 22 April 1954) 999 UNTS 137 (“ICCPR”), Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religious Belief (adopted 18 December 1979, entered 
into force 3 September 1981) A/RES/34/180, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (adopted 
27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986 CAB/LEG//67/3. 
4
 Section 15 of the Constitution. 
5
 Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) (“Prince”) para 24. 
6
 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) (“Christian Education”) para 
36. 
7
 In the 2011 national census no questions were posed about the religious convictions of the South African 
citizenry. The 2001 figures are thus the most recent information on the country’s religious demographic.  
8
 D Bilchitz & S de Freitas “Introduction: The right to freedom of religion in South Africa and related 
challenges” (2012) 28 South African Journal of Human Rights 141 141. 
9
 LM du Plessis “Affirmation and celebration of the ‘religious Other’ in South Africa’s constitutional 
jurisprudence on religious and related rights: Memorial constitutionalism in action?” (2008) 8 African Journal 
of Human Rights Law 376 380. 
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religious observances, either individually or as part of a religious community. Observances of 
a religious nature may be conducted in a private setting, in a religious institution as part of a 
religious activity, or in a public setting. 
Section 15(2) of the Constitution makes specific provision for religious observances to be 
conducted at state and state-aided institutions. It protects the right of religious adherents to 
manifest their religion in the public sphere, subject to certain requirements. Observances must 
(a) follow rules made the appropriate public authorities,10 (b) be conducted on an equitable 
basis,11 and (c) attendance at them must be free and voluntary.12  It is generally accepted that 
the drafters of the Constitution included this section partly in an effort to ensure that religious 
observances may be conducted within the public school system.13 In the pre-constitutional 
era, religion had been an integral part of formal education and this section aimed to preserve 
some of this practice, albeit under rules that are more democratically and constitutionally 
reflective.  
Section 7 of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1997 (“Schools Act”) delegates the 
power to issue rules on religious observances to the governing body of the school. The 
Constitution has, however, created a peculiar tension with the inclusion of section 15(2), read 
with section 7 of the Schools Act. On the one hand, it allows for the practice of religion in the 
public sphere (including the school environment), while on the other hand guaranteeing the 
right to religious freedom and freedom from religious coercion. What, from one perspective, 
would constitute a school community’s legitimate practice of their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to religion, might, from another, amount  to a limitation of an individual 
learner’s right to be free to choose and practise his own religion or abstain from religious 
observances at all. In a country with such a diverse citizenry it is often difficult for schools to 
navigate this tension and ensure that all learners are afforded an equitable right to religious 
observances, while being free from any religious coercion.  
In South Africa, many governing bodies simply refrain from adhering to section 15(2) and 
actively promote themselves as schools with a particular religious character or ethos.14 
                                                                 
10
 Section 15(2)(a).  
11
 Section 15(2)(b). 
12
 Section 15(2)(c).  
13
  LM du Plessis “Religion, law and the state in South Africa” (1997) 4 European Journal for State and Church 
Research 221 233; N Smith “Freedom of religion under the final Constitution” (1997) 114 South African Law 
Journal 220; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6
th
 ed (2013) 330; GE Devenish The South 
African Constitution (2005) 72. 
14
E Thelwell “Does God belong in schools?” (2014-09-05) News24 <www.news24.com/South 
Africa/News/Does-God-belong-in-schools-20140905> (accessed 02-02-2015); M Thamm “Religion in schools: 
Watershed case to ensure teaching and not preaching” (2014-09-03) Daily Maverick (accessed 15-03-2015). 
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Religious observances are consequently often conducted in accordance with the majority 
religion, while religious minorities are coerced into participation. This is partly because 
section 15(2) is one of the few provisions in the Bill of Rights that have not been the subject 
of a legal dispute. As a result, the courts have not had an opportunity to interpret and define 
the nature and extent of the right to conduct religious observances.15 The legislature and the 
Department of Education have, through the Schools Act and the National Policy on Religion 
and Education, 2003 respectively, attempted to assist public schools in drafting rules on 
religious observances. However, the Schools Act only reiterates section 15(2), while the 
Policy is unclear and has not been interrogated for compliance with the Constitution.  
In order to determine the constitutionality of religious observances in South African public 
schools, it is imperative that the requirements in section 15(2) of the Constitution, together 
with section 7 of the Schools Act, be interpreted and defined. Establishing what is meant by 
“state and state-aided institutions”, “rules”, “equitable basis”, and “free and voluntary” is 
needed in order to determine whether the religious observances conducted by a school adhere 
to the Constitution and the Schools Act. Section 15(2) must, however, be interpreted within 
the framework of the Constitution as a whole, taking cognisance of supporting and related 
rights in the Bill of Rights.16 The Schools Act and the National Policy on Religion and 
Education attempt to concretise section 15(2), and must therefore also be analysed. Any 
interpretation afforded to the right to conduct religious observances must ultimately protect 
and further the constitutional and democratic values of freedom, equality and human dignity. 
 
2 Research question, research aims and methodology 
The research question addressed in this study centres on how the requirements for 
religious observances in state and state-aided institutions, as stipulated in section 15(2) of the 
Constitution and reiterated in section 7 of the Schools Act, must be interpreted within the 
context of public schools, to strike a constitutionally appropriate balance between the powers 
of school governing bodies and the right of learners to be free from religious coercion. As a 
point of departure it is accepted that the Constitution allows for religious observances to be 
                                                                 
15
 In August 2014, an application was filed in the Gauteng High Court by the non-governmental organisation, 
Organisasie vir Godsdienste-Onderrig en Demokrasie. The application is aimed at prohibiting six public schools 
from subjecting their learners to any form of religious observances or practices, advertising themselves as 
exclusively Christian or as schools with a Christian ethos and exposing the learners to direct or indirect religious 
coercion. At the time of submitting this thesis, the case had not been heard before court.  
16
 These are: the right to religious freedom (section 15), equality (section 9), human dignity (section 10), 
freedom of expression (section 16), right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and petition (section 17), freedom of 
association (section 18), right to a religious community (section 31), the best interest of the child (section 29), 
and the general limitation clause (section 36). 
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conducted in public schools. The aim of this study is to establish how these observances must 
be constructed to be constitutionally permissible. This will be done by analysing and 
interpreting relevant constitutional provisions, legislation, case law, policy documents, and 
international and foreign law. 
The study will argue that the right to conduct religious observances is not a stand-alone 
right, but functions within a broader constitutional, legislative and policy framework that 
influence the nature and the form that religious observances can take.  It will also be argued 
that a symbiotic relationship exists between the requirements of “free and voluntary” and 
“equitable basis” in section 15(2), and that they work together in structuring religious 
observances in a constitutionally permissible way. It is submitted that a more lenient 
interpretation must be afforded to “free and voluntary”, which will allow for a limited 
measure of indirect coercion. The undue coercive burden this might cause to learners, parents 
and teachers can however be mitigated by construing “equitable basis” strictly, requiring a 
high standard of equity for the religious observances performed in the school. Throughout the 
study suggestions will be made as to how rules around observances in public schools can be 
drafted to comply with the Constitution.   
 
3 Overview of chapters 
Chapter 2 will analyse the relationship between the state and religion in South Africa. The 
purpose of this chapter is to determine what model of state-religion interaction is envisioned 
by the Constitution, as it will create the theoretical framework within which the 
constitutionality of religious observances in public schools will be evaluated. This will entail 
an overview of different models of state-religion relations, after which the South African 
approach will be discussed. The history of the relationship between the state and religion in 
South Africa will be analysed, including the role that religion played in the education system. 
The chapter will then examine the impact of the Constitution on religion-state relations and 
describe the characteristics of the accommodation model envisioned by the Constitution. 
Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the constitutional-, legislative- and policy 
framework that governs religious observances in South Africa. This includes the 
constitutional provisions regarding religious freedom, equality, human dignity, freedom of 
expression, the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and petition, freedom of association, 
the right to a religious community, the best interest of the child, and the general limitation 
clause. The impact of the Schools Act will also be discussed, as well as the role of the 
National Policy on Religion and Education. Finally, the international law instruments that 
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relate to religious observances in public schools will be analysed in order to determine what 
role they can play in the structuring of religious observances in public schools.  
Chapter 4 will provide an in-depth analysis and interpretation of section 15(2) of the 
Constitution. This will include a discussion on the definition of “state and state-aided 
institutions” as well as an interpretation of the meaning of “rules”. The purpose is to 
determine the legal status of the rules issued by the governing body and whether they have to 
adhere to the rule of law. Finally, the meaning of “appropriate public authority” in the context 
of public schools will be discussed. This will entail an analysis of the powers of school 
governing bodies and the implications of developments in case law for the ability of a 
governing body to issue rules on religious observances. 
Chapter 5 will address the meaning of “free and voluntary” as required by section 15(2). 
This includes a discussion of direct and indirect coercion as well as a legal comparative 
analysis of the American, Canadian and German approaches to religious coercion. The 
purpose of the comparative study is to determine what rights-based and policy arguments are 
relevant when interpreting the voluntariness requirement in section 15(2). An analysis will 
then be provided of the way in which “free and voluntary” must be interpreted within the 
South African public school setting. 
Chapter 6 will focus on the requirement of “equitable basis” in section 15(2). This will 
include a general definition of “equity” as well as a discussion of the way in which religious 
equity has been achieved in German religious instruction. Using the German approach to 
religious instruction as an example of how equity can be achieved in a religiously diverse 
society, a model will be proposed for the interpretation of “equitable basis” in the 
Constitution. Practical suggestions will also be made as to how religious observances can be 
structured to adhere to this requirement.  
 
4 Definition of “religious observances” 
The definition of “religious observances” in section 15(2) has largely been clarified in case 
law and refers to a very particular set of conduct. Van Dijkhorst J in Wittmann v Deutscher 
Schülverein, Pretoria17 defines “religious observances” as an “act of religious character, a 
rite.” This includes “[t]he daily opening of a school by prayer, reading of the scripture (and 
possibly a sermon or religious message, and benediction).”18 In particular, “religion” is 
viewed as the “human recognition of super human controlling power and especially of a 
                                                                 
17
 1998 JOL 3644 (T) (“Wittmann”) 60. 
18
 60. 
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personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship.”19 Although Wittmann was decided 
under section 14(2) of the Interim Constitution, the case clearly extends this rather narrow 
interpretation of religious observances to section 15(2) of the Final Constitution.20 Religious 
education is deliberately excluded,21 which means education of a confessional nature (such as 
studying the Bible) or of an informal general nature is not protected under section 15(2).22 
The National Policy on Religion and Education23 does not provide a definition of the term, 
but does give a few examples of religious observances that may be protected under the 
Policy. These include voluntary public occasions, which make use of school facilities for 
religious services on a day of worship or rest; voluntary occasions when the school 
community gather for religious observances; observances held in a voluntary gathering of 
pupils and/or teachers during a school break; and an observance which may be ongoing such 
as dress, diet and prayer times that must be respected and accommodated in a manner agreed 
upon by the school and the relevant faith authority.24 All of these practices are, however, 
subject to the Constitution and the Schools Act, which means that they must still meet the 
requirements of section 15(2).  
It is thus clear that section 15(2) was intended to protect only a narrow category of 
practices. Religious instruction and religious education, where children are proselytised 
towards a specific religion, will not fall under section 15(2) and will constitute a limitation of 
section 15(1) if practised in the public school system in South Africa. The ambit of this study 
is restricted to religious observances that are conducted at public schools, either with the 
assistance of the school or simply facilitated by the school. The study does not address issues 
like religious dress or diet. These are in themselves controversial topics and although they are 
regarded as forms of religious observance, this study will focus on observances such as 
school prayers, the reading of religious texts, the singing of religious songs, or any other 
observance that constitutes a collective public display of religious affiliation.  
 
5 Religious observances: A qualifying provision or a right? 
As has already been mentioned, section 15(2) of the Constitution is generally viewed as an 
attempt by the constitutional drafters to make provision for the practice of religious 
                                                                 
19
 59. 
20
 60. 
21
 60. 
22
 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook  331. 
23
 See Chapter 3 for a further discussion of the National Policy on Religion and Education.  
24
 The National Policy on Religion and Education section 59.  
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observances in South African public schools.25 Smith26 argues that the insertion of section 
15(2) was a conscious decision by the drafters to distinguish South Africa from the broad 
trend of North American school prayer cases where religious observances have been 
prohibited as they are viewed as at least indirectly coercive. As a point of departure, religious 
observances in South African state and state-aided institutions are thus constitutionally 
permissible, as long as they comply with the requirements of the Schools Act and section 
15(2) and do not infringe on any of the rights or freedoms in the Constitution. The 
constitutionality of particular devotional practices may consequently be challenged on the 
basis that they are not free and voluntary or are not conducted on an equitable basis. 
Section 15(2) states that religious observances “may” be conducted at state and state-aided 
institutions. The word “may” suggests a mere possibility,27 as opposed to an absolute 
obligation or necessity. On the face of it section 15(2) seems to provide institutions, as well 
as the individuals that form part thereof, an opportunity to choose to conduct religious 
observances or not. It invites the possibility of religious observances and authorises their 
presence in state and state-aided institutions, but does not make them obligatory for the 
institution or the individuals. A question, however, arises as to the nature of section 15(2). Is 
it merely a provision that qualifies section 15(1), or does it create a general right to conduct 
religious observances in state and state-aided institutions? 
Reading section 15(2) as a mere qualifying provision would not necessarily establish a 
right on which religious adherents can rely to compel an institution to allow them to conduct 
religious observances. Section 15(1) confers a general right to freedom of religion that does 
not contain any specifications on the extent of the right. Section 15(2) can be read as 
qualifying section 15(1) by indicating that the right to religious freedom does not preclude 
religious observances at state and state-aided institutions.28 On this reading, section 15(2) 
does not create a right on which individuals can rely, but rather establishes state and state-
institutions as environments where religious observances may take place.  
It would be possible for either the institution itself or the individuals who form part of the 
institution to initiate the practice of religious observances and for the institution to draft rules 
                                                                 
25
 Du Plessis “Religion, law and the state in South Africa” European Journal for State and Church Research 
233; Smith “Freedom of religion under the final Constitution” South African Law Journal 220; Currie & De 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 330; Devenish The South African Constitution  72. 
26
 “Freedom of religion under the final Constitution” The South African Law Journal 220. 
27
 J Crozier, A Grandinson, C McKeown, E Summers, P Weber (eds) Collins English Dictionary (2005) 497. 
28
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on the place, time and manner in which observances are to be conducted. This reading is 
supported by the fact that section 15(2) does not contain an explicit reference to a “right” as 
is the case in section 15(1). It could therefore be argued that section 15(2) does not create a 
stand-alone right. This means that, if an institution makes a decision not to allow for a 
specific place and time to conduct religious observances, an individual will not be in a 
position to argue that the institution infringes on section 15(2). In terms of this reading 
section 15(2) simply empowers institutions to allow for observances, but does not create a 
right on the side of adherents to insist on observances in accordance with their faith.  
The above interpretation is a rather narrow reading of section 15(2) and the right to 
religious freedom in general. It would effectively mean that state and state-aided institutions 
can decide not to allow religious observances in the institution, even if a substantial part of 
the community that is served by it is in favour of such observances. This is problematic as an 
effort to eliminate religious observances in the institution could infringe on section 15(1) and 
the right to religious freedom of the individuals who form part of the institution. It will be 
argued in this study that section 15(2), read with section 15(1), creates a right to religious 
observances and that individuals can rely on that right to compel the state or state-aided 
institution that they form part of to take steps to accommodate religious observances. This 
argument will be based on a textual and contextual interpretation of section 15(2) and its role 
in the Constitution. 
First of all, it is important to consider the nature of the right to religious freedom in section 
15(1). The right to religious freedom includes the right to declare religious beliefs openly and 
to manifest religious beliefs.29 Van der Schyff30 argues that section 15(1) includes the right to 
freedom of religious observance which protects acts motivated and associated with religion. 
On this reading, section 15(2) can be viewed as a restatement and a refinement of the right to 
conduct religious observances under section 15 of the Constitution. It expressly makes 
provision for religious observances, thereby affirming the already-established right under 
section 15(1). It further extends this right to state and state-aided institutions, and makes its 
exercise in these institutions subject to certain requirements.  
The establishment of religious observances as a “right” has certain constitutional 
implications for state and state-aided institutions. Section 7(2) of the Constitution enjoins the 
state to “respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.” The first part of 
                                                                 
29
 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) (“Lawrence”) para 92. The right to religious 
freedom will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
30
 G van der Schyff The right to freedom of religion in South Africa (2001) unpublished LLM thesis 
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this section acts as a shield against any excesses in the exercise of power by the state by 
requiring the state to refrain from interfering with the rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
and to ward off any threats against such rights.31 The second part of the section speaks to the 
protection, promotion and fulfilment of rights and is premised on the notion that 
constitutional guarantees of human rights require the state to take positive action to promote 
the constitutional ideals of individual and communal self-realisation and fulfilment.32 There is 
a positive obligation on the state and its organs (of which state and state-aided institutions 
form part) to provide appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed 
to afford such protection33 and to act to protect and promote the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
The right to religious observances is one of the rights that have to be respected, protected, 
promoted and fulfilled under section 7(2). This means that there is an obligation on state and 
state-aided institutions to take active steps to facilitate and accommodate the religious 
observances of the individuals who form part of the institutions. Consequently, section 15(2) 
creates both a right and an opportunity for the individual. It does not force individuals to 
participate in religious observances, but provides that they “may” use this public setting to 
practise their religion, should they feel so inclined. Once individuals decide to exercise their 
right to conduct religious observances, the institution must as far as possible accommodate 
their practices and allow an opportunity for participation.  
State and state-aided institutions must therefore try to take steps to facilitate religious 
observances when the need arises. This must be done in a manner that complies with section 
15(2) and under rules that are both voluntary and equitable. Should there be no need for 
religious observances in a particular state or state-aided institution, and the individuals prefer 
to refrain from practising their religion in public, there is no obligation on the institution to 
take steps to facilitate participation. In instances like this, care must however be taken to 
ensure that a religious-friendly environment is maintained. Should new individuals who wish 
to conduct religious observances, join the institution, they must be reasonably 
accommodated. The obligation on the institution is thus subject to the needs of the members 
of the institution and may arise at varying times. 
It is, however, submitted that an institution may refrain from allowing religious 
observances if it would be unduly burdensome. This is especially true for institutions that 
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 Du Plessis “Affirmation and celebration of the ‘religious other’” African Human Rights Law Journal 383. 
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provide a necessary service that will be negatively impacted should its members participate in 
organised religious observances.  For example, should the staff of a public hospital insist on 
being allowed an hour every morning to practise their religious observances, it will inevitably 
lead to an unacceptable disruption of the workplace. If the nature of the institution and the 
nature of the observances are not compatible, it would not be unreasonable for the institution 
to declare that religious observances will not be facilitated at its premises and must be 
reserved for the private sphere. A decision like that does not completely negate the right to 
religious freedom, but limits it for legitimate reasons.  
In the context of the public school system, section 15(2) allows religious observances to be 
conducted at schools that fall within the definition of “state and state-aided institutions”. 
There is no obligation on learners, parents and teachers to conduct religious observances – 
they are allowed a choice by section 15(2). Should the school community however decide to 
conduct religious observances, an obligation arises on the side of the school and the 
governing body to attempt to facilitate and accommodate participation in accordance with the 
requirements of section 15(2). Schools cannot force learners and teachers to conduct religious 
observances, even if it is in accordance with their particular religion or beliefs. The decision 
to facilitate religious observances must be the result of an expressed need within the school 
community.  
If a majority of the school community is religious, it is likely that a need will arise for the 
school to facilitate religious observances. The particular religions and the nature of the 
facilitation may change over time as the religious demographic of the school changes, but the 
need to accommodate observances will most likely be consistent. Just as in other state and 
state-aided institutions, it might occur in exceptional circumstances that the practice of 
religious observances become so divisive and so disruptive that a school may elect to entirely 
refrain from facilitating any religious observances. Should a school for example have a very 
religiously diverse learner-body and the practice of religious observances leads to emotional 
or physical intimidation between members of the school community, a school may consider 
putting a stop to the facilitation of religious observances. Although this will limit religious 
freedom, in particular the right to conduct religious observances, it would be a reasonable 
limitation in the circumstances. Before making a decision like this, a school must, however, 
try to take reasonable steps to solve the animosity that exists in the school community and 
foster religious tolerance. 
A second consideration that adds weight to the argument that section 15 creates a right to 
religious observances is the wording of section 15(2). The institutions referred to in section 
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15(2) provide the public spaces where religious observances may be conducted. It clearly 
states that observances may take place “at” state and state-aided institutions. They form the 
institutional settings within which people are allowed to exercise their rights under section 
15(2). The section does not state that religious observances may be conducted “by” state and 
state-aided institutions. There is an important distinction between these two formulations. If 
religious observances were to be conducted “by” state and state-aided institutions, there is the 
danger that the state may blur the line between accommodating religions and religious 
endorsement. Observances that are purely driven by the institutions, that are extensions of the 
state, as well as organs of state, have the potential to discriminate against some religions, 
while promoting others.  
The section rather requires that state and state-aided institutions be environments for 
religious participation. This means that they must facilitate and accommodate religious 
observances in accordance with the needs of the people who form part of the institution. By 
using the word “at” the drafters seem to suggest that religious observances are not dependent 
on the discretion or the will of the institution, but rather the will of the people who form part 
of the institution and use it as a setting. The right thus falls to the individual, group, or 
community to decide to conduct religious observances, at which point the institution must 
attempt to facilitate the observances “at” the institution. An institution would arguably not be 
in a position to simply deny someone the opportunity to conduct religious observances 
without consulting with the individual or group and attempting to facilitate the needs of the 
adherents. To do so would be an infringement of the right to religious freedom in section 
15(1) and the right to conduct religious observances in section 15(2), read with section 15(1). 
A third important consideration is the role of minority rights. The Constitution, and in 
particular the Bill of Rights, intended to refine majoritarian democracy by making provision 
for the rights and freedoms of minorities.34 Religious freedom has a fundamental role to play 
in protecting and promoting the religious rights of minorities. This includes the religious 
observances that are associated with their religion. It is important that religious observances 
be entrenched as a constitutional right on which religious minorities can rely to protect their 
religious freedom against that of the majority. This ensures that learners who adhere to a 
minority religion in a school setting can enforce their right to religious observances in an 
effective way by insisting on exemption from participation and the accommodation of their 
specific religious needs.  
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Lastly, the right to conduct religious observances must be understood against the larger 
South African and international framework. As will be illustrated in this study, religious 
differences have always been a source of tension in South African society, leading to 
ignorance of the religious “Other” that has fostered intolerance and created a divide between 
members of different religions. The right to conduct religious observances at state and state-
aided institutions has the potential to bridge this divide by placing religious differences at the 
centre of human interaction. It requires the majority to respect the religious observances of 
minority adherents as it provides both the majority and the minority with similar rights. The 
majority can therefore not rely on their numbers to oppress and negate the religious freedom 
of minority believers, but are forced to respect their rights and interact with the religious 
“Other”. The aim is to move beyond the point of mere tolerance of religious differences to an 
understanding, recognition, and acceptance of the religious idiosyncrasies of the “Other.”35 
Recognising religious observances as a right that has to be respected fosters an environment 
in which religious diversity can thrive.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1 Introduction 
The relationship between religion and state has historically been one of complex 
controversy. In many countries of the world legal systems and state structures were informed 
and shaped by the dominant religion. Churches were often seen as centres of political and 
social control, with religious leaders actively engaging in the governance of states,1 while 
political leaders were equally involved in the workings of the church. This alliance between 
the church and state took different forms2 depending on the religion and the political 
circumstances, but it often proved to be an alliance with a wholly unholy3 character. Over 
time, this somewhat incestuous relationship has made way for a more separatist model of 
state-religion interaction and very few absolute theocracies still exist.4   
Today, the separation between religion and the state is regarded as a significant part of 
liberal democracy,5 but practically, there are various forms of separation. This ranges from an 
absolute separation between the state and religion to models of separation that allow for 
considerable interaction between the two entities. In order to analyse the constitutionality of 
religious observances in South African public schools, it is important to determine the model 
of state-religion interaction envisioned by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. Public schools are state-aided public institutions and as such, must reflect the 
constitutional vision of state-religion interaction.  
In South Africa the adoption of the Constitution fundamentally altered the way in which 
the state engaged with religion and religious institutions,6 departing from the apartheid-model 
of Christian favouritism. South Africa has thus had the unique opportunity of re-inventing the 
relationship between the state and religion to create a model that adheres to the constitutional 
vision of human dignity, equality and freedom. The dominance of one religion was rejected,7 
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with the state rather opting for what has since been called the accommodation model, or the 
separation with interaction approach.8 
In this chapter, a brief overview of the various models of state-religion interaction will be 
provided, where after the South African approach will be discussed. This will entail a 
historical overview of the relationship between the state and religion prior to the Constitution 
and an analysis and discussion of the accommodation model introduced by the Constitution. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the structure and content of this model and to 
provide a measure of clarity as to the way the relationship between the state and religion must 
function in post-apartheid South Africa. This will establish the theoretical framework for the 
subsequent discussion of the constitutionality of religious observances in public schools and 
act as a guideline for the interpretation of section 15(2) of the Constitution. 
 
2 Models of state-religion interaction 
The formal model of interaction that develops between the state and religion in a given 
country is usually determined by three factors, namely the constitution, legislation and the 
judicial interpretation of legislation.9 This relationship is however also influenced by various 
other societal determinants like the stability of political regimes, the history of the state-
religion relationship in the country, the degree of religious pluralism, the nature of the 
dominant religion(s) and their commitment to religious tolerance and freedom, and the 
historical interaction between religious groups in the country.10 Models of state-religion 
interaction are traditionally viewed on a continuum,11 with absolute control of the state by 
religion (theocracy) on the one end of the spectrum and a complete separation between the 
state and religion on the other end. Numerous models can be located in between these two 
extremes. Bilchitz and Williams12 emphasise that state-religion models are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive - they overlap significantly and must therefore not be categorised too 
rigidly.  
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The complexity of categorising these models is evident from the variety of classifications 
and labels used by academics to describe state-religion relationships. Paul Mojzes13 
distinguishes between ecclesiastical absolutism, where one religion is afforded preferential 
treatment; religious toleration, where the state tolerates all religions while showing preference 
for a particular religion; secular absolutism, where the state is viewed as secular and all 
religions are rejected; and pluralistic liberty, where the state is neutral and indifferent to 
religion. International law authors like Dinah Shelton and Alexander Kiss14 opt for a more 
nuanced classification. They identify five models of interaction, namely state control over 
religion; state neutrality towards religion; theocratic political perceptions, where a dominant 
religion controls the state sphere; state hostility towards religion; and the division of authority 
between the state and church with religious institutions being afforded autonomy over certain 
activities. 
Writing from a South African perspective, Bilchitz, Williams15 and Farlam16 distinguish 
between theocracies on the one end of the spectrum and states with an overtly hostile 
approach to religion at the other end. Situated between these extremes are states with an 
established or endorsed church; states that follow a co-operative model of interaction, where 
no religion is regarded as dominant, but the state co-operates closely with churches in a 
variety of ways;17 the accommodation model, where the state accommodates the specific 
requirements connected to citizens’ religions without affording preferential treatment to a 
specific religion;18 and the separationist model. In the latter instance, there is a wall of 
separation between the state and religion with minimal involvement of the state in religious 
activities, although this model manifests differently depending on the particular country.19 In 
some states, the distinction between religion and the state is enforced with such vigour that 
the state can be perceived as hostile towards religion,20 while others are more tolerant of the 
inevitable overlap with religious practices. 
In what can be described as probably the most elaborate classification21 of state-religion 
models, Cole Durham22 identifies two additional models of interaction. They are states with 
                                                                 
13
 Cited in Van der Vyver “Introduction” in Van der Vyver & Witte Religious Human Rights in Global 
Perspective xix. 
14
 xix.  
15
 “Religion and the public sphere” SAJHR 148. 
16
 “Freedom of religion, belief and opinion” in Woolman et al CLOSA 41-26. 
17
 41-26. 
18
 Bilchitz & Williams “Religion and the public sphere” SAJHR 156. 
19
 Farlam “Freedom of religion, belief and opinion” in Woolman et al CLOSA 41-26. 
20
 Bilchitz & Williams “Religion and the public sphere” SAJHR 153. 
21
 Van der Vyver “Introduction” in Van der Vyver & Witte Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective xix. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
an inadvertent insensitivity towards religion, and states that persecute religious followers – 
mostly those of minority religions. In the former instance, the aim of the state is not 
necessarily to infringe on the rights of religious communities, but the state remains ignorant 
of the negative impact legislation, regulations and policies have on certain religious 
groupings. This then results in the suppression of religious freedom.  
In countries where religious groups are persecuted, there is a deliberate attempt by the 
state to eliminate all religious practices or those practices that do not conform to the dominant 
religion. Persecution can take the form of bureaucratic roadblocks that cumulatively have the 
effect of impairing religious liberty or, in more severe cases, the prosecution and 
imprisonment of those with divergent religious beliefs.23 In the most extreme instances, this 
could even result in a form of “religious cleansing”, bordering on genocide.24 Although 
Durham identifies this as a separate model of state-religion interaction, religious prosecution 
is often an element of absolute theocracies, where the state attempts to suppress minority 
groupings that could possibly pose a threat to the state-religion.  
From the discussion above it is evident that the names given to the various categories often 
reflect a distinction without a difference, illustrating the difficulty in creating models with 
distinct characteristics. Ultimately, these models and the way in which they operate can only 
be identified in broad terms. Their practical manifestation will differ depending on the state 
in question and the forces and factors unique to that state. In order to determine the most 
appropriate model under the South African Constitution, it is helpful to give a brief overview 
of the various models. By evaluating the positive and negative aspects associated with each, it 
will be possible to identify the characteristics that will best inform the model envisioned by 
the Constitution. As far as the names of the models are concerned, I will use the most 
commonly referred terms, and where uncertainty arises, attempt to group and clarify the 
names given by the various authors. 
 
2 1 Theocracy 
The theocratic model of state-religion interaction entails the merging of the state and a 
majority religion, resulting in the law of the state being identical to, or strongly resembling 
the law of that particular religion.25 As a result of the close link between the state and 
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religion, these states have a religious character, for example identifying them as Christian or 
Islamic states.26 There are very few theocracies left in the world today and the examples most 
cited in this regard is the Vatican City (a Christian theocracy), and the so-called Islamic 
states27 that consider Sharia as the basis of their legal codes.28 According to the Universal 
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, Islam does not recognise a division between the state 
and the church29 and Islamic law is also regarded as the law of the state. The constitutions of 
most Islamic states profess to the overriding sovereignty of Allah,30 or proclaim Islam to be 
the official state religion.31 In some states like Afghanistan, Algeria, Mauritania and Pakistan, 
the constitution also requires the head of state and certain high ranking office bearers to be of 
the Muslim faith, effectively preventing adherents of minority religions from garnering any 
real political power.  
In countries with a religiously homogenous citizenry, the theocratic model has the 
advantage of allowing people to be governed in accordance with their religious beliefs and 
affording them the opportunity to experience the full ambit of their religious convictions. It is 
a manifestation of their right to self-determination as people are allowed to choose to be 
governed by systems and institutions vastly different from the traditional Western forms of 
governance. Unfortunately, hardly any country in the world can classify itself as completely 
homogenous with no religious diversity32 and the theocratic model has the inevitable 
consequence of infringing on the religious freedom of adherents to minority religions, and 
even those of the followers of the state religion.  
In theocracies a very specific conception of the “good”33 is imparted on people, regardless 
of their own convictions. This negatively impacts on their right to live their lives in 
accordance with their religion of choice and the preference of one religion indirectly coerces 
citizens to adopt the religion favoured by the state.34 The preferential treatment afforded to 
one religion also impacts on the rights of other religious traditions to be treated equally 
before the law. Even in theocracies that are tolerant of religious diversity, the state will never 
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be able to grant all religions equal rights and opportunities.35 Inevitably, theocracies alienate 
people from the state,36 undermining its legitimacy as a state for all its citizens.37 A lack of 
respect for the rights of minorities fosters a culture of political instability38 where people feel 
too alienated from the state to obey or respect its laws. This alienation also manifests on 
ground level. In countries where citizens are indoctrinated in accordance with a particular 
religion, discrimination, violence and animosity towards minority religions can easily be 
instigated. By treating the minority religions as the “Other”, states create a culture in which 
anyone outside of the state religion is ostracised and vilified as religious degenerates. If left 
unaddressed, violence and persecution of minority religions can occur, resulting in a form of 
religious cleansing bordering on religious genocide.  
The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 illustrates this phenomenon. After the revolution, 
Baha’is, a liberal religion that emerged as an offshoot of Iranian Islam in the nineteenth 
century, was excluded as a minority religion from the Iranian Constitution and was denied 
any legal recognition.39 Followers of Baha’is were persecuted, incarcerated, tortured and 
executed in post-revolutionist Iran.40 Perceptions of the inferiority and degenerateness of 
minority religions can thus have a devastating impact on the members of that religion. Not 
only does it expose them to the possibility of violence and persecution, but it also excludes 
them from the opportunities and the rights afforded to the majority.  
Furthermore, the fusion of the state and church effectively concentrates a vast amount of 
power in the hands of a central body – combining the authority of the state and religion to 
create a vehicle susceptible to abuse by government or church officials.41 From the outset, it 
is quite clear that the theocratic model of state-religion interaction cannot reflect the vision of 
the South African Constitution. Under the Constitution everyone is afforded the right of 
religious freedom42 and equality before the law and freedom from unfair discrimination on 
the basis of religion.43 This means that all religions must be treated on an equitable basis, and 
it would be impermissible for the state to adopt the laws of any particular religion. A situation 
like that will effectively infringe on the right of every South African to live a free and 
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dignified life in accordance with their religious convictions. The theocratic model will 
inevitably negate the Constitutional vision of a country that views human dignity, freedom 
and equality as the cornerstone of democracy.44 
 
2 2 States with established and endorsed religions 
In states with an established religion or church, the interaction between the state and 
religion is difficult to determine in abstract terms, as this relationship manifests differently 
depending on the country. At the most extreme end of this model, a particular religion has a 
virtual monopoly in religious affairs,45 although the fusion of the state and religion is not as 
prevalent as in theocracies. The dominance of one religion is however reminiscent of the 
theocratic model and, although to a lesser degree, exhibits the same constitutional difficulties 
discussed in relation to theocracy. The next position is held by states that have an established 
religion, but tolerate a set of divergent religions and beliefs.46  Sudan is a good example in 
this regard. Although it is an Islamic state, section 16 of the Sudanese Constitution protects 
Christians and members of “heavenly religions” from Islam.47  
At the least extreme end of the spectrum, are countries with an established church, while 
simultaneously guaranteeing equal treatment, rights and protection to all other religions.48 
The interaction between the Church of England and the state in Great Britain illustrates this 
relationship, with the state tolerating all religions and affording its citizens religious freedom, 
regardless of the close ties it has with the Church.49 General characteristics of the 
establishment model are that it provides for separate organisational structures and 
independent decision-making processes.50 This means that at an institutional level, the state 
and the church are not as intertwined as in the theocratic model. No state authority is 
exercised by the church and for the most part, religious freedom of non-followers is 
respected.51 The relationship between the state and a particular church is however evident in a 
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number of ways. This can include public holidays being scheduled on the holy days of the 
endorsed religion or affording recognition to that religion at public ceremonies.52 
Related to this model of state-religion interaction, is that of states with an endorsed 
church. In these states, although one particular church is not officially affirmed as the church 
of the state, it is afforded special acknowledgement and treatment.53 This is usually the result 
of that Church having a special place in the country’s traditions,54 history or culture.55 This 
model is quite prevalent in countries where the Roman Catholic Church has historically 
played a dominant role.56 Importantly, religious freedom is usually constitutionally protected 
and discrimination on religious grounds is prohibited in these states.57 Sometimes the 
endorsed church model is however abused to maintain the veneer of religious liberty, while 
preserving the prerogatives of an established church.58  
In states that adopt the models of an established or an endorsed church, the threat to 
religious liberty is not as prevalent as in theocracies, but religious freedom is by no means 
guaranteed. Here public power is not necessarily used to enforce a particular conception of 
the good, but such a conception is rather endorsed.59 Effectively, one religion is favoured 
over the others, resulting in differential and unequal treatment.60 The state also aligns itself 
with a particular religion, impairing the legitimacy of the state as representative of all its 
citizens. Followers of minority religions or non-religious people become alienated from the 
state as they are not afforded the same privileges as the established or the endorsed church. 
The practice of allowing public holidays on the sacred days of the established or endorsed 
religion illustrates this dilemma. Allowance is made for everyone in the country to celebrate 
the religious days of the established or endorsed religion – regardless of whether adherents to 
the minority religions wish to participate in this practice. When the followers of the divergent 
religions want to celebrate a religious day, they have to stay home from school or take leave 
from work. Their ability to fully enjoy their religion is thus inhibited and placed on an 
unequal footing in relation to the majority religion.  
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In pre-constitutional South Africa, there was never an established church,61 but close ties 
existed between the state and Christian churches, especially the Dutch Reformed Church. 
This relationship will be discussed in more detail below, but at this point it is sufficient to say 
that remnants of the relationship are still evident in South Africa today. The practice of 
allowing public holidays to coincide with the religious days of Christianity illustrates this 
phenomenon.62 Under the Constitution it would be highly inappropriate for the state to align 
itself with a particular religion or to endorse a particular church. Just as with the theocratic 
model, the establishment and endorsement models raise concerns regarding the infringement 
of the rights to equality, religious freedom and human dignity.  
 
2 3 Separation between the state and religion 
As with most of the other models of state-religion interaction, the separation model refers 
to a diverse range of regimes.63 Although the majority of countries in the world today adopt 
at least some form of separation between religion and the state,64 this model will manifest 
differently in every country. This makes it difficult to identify uniform characteristics. The 
separation model suggests that there must be a complete separation between the secular state, 
and religion and the church. In some countries this separation is enforced with such vigour 
that the state can be perceived to be intolerant or hostile towards the religious practices of its 
citizens.65  
Such a strict separation can see the state almost promoting a secular ideology at the 
expense of the convictions of religious communities.66 In 2004 the French National Assembly 
enacted a law banning “conspicuous” religious symbols in schools.67 The law effectively 
bans learners from wearing any religious garments such as the headscarf associated with the 
Muslim faith. The ban is based on the strictly secular nature of the French state which views 
religion as a private matter and aims to ensure that the public sphere is devoid of religious 
expression. As the Western European country with the largest Muslim community,68 France 
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has been criticised for infringing on the rights of religious minority groups, illustrating the 
dangers of a too vigorous enforcement of separation.  
In the most extreme cases the separation model can see the state making strong attempts to 
establish a clear distinction between public life and private life.69 Any state involvement with 
religious activities or suggestion of public support for religion would be considered 
inappropriate,70 and religious observances in public schools will not be allowed as it infringes 
the division between the public and the private sphere. Some states allow their citizens to 
establish private schools with a religious character, but others demand a complete monopoly 
of the education system – not allowing parents to educate their children in accordance with 
their religious convictions. In these states religious freedom is substantially limited and 
reserved for the private sphere.  
The separation model may however also develop as a result of the state’s reverence 
towards religion and the need to treat all religions on an equal basis, without interference or 
control by the public sphere. In these countries the intention of the state is to remain neutral 
in respect of competing conceptions of the “good” and to refrain from justifying its actions by 
invoking a particular religion.71 The advantage of such an approach is that the legitimacy of 
the state is protected as all religions are afforded the same status in the public realm and 
followers of minority religions are not indirectly coerced towards a preferred religion. The 
United States of America provide a useful example in this regard. The First Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States of America states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The first 
part, which is known as the “Establishment” clause, erects a wall of separation between the 
state and religion,72 while the second part allows for the free exercise of religion.73  
In the American context, it seems that the state, and especially the courts, has struggled to 
come to grips with the contradiction created by the First Amendment. Problems tend to arise 
when religious practices filter into institutions traditionally associated with the public sphere. 
The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court illustrates the struggle to strike a 
balance between the state as a secular institution and the rights of people to be religious in the 
public sphere. Religious instruction on public school premises was outlawed in McCollum v 
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Board of Education,74 and a daily period of silence in public schools, dedicated to voluntary 
meditation or private prayer,75 was declared unconstitutional. Conversely, religious colleges 
are allowed to use federal funds for capital projects,76 while a religiously motivated rule 
prohibiting dancing by students on school grounds was found to be constitutional.77 From 
these brief examples, it is clear that attempts by the United States Supreme Court to reduce 
the First Amendment to a consistent and universally applicable principle have thus far been 
unsuccessful,78 and in a sense serve to illustrate the difficulties associated with the separation 
model. 
The separation model fails to appreciate and accommodate the inevitable “dialectical 
interdependence”79 of law and religion.80 Religion cannot be confined to the private sphere 
alone, because people, and by implication their religious convictions, are not confined to the 
private sphere. A necessary overlap must occur. Bilchitz and Williams81 use the example of 
someone walking in the town square dressed in religious apparel. The choice of clothing was 
a deeply personal decision, taken within the confines of the private sphere, but once he leaves 
his home he carries his religion into the public sphere.82 A strict separation between religion 
and the law seems almost impossible83 and even if it could be attained, it would constitute a 
severe infringement on the religious freedom of those that are religious. By restricting their 
religion to the private sphere, the state requires them to leave behind an essential part of their 
identity the moment they engage in the public domain. This is not only a clear violation of 
religious freedom, but also subjects religious followers to unequal treatment.84 They are 
expected to compartmentalise their identities,85 while those who do not adhere to any religion 
need not separate their private and public lives in quite such a severe way.  
The danger in states that profess an absolute separation is that the state can be perceived to 
advocate secularism. The right to religion is not only a positive right, but also manifests as a 
negative right, allowing people to be free to choose not to be religious. Non-religious citizens 
and their decision not to be religious are thus given preference over those who are religious in 
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the country. Ultimately, religious followers are directly (the case of France comes to mind) 
and indirectly coerced into secularism. Just like the theocratic model, this model erodes the 
legitimacy of the state as many religious people feel alienated86 and unable to identify with an 
institution that so fundamentally denies the convictions they hold sacred.  
From the outset, it is quite clear that the South African Constitution never envisioned an 
absolute separation between the state and religion87 and the application of this model in the 
South African context would raise constitutional concerns. Prohibiting people from any form 
of religious practices in the public sphere will constitute an infringement of their right to 
religious freedom, equality and human dignity and will result in a denial of an integral part of 
the identity of the South African community.  Certain elements of the separation model is 
however present in the South African model of state-religion interaction. At least some 
degree of separation is envisioned by the Constitution, in the sense that the state cannot 
affiliate itself with a particular religion, but must attempt to treat all religions on an equitable 
basis and refrain from directly or indirectly coercing people towards a chosen religion.  
 
2 4 Accommodation and cooperation models 
The accommodation and cooperation models are also sometimes referred to as models of 
separation with considerable interaction88 between the state and religion. They will be 
considered together as they share many of the same features, but only a brief discussion of 
the general characteristics will be provided as their manifestation in the South African 
context will be addressed in more depth below.  The core of these models is that states 
accommodate religions, and cooperate and interrelate with them, without affording a 
particular religion preferential treatment.89 There is a great deal of overlap between the two 
models, but Durham90 distinguishes them on the basis that countries that follow the 
cooperationist model, allow for the state to provide direct financial subsidies to religion or 
religion education. In countries with an accommodation model, the state is not necessarily 
financially involved in the promotion of religion or religious education.91 
The accommodation model envisions a separation between the state and religion, but 
provides for a degree of endeavour by the state to accommodate those that are religious in the 
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public sphere.92 The state remains neutral towards religion, but accommodates persons that 
have specific requirements or needs associated with their religion93 in an effort to fully realise 
their right to religious freedom. In accommodation regimes the importance of national or 
local religious culture is appreciated, religious symbols in public settings are tolerated and 
exemptions like dietary needs or religious holidays are allowed.94 Germany95 and Botswana96 
are good examples of countries that have an accommodation model of state religion 
interaction. 
The cooperation model extends further than this, as no special status is granted to a 
specific church or religion,97 but there is an active and cooperative relationship between the 
state and religion. Interaction between the two domains is not limited to accommodating the 
needs of religious communities, but entails a working relationship between the state and 
religion.98 Although the state regards itself as religiously neutral, cooperationist countries 
often assist and aid larger denominations.99 This can take the form of funding for church-
related activities such as religious education or the payment of church officials.100  
The cooperation model can however present a few challenges in a constitutional 
democracy. Different religions have different needs and this can lead to an uneven dispersal 
of assistance.101 It is also easy for the state to fall into a pattern of preference in which the 
majority religion or the religion the state associates with most is afforded advantages over 
other religions.102 It is in light of these concerns, that authors like Durham,103 Farlam104 and 
Bilchitz and Williams105 prefer the accommodation model as the one most likely to give 
effect to the constitutional vision of freedom of religion. By not refraining from involvement 
with religion, the state can actively advance the religious identities of its citizens.106 This is 
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done on an equitable basis, where, unlike the separationist model in which the state refrains 
from any involvement in religion, the state now pursues a relationship with religions on equal 
terms.107  
What exactly constitutes equal terms or treatment is however unclear and poses the 
greatest challenge to states that adopt the accommodation model. Different religions have 
different needs (both financially and socially) and it can become very difficult for a state to 
disperse its resources in such a way that all religions feel they are being treated the same. As 
has already been mentioned, section 15(2) of the Constitution also make provision for the 
conducting of religious observances in state and state-aided institutions, so long as it is done 
on an “equitable basis.”  
The requirement of “equity” is thus also used within the South African context and giving 
content to it will form the cornerstone in determining how the state-religion relationship in 
South Africa should function. In order to determine the exact content of the accommodation 
model in South Africa, the Constitution, legislation and the judiciary’s approach to religious 
rights cases have to be analysed. The goal is to interpret and construct the historical and 
social context in which the Constitution exists, so as to determine the exact ambit of South 
Africa’s unique accommodation model.108 What follows is a historical overview of the 
relationship between the state and religion in the pre-constitutional era. 
 
3 State-religion relations in the pre-constitutional era 
3 1 Colonisation and religion in South Africa 
Determining the relationship between the state and religion in pre-constitutional South 
Africa presents a few difficulties. Not only was it an ever-changing relationship, but it was 
also considerably influenced by the tumultuous political climate that accompanied the 
colonial occupation of South Africa in 1652.109  Before the advent of colonial rule most 
people lived in accordance with indigenous religions and traditional customary law.110 The 
arrival of the Dutch East India Company in 1652 not only meant a radical transformation of 
the social, cultural and political situation of the indigenous people of South Africa, but also 
coincided with the arrival of Christianity.111 The traditional African religions were not left 
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untouched and the presence of Christian missionaries and the state’s paternalistic 
endorsement of a particular European Christian worldview, ensured that many African 
religious traditions were regarded as incompatible with Christianity and unacceptable in the 
eyes of the colonial state.112 A particular Christian conception of “the good” was imposed on 
the indigenous people of South Africa and consequently the relationship between the state 
and the church also became a reflection of the race relations in the country.113 
During the first 150 years of Dutch colonisation, there was considerable interaction 
between the state and the Dutch Reformed Church, with the Political Council and the 
Commander of the Cape exerting a great amount of power over the internal affairs of the 
Church.114 Pillay115 goes as far as to describe it as a “state church”, suggesting that South 
Africa showed signs of the theocratic model of state-religion interaction. The Dutch East 
Indian Company even prohibited the existence of any other religion in the Cape until 1778.116 
Pillay’s argument seems plausible considering the extent of interference of the state in 
religious matters. From 1652-1665 the Political Council, under the leadership of the 
Commander, was responsible for the religious and spiritual care of the people of the Cape.117 
In 1665, the Cape got its first permanent minister and church council, shifting the 
responsibility of spiritual care to the church.118 In reality, power over religious affairs still 
resided with the Political Council as all decisions made by the church council had to be 
submitted to the Political Council for consideration.119 Furthermore, the Political Council still 
elected elders and deacons in the church, while Political Commissioners represented the 
Political Council at all meetings of the church.120 The Political Council even played a role in 
the day-to-day running of the church, decided the time and place of worship, built new 
churches and decided whether heathen children could be baptised.121 This relationship 
continued all through the 1700s and in a sense the church was what Vorster122 describes as a 
mere “engine of the State,” always subordinate to the Political Council. 
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The British occupation of the Cape in 1795, and again in 1806, heralded the start of a more 
tolerant policy towards religion,123 although the relationship between the state and the church 
remained intertwined. Initially, it was guaranteed that no exceptional changes would be made 
to church-state relations and the practice of allowing the Political Commissioner a seat on the 
church council continued.124 Deacons and elders still had to be approved and the official 
functions of church ministers were completely controlled by the government.125 In 1843 
Ordinance 7 of 1843 was passed in an effort to make the church more free from government 
involvement with the goal of eventually separating the two domains.126 The church finally 
received the power to organise its own internal affairs, but the government still exerted 
financial control over the church as well as retaining the power to appoint the ministers to 
congregation.127 This Ordinance was only revoked on 21 October 1957, when the Dutch 
Reformed Church declared itself as an independent body free from government regulation.128 
Within the education system, developments in the early 1900s paved the way for the 
creation of a system of Christian nationalist education that would later form an integral part 
of the apartheid ideology. After the end of the South African War in 1902, there was a great 
urge for self-determination amongst the Afrikaans Christian community in South Africa.129 
Under British rule, education in state schools had a distinct Anglican nature and especially 
through Lord Milner’s government, the aim was to anglicise the children of the Afrikaner 
community. In response to this, private church-supported schools were established with a 
view to furthering Christian National Education. Once responsible governments were 
appointed in each of the colonies, these schools became integrated into the state education 
system.130  Under British imperialism, the Dutch Reformed Church had come under pressure 
from the largely Anglican government.  
The Dutch Reformed Church utilised the discontent with British colonial rule as the basis 
for restoring the church as an important player in the affairs of the country.131 The rise of 
Afrikaner Nationalism thus coincided with the revival of the Dutch Reformed Christian 
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theology and this established the basis for the alliance that existed between the state and the 
Dutch Reformed Church during apartheid. 
The dominant position of Christianity during the colonial era in South Africa also had an 
immense impact on the religious freedom of adherents of minority religions. Furthermore, the 
unequal treatment of the non-Christian religions also manifested in the unequal treatment of 
racial groups. Traditional African religions were regarded as degenerate, and were 
consequently subverted by the state. Age old practices like African dances, marriage 
ceremonies and actions of traditional worship were regarded as incompatible with 
Christianity and prohibited under colonial rule.132  
On an institutional level attempts were made by the government to strengthen the 
Christian faith amongst the traditional communities and the slaves that fell victim to the 
formal slave trade in the country. An ordinance that was passed in 1770 prohibited the buying 
or selling of slaves that had converted to Christianity. This was an attempt to encourage 
conversion amongst the traditional groups, but slave-owners tended to exclude their slaves 
from Christian conversion or baptism in order to retain property rights over them.133 The 
indigenous people of South Africa held a subordinate position in society and the 
discrimination they experienced was intensified by their religious convictions. 
It was not only traditional African religions that suffered under colonial rule, but adherents 
of religions like Islam and Buddhism were also treated unequally In 1856, the Muslim 
religious festival of Khalifa was banned as “dangerous to the law and the peace of the 
community”134 and permission to build a mosque in South Africa was only granted in the late 
1700s.135 Over time, the colonial courts were given permission to apply the customary law of 
the indigenous communities and give recognition to certain religious practices as far as they 
were not “repugnant to the general principles of humanity observed throughout the civilised 
world.”136 This rather widely phrased discretion meant that the courts could elect the laws 
they wished to apply with reference to their own conception of civility. Under this 
Proclamation customary marriages and lobola agreements were not recognised because 
polygamy and the paying of an amount of money to wed someone were regarded as 
unacceptable in a civilised society.137  
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It is thus clear the discrimination based on religion went hand in hand with discrimination 
based on race. This phenomenon came to head under the apartheid system where religion, 
and specifically the Dutch Reformed Church, was masterfully used to justify the policy of 
racial segregation that marked the apartheid era. 
 
3 2 Religion and the apartheid state 
In 1948 the National Party (NP) came into power and soon started to implement its policy 
of racial segregation and separate development. This marked the beginning of an era that 
would see widespread violence, discrimination and human rights abuses. It also signalled the 
beginning of an interesting and quite tumultuous time in the relationship between the state 
and religion. As already mentioned, there was no established church in South Africa138 during 
the apartheid era and to a large extent other religions were tolerated as long as they did not 
interfere with the policies of the state and did not pose a threat to the NP139 In practice, the 
relationship between the state and the different churches proved to be strained and marred by 
conflict. On the one hand the three Afrikaans churches,140 and more particularly the Dutch 
Reformed Church, provided the theological framework and justification for apartheid;141 
while on the other hand, missionaries concerned with the wellbeing of black people in South 
Africa, the traditional black churches142 and more liberal members of the traditional white 
churches,143 vehemently opposed the apartheid system.  
Internationally, churches and religious leaders condemned the South African government 
for its blatant disregard for human rights, joining the voices within the South African 
religious community that began to warn against the violent system of racial segregation 
imposed by the government.144 Opponents of the government, religious or not, were however 
not treated kindly and church leaders and members were regularly detained or banned 
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without a trial, denied passports or placed under house arrest.145 Missionaries known to be 
against the government policy were denied entry into the country, while church offices were 
raided by the Security Police and publications confiscated or banned.146 The apartheid regime 
justified their actions by arguing that they were not opposed to the church per se, but rather 
individual members using the guise of religion to further their anti-governmental objectives. 
Subtle forms of intimidation were also used by the state, with the government-controlled 
media often referring to certain churches as “leftists” or “supporters of terrorism,”147 using 
insinuations to damage the public’s perception of the church. 
The state also used legislation to interfere in the internal affairs of religious bodies.148 One 
of the most notorious examples is the so-called “church clause” which was section 9(7) of the 
Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 1957. This section conferred on the Minister of Co-
operation and Development the power to prohibit blacks from attending church services and 
functions in areas occupied by non-blacks.149 Universal outcry from all religious institutions, 
including the government supported Dutch Reformed Church, led to the section never being 
enacted,150 but it illustrated how far the government was willing to go to implement its policy 
of racial segregation. Furthermore, the repression of religions institutions was conducted 
under the guise of security legislation.151 Religious organisations could be declared unlawful 
and banned under the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 in terms of which the Minister of Law 
and Order could form an opinion on whether the organisation engaged in activities that 
endangered the security of the state or the maintenance of law and order.  
Other pieces of legislation were not necessarily aimed at religious organisations, but used 
Christianity as a way of justifying the rules imposed by the state, or abused legislation to 
impose the government’s unique brand of “the good” onto South Africans. Two such pieces 
of legislation were the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 and the Immorality 
Act 23 of 1957, which prohibited marriages and relationships between people of different 
races. By enacting these laws, the state ventured deep into the private sphere, effectively 
attempting to control the social dimension of its citizens’ lives. The fact that the decision was 
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theologically substantiated illustrated the extent to which Christianity and the state had 
become intertwined.152  
As has already been mentioned, a special relationship existed between the state and the 
Dutch Reformed Church which, to a large extent, justified and legitimised the apartheid 
regime. As was explained above, the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the Nationalist Party 
coincided with the revival of the Dutch Reformed Church, which at that stage had a distinct 
Afrikaner identity, resulting in the theology of the church being termed the “Afrikaner civil 
religion.”153 In 1960, following the Cottesloe deliberation between delegates from different 
churches in South Africa, as well as the World Council of Churches, the Dutch Reformed 
Church issued a statement in which it confirmed the government’s policy of differentiation 
and rejected any form of integration.154 It also viewed it as the task of the church to test the 
government against the principles of Scripture and to ensure that the state acted in accordance 
with the Christian conception of the “good.”155 
As the devastating realities of apartheid became more apparent and the state intensified its 
efforts to implement the policy of separate development, the relationship between the state 
and the Dutch Reformed Church started changing. Initially, the victims of apartheid and the 
more liberal churches in South Africa criticised the state’s theological justification for the 
system of white supremacy,156 alluding to the fact that apartheid contradicts much of what the 
Christian faith proclaims about the nature of the church and its role in attending to all people 
alike.157 Within the ranks of the Dutch Reformed Church, a great deal of introspection was 
done after the Cottesloe deliberations and in 1962 the General Synod was created in an 
attempt to re-evaluate the role of the church in the South African society.158 The first Church 
Order of the General Synod in 1962 proclaimed the church to be independent from the state, 
but it still considered itself to be under the general protection of the state.159 It almost seems 
as if the church attempted to strike a balance between its evangelical role as a Christian 
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institution and the preservation of the mutually beneficial relationship it enjoyed with the 
apartheid government. 
By the 1980s the church had however become much more critical of the government and 
the relationship between the two institutions was mostly maintained by the conservative wing 
of the church order. Publically, the church started to condemn the action of the apartheid 
regime and at the 1982 synod the Dutch Reformed Mission Church, which formed part of the 
Dutch Reformed Church, condemned the theological justification of apartheid as a heresy.160 
The document, Kerk en Samelewing, was adopted by the General Synod in 1986 in which the 
church rejected apartheid as a system that unfairly benefits one group over another and 
criticised attempts to justify apartheid with reference to Scripture.161  
Interestingly, the church also rejected racism stating that it strips people of their human 
dignity, duties and rights and justifies oppression and exploitation.162 The language employed 
in this part of the document illustrates the extent to which the church had at that point moved 
away from their initial relationship with the state. The Dutch Reformed Church realised that 
it could no longer be the handmaiden of the state.163 Within government structures, the winds 
of change were however also about and the escalating violence in the country, states of 
emergency and international pressure, were the final nails in the apartheid coffin.  
 
4 Religion and education before 1994 
The previous section dealt extensively with the relationship between the state and religion 
in South Africa before the promulgation of the Constitution.164 While it is quite evident that 
religion, and especially Christianity, had a profound impact on the functioning of the state, 
this interaction was particularly apparent within the realm of education. Before 1652 the 
indigenous tribes in South Africa practised an informal type of education.165  The advent of 
colonial rule in the Cape introduced a process of Christianisation, and although initial efforts 
at evangelising and educating the indigenous people were fragmented,166 the occupation of 
the Cape in 1795 by the British saw a surge in missionary activity.167 The Moravian Church 
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was the first Protestant mission society to evangelise and educate at the Cape in 1737, and by 
1799 several other mission societies had joined them.168 Missionaries believed Christianity to 
be superior to the “heathen” religions practiced by the indigenous people and regarded it as 
their duty to proselytise them towards Christianity.169  
Initially, the British government did not financially support the endeavours of the mission 
societies and it was only by 1841 that mission education became partially financed.170 This 
was mainly to ensure government control of the education provided to indigenous people171 
and resulted from the realisation that education could be utilised to ensure the establishment 
of British imperialism and culture.172 Schools were gradually Anglicised and by the mid-
nineteenth century173 the relationship between the government and missions schools had 
become one of mutual benefit, with the schools receiving much-needed financial support, 
while the government expanded its control of the indigenous people.  
Children who attended mission schools (often against their will) were subjected to a 
Western system of education that differed vastly from the education they had received in the 
indigenous communities.174 Their own religions were regarded as heathen while their 
education systems were negated, vilified and viewed as inferior to the education the 
government and the church could provide.175 In a sense mission schools served both a public 
and particular private interests. The missionaries regarded the creation of a Christian society 
as important for the public good, while the British government used the education system to 
achieve their private political goals and establish imperial rule.176  
By the late nineteenth century the government’s policy of racial segregation had filtered 
into the realm of mission education and these schools became part of an institutionalised 
policy of discrimination against black indigenous people.177 Perceptions of the intellectual 
inferiority of black people were common among the missionaries and the government alike, 
and a lack of resources in mission schools provided most black people with an inferior 
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education178 or no education at all.179 By 1910 almost all schools for indigenous people were 
run by missionaries180 - a situation that was only addressed after the NP came to power in 
1948.  From the inception of colonial rule, black people in South Africa had thus been 
subjected to a system of education that was inseparably entwined with Christianity. While the 
missionaries initially saw it as their duty to educate the indigenous people in accordance with 
Christianity, mission education later became a powerful mechanism for social and racial 
segregation. 
Parallel to the establishment of the British system of mission education, another system 
was developing in South Africa that would eventually prove to be one of the corner stones of 
the apartheid regime. Influenced by the Calvinist doctrine of the Dutch Reformed Church, 
and in reaction to the Anglicisation of schools by the British colonial government, the early 
Dutch settlers established schools to reflect their own religious convictions and cultural 
practices.181 Education in these schools was influenced by the Christian values of the Dutch 
Reformed Church and unlike the mission schools they managed, for the most part, to remain 
exempt from government control.  
By the 1800s these schools were still in the complete control of parents and the church.182 
Over time, these Dutch descendants started to form their own cultural identity and the South 
African War (Anglo-Boer War) between the British and the Afrikaners (1899-1902) was in 
many ways a reflection of the disconnect that existed between the colonial government and 
the descendants of the previous colonisers.183 This led the way for the establishment of the 
first schools based on the policy of Christian National Education (CNE)184 – a step that 
reflected the growing nationalist ideology that was developing among the Afrikaner 
community.  
By the beginning of the 1900s the South African education system was a tapestry of 
different institutions, each reflecting a particular religious and political ideology. In an 
attempt to create a measure of unity, all education (with the exception of higher education 
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that was in the hands of the Union Parliament)185 was handed over to provincial 
administration on 31 May 1910.186 Practically, however, the missionaries still administrated 
the education of black pupils,187 while the schools for Afrikaans speaking children continued 
to be controlled by parents and the Dutch Reformed Church. The years following the 
unionisation of South Africa saw the gradual political rise of the Afrikaner community and 
the expansion of its policy of Christian nationalism. This, just like the arrival of the first 
European settlers, would again have a dramatic impact on the relationship between religion 
and education in South Africa. The election of the NP in 1948 saw the government organising 
the education system to reflect the entwined model of state-religion interaction that prevailed 
during the apartheid years. 
In 1939, at a conference held by the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereninge (FAK), 
the Institute of Christian-National Education (ICNE) was formed in an attempt to further the 
ideals of Christian National education. Under the guidance of the ICNE, the Christian 
National Education policy was published in 1948 and on 17 November 1948, the congress of 
the NP adopted a resolution that the country’s education policy should conform to the ICNE’s 
version of CNE.188 The CNE policy was based on two central features, the first being that all 
education must be based on the Christian faith and secondly that humanity was divided into 
nations and that education should reflect the differences between them.189 Section 2 of the 
policy stated that “religion should determine the spirit and direction of all other subjects” and 
“all instruction shall be founded on the Christian basis of life and world-view of our nation.” 
Allowance was made in the curriculum for religion education (where students were taught 
about different religions), but religion was not limited to a particular subject and the idea was 
that the entire education system must be influenced by and reflect the ideals of the Christian 
faith.190 Even religion education had to be presented with a certain Christian 
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authoritarianism,191 drawing on the notion that the followers of Christianity were somehow 
morally superior to those that adhere to “heathen” religions.  
The model of Christianity propagated by the government was based on a very specific 
interpretation of Calvinism that accommodated the government’s policy of racial 
segregation,192 and in 1949193 the Eiselen Commission194 was established to look into black 
education.195 The Eiselen Commission’s recommendations196 formed the basis for the 
promulgation of the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 (“Bantu Act”).197 In terms of the Bantu 
Act, education for black pupils had to be handed over to the Department of Bantu 
Education198 that would replace the missionaries in the running of their schools. Provision 
was also made for schools to stay under missionary control, but they would forthwith have to 
do without any government subsidies.199 Most of the missionary schools relied very heavily 
on the funding they received from government and the Bantu Act left them unable to function 
without forfeiting control.  
The aim of the Act was essentially to align black education with the apartheid ideology200 
as the missionaries were perceived as unable to root black people within their own “tribal 
community.”201 One of the ways in which this was to be achieved was by implementing CNE 
in the sphere of black education.202 This meant black education, that had previous been 
dominated by missionaries, would forthwith be under direct state control and strictly 
segregated in line with the values of Afrikaner Nationalism.203 The National Education Policy 
Act 39 of 1967 made provision for education based on the principles of CNE to be conducted 
in the primary and secondary schools of white children.204 Similarly, education in black and 
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coloured schools had to have a Christian character.205 The Coloured People’s Education Act 
47 of 1963 extended CNE to coloured schools,206 while the Indian Education Act 61 of 1965 
made provision for CNE in Indian schools.  
Interestingly, the 1948 CNE policy contained no reference to the Indian community or the 
education of Indian children and even when the CNE curricula was extended to Indian 
education, special provision was made for the teaching of a subject called “Right Living”.207 
This was an attempt to accommodate the special religious needs of the Indian community and 
Right Living focussed on universal values of morality rather than impose a distinctly 
Christian conception of the good. CNE was a mono-religious, confessional policy that had a 
devastating impact on the right to religious freedom. This was especially true for the learners, 
parents and teachers who were forced to learn and teach in accordance with a religious 
ideology they supported neither politically nor religiously.  
The superior position enjoyed by Christianity inevitably coincided with the large scale 
marginalisation of other religions and those individuals who adhered to no religion at all. 
Even within the Christian faith, adherents who held viewpoints that differed from the very 
strict Calvinist model of CNE were ostracised and vilified as opponents of the government 
and the church. Indirectly, the religious marginalisation experienced by religions that 
deviated from the norm also became a manifestation of racial discrimination, social exclusion 
and political disempowerment.208 CNE imparted the religious convictions of a small white 
minority on the majority of the white, black, coloured and Indian people of South Africa and 
in the process negated their rights to religious freedom, human dignity and equality.  
Initial opposition to the Bantu Act was especially rife among non-student organisations 
outside educational institutions209 with parents, teachers and pupils playing a somewhat 
marginal role in the fight against the CNE policy. By the 1960s it seemed as if opposition to 
CNE had subdued,210 primarily as a result of the banning of prominent political organisations 
like the African National Congress (ANC) that drove the opposition movement in the 
1950s.211 However, increasing unemployment, a reduction in living standards and the 
deteriorating condition of Black education as a result of inadequate funding, led to an 
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upheaval of organised political action from 1969 onwards.212 Unlike the protests of the 
1950s, the 1970s saw learners themselves actively engage in the anti-apartheid struggle. 
Parents, teachers and communities affected by the racist education system were mobilised in 
an attempt to dismantle Bantu education and the racist ideology that informed the policy.213 
Opposition reached a historical climax when a mass protest of around 6000 school 
children in Soweto against the imposition of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of education 
in black schools, erupted in a violent confrontation with the police.214 The Soweto uprising of 
16 June 1976215 triggered riots and violent unrest that gradually spread throughout the 
country.216 In many ways Soweto became a symbolic catalyst for the fight against the entire 
apartheid regime. In the aftermath of the Soweto uprising, the government abandoned its 
policy of compulsory Afrikaans instruction217 and renamed the Department of Bantu 
Education to the more socially and politically acceptable Department of Education and 
Training.218 The policy with respect to religious instruction in schools had however remained 
unchanged. 
As the 1970s grew to a close, the situation in black education was more tumultuous than 
ever as learners continued to protest for equal education across all sectors of society.219 In an 
attempt to curb the insistent violent protesting by learners, the government made education 
compulsory at the beginning of 1981.220 This step was not met with the anticipated 
enthusiasm as the general consensus was that the acceptance of compulsory education would 
be tantamount to the acceptance of inferior education.221 Consequently, the decision had quite 
the opposite effect, with learners, parents and teachers rather intensifying their opposition to 
the education policy. The imposition of mandatory education also did not coincide with a 
system of free education. Unable to afford the tuition the government levied on black 
education, many parents and children were inadvertently left in contravention of the law.  
By the mid-1980s black education in South Africa was in crisis as learners continued to 
rebel and schools became both the battleground and the weapon of a youth movement that 
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rallied under the slogan “Liberation first, Education later”.222 The government responded by 
closing educational institutions, arresting learners and dismissing teachers.223 Amendments to 
the Education Affairs Act in June 1988 made it an offence for teachers to question, criticise 
or act against a law or state department.224 These authoritarian measures led to the large scale 
occupation of schools and the intimidation of learners who were not involved in the struggle 
and teachers who refused to boycott the education system.225 School property was also 
vandalised on a large scale, contributing to poor infrastructure and leaving many schools 
unable to provide even the most basic education to the remaining learners. A culture of 
anarchy and violent resistance ensued, devastating the educational prospects of most children 
who were either directly involved in the liberation movement, or simply bystanders of the 
call for transformation that was resonating throughout South Africa.  
By the end of the 1980s the political situation in South Africa had become untenable. 
Secret meetings between some of the imprisoned ANC leaders and the NP government 
started in July 1984 already,226 as the government realised it could no longer control the 
perpetual violence or handle the political pressure from both within the country and 
internationally. On 5 July 1989, then President PW Botha and imprisoned ANC leader, 
Nelson Mandela, met face to face in an effort to negotiate a settlement for the ANC’s 
political demands. On 2 February 1990, President FW de Klerk announced the unbanning of 
all political organisations. The way was paved for the development of a democratic South 
Africa, and more importantly, the formulation of a Constitution that would ensure that the 
atrocities of the past would never be repeated. As a result of the problematic relationship that 
existed between the state and the church under apartheid, the formulation of a section dealing 
with religion was one of the difficult challenges facing constitutional drafters. 
 
5 Freedom of religion under the Constitution 
5 1 Drafting the Constitution 
One of the main reasons why the apartheid government could maintain the apartheid 
system for so long was the absence of a supreme constitution that could counter the abuses of 
Parliament. The Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) commenced on 20 
December 1991, consisting of representatives of political parties, liberation movements, the 
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NP and governments of the former homelands.227 The aim of CODESA was to negotiate the 
process of democratisation in South Africa and, importantly, to formulate constitutional 
principles that would form the basis for the drafting of a final constitution.228 The CODESA 
negotiations broke down in mid-1992 as a result of a stalemate over the constitution-making 
process.  
The ANC wanted the constitution to be drafted by a democratically elected body, while 
the NP, who knew they would lose a democratic election, wanted to negotiate over the 
content of the constitution.229 A proposal by Joe Slovo, the leader of the South African 
Communist Party, that executive power-sharing for an agreed number of years after the 
adoption of a democratic constitution, should be compulsory, finally broke the stalemate.230 
The Multi-Party Negotiation Process was a follow-up to CODESA, and was tasked with 
formulating an Interim Constitution that would provide for the first democratic elections in 
South Africa. The Interim Constitution came into power on 27 April 1994 and marked the 
end of parliamentary supremacy.231 
The new Parliament elected under the Interim Constitution had the dual role of acting as 
both the legislature and the Constitutional Assembly, mandated to formulate the Final 
Constitution. During the Multi-Party Negotiation Process, 34 constitutional principles were 
agreed upon by the parties and these principles had to inform the Final Constitution. The final 
draft of the Constitution then had to be presented to the newly established Constitutional 
Court for certification after which the Final Constitution would come into power. The 
Constitutional Court, in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996232 rejected the first draft 
for not adhering to the 34 constitutional principles. After adapting the text in accordance with 
the judgment, the Constitutional Court certified the Final Constitution on 8 May 1996.233  
On the education front things were also changing. As discriminatory laws were abolished, 
schools that were formerly reserved for white learners became inclusive institutions 
accessible to children of all races. Although education reform was probably one of the most 
pressing challenges facing the democratic process, very little attention was afforded to 
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education during CODESA and the subsequent Multi-party Negotiation Process.234 This was 
mainly due to the existence of more pressing political concerns, and it would eventually fall 
on the new political dispensation to map the way for a democratic education system.235 
Provision was however made in the Interim and the Final Constitution for certain rights 
pertaining to education and it was realised that dramatic reform was needed to ensure the 
eradication of the apartheid policy of racially separate education.  
Every South African was afforded the right to basic education236 which included, where 
reasonably practicable, the right to receive education in the language of their choice. This was 
a direct response to the arbitrary language policies of the apartheid government and a way of 
ensuring that all children, regardless of race, colour or language, would be afforded equal 
educational opportunities. The apartheid government’s policy of CNE was also earmarked to 
transform. The Bill of Rights of both the Interim and the Final Constitution contain 
provisions relating to freedom of religion. This not only redefined the relationship between 
the state and religion, but also had a profound impact on the way in which religion had to be 
dealt with in the education system. 
 
5 2 The Interim Constitution and religion 
The Bill of Rights of the Interim Constitution was drafted between May and November 
1993 by a Technical Committee appointed by the Multi-Party Negotiation Process.237 Various 
international documents and foreign bills of rights were presented to the committee, amongst 
them, a proposed freedom of religion clause that was submitted by the South African Chapter 
of the World Conference on Religion and Peace.238 Section 14(1) of the Interim Constitution 
was to a large extent a reflection of the first subclause of their proposal, although the 
committee understood the need to add religious communities’ systems of religious law and 
make provision for legislation to be enacted that would allow for the recognition of these 
systems.239 
Substantially, the wording of section 15 of the Final Constitution is almost identical to that 
of the Interim Constitution, with the exception that the reference to “academic freedom” in 
section 14(1) now forms part of the right to freedom of expression in the Final Constitution, 
while section 15(3) of the Final Constitution also recognises marriages concluded under 
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systems of personal or family law.240 It is also evident that from the outset, there was never 
an intention to erect a wall of separation between the state and the church in democratic 
South Africa. In the Interim Constitution provision was already made for the right to conduct 
religious observances in state and state-aided institutions, and this formulation was carried 
through to section 15(2) of the Final Constitution. 
 
5 3 Freedom of religion under the Final Constitution and the state-religion relationship 
The Final Constitution, like its predecessor, is silent on the relationship that should exist 
between the state and religion in a democratic South Africa. There is no establishment clause 
creating a strict separation between the two domains,241 and the consensus amongst courts242 
and academics is that it was never the intention of the constitutional drafters to prohibit 
interaction between the state and religion. On closer inspection of the sections dealing with 
religion, it is quite clear that the Constitution created a framework for accommodating rather 
than suppressing religion and religious differences. Section 15(1) of the Constitution 
guarantees that “[E]veryone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief 
and opinion.”  
Section 15(2) in turn allows for religious observances to be conducted at state or state-
aided institutions, subject to three restrictions: they must “follow rules made by the 
appropriate public authorities”, they must “be conducted on an equitable basis”, and 
attendance must be “free and voluntary”. Section 15(3) also allows for legislative recognition 
of marriages conducted in terms of religious law. Direct or indirect discrimination based on 
religious grounds is prohibited in section 9 of the Constitution, and everyone is guaranteed 
equal protection and treatment under the law. Section 31 extends even further, affording 
members of religious communities the right to practise their religion and form, join and 
maintain religious organs of civil society. Underlying the right to religious freedom are the 
interrelated values of freedom, equality and human dignity, which play an equally important 
role in establishing the parameters of the state-religion relationship in South Africa.243 
The inclusion of a provision on religious observances at state and state-aided institutions 
created a framework for the continued presence of religion in education. This is an interesting 
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addition as it initially seemed as if the framers of the Constitution wanted to abolish religion 
from the education system completely. From 1990 onwards there was much discussion about 
how the democratic education system might deal with the question of religion in education.244 
Supporters of CNE wanted Christianity to be the only religion taught in schools, while others 
wanted religion to be completely removed from the education system.245 In 1992, the 
National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) that was commissioned by the National 
Education Crisis Committee (NECC)246 insisted that Christian religious instruction in 
accordance with CNE had to be abandoned.247 NEPI had three options: to eliminate any form 
of religious instruction in the school curriculum; to allow different religious groups to 
develop parallel programmes in religious instruction; or to introduce a programme of multi-
religious education which would promote teaching and learning about religion as opposed to 
the teaching of religion.248  
From the draft National Curriculum Framework for General and Future Education and 
Training that was issued by the Department of Education in 1996, it seemed that the new 
democratic government had opted for the first choice, namely omitting religion altogether. 
This was mostly based on the presumption that a secular education system made no 
allowance for religion,249 and in light of the relationship between education and religion in 
the past, caution in this regard was understandable. However, the framers of the Constitution 
created a very interesting paradox. Not only does the Constitution recognise the right to 
religious freedom, but it also allows for religious observances to be conducted in state and 
state-aided institutions.250  
With the promulgation of the Schools Act in 1996, section 15(2) of the Constitution was 
reflected almost verbatim in section 7 of the Act, leaving the right to decide the religious 
policy of a school in the hands of the governing body. Discrepancies thus exist between 
initial policy decisions made in the run-up to the adoption of the final Constitution, and the 
legislative and constitutional framework that governs religion in education today. Although it 
is clear that religious instruction comparable to CNE will sit extremely uncomfortably 
alongside the right to religious freedom in the Constitution, the nature and extent of the 
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interchange between religion and education in a democratic South Africa is not altogether 
clear and will be fleshed out more in coming chapters. As a point of departure, this 
relationship should, however, reflect the overarching accommodation model of state-religion 
interaction that is envisioned by the Constitution. 
In order to determine how this relationship has developed since the promulgation of the 
Constitution, reference can be made to the Constitution itself, judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution and legislation dealing with religious freedom. It is firstly important to note that 
section 7(2) of the Bill of Rights obliges the state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.” This is not only a negative duty in the sense that the state must 
refrain from infringing on the rights of its citizens, but it also has a positive dimension in that 
the state must actively promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.251 How this 
obligation should function in the context of religious rights is not completely clear, but it does 
imply a certain degree of interaction between the state and religion, which means that the 
state must respect and accommodate the full ambit of religious diversity in the country. Case 
law relating to section 15(1) also provides insight to the judiciary’s interpretation of the 
appropriate model of state-religion interaction. Chaskalson P (Langa DP, Ackermann J, and 
Kriegler J concurring) in Lawrence252 explains section 15(1) of the Constitution as follows: 
 
“The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a 
person choose, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, 
and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.”  
 
The “right to declare religious beliefs openly” and the “right to manifest religious beliefs 
by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination” clearly suggest an intention that 
religion should not be reserved for the private sphere, but can and must become part of the 
public domain. The presence of religion in the public sphere was also recognised by Sachs J 
in Fourie, a judgment which resulted in the legalisation of same-sex marriages. He stated 
that: 
 
“religious bodies play a large and important part in public life, through schools, hospitals and poverty 
relief programmes… They are part of the fabric of public life, and constitute active elements of the 
diverse and pluralist nation contemplated by the Constitution. Religion is not just a question of belief or 
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doctrine. It is part of a people’s temper and culture and for many believers a significant part of their 
way of life.”253 
 
From these two examples it is clear that the Constitutional Court has interpreted the right 
to religious freedom to extend to the public domain, rejecting the idea that there should be no 
interaction between the state and religion. As has already been mentioned, section 15(2) of 
the Constitution provides specifically for the conduct of religious observances in state and 
state-aided institutions. In terms of this section, individuals are allowed to express their 
religious identities positively within the public sphere, but such observances will only be 
accommodated if they are practised in a way that adheres to the internal restrictions imposed 
by the Constitution. This section rules out both a strict separation model and a theocratic state 
in which other religions are subordinate to the state religion.254 Section 15(3) also makes 
provision for the recognition of systems of religious, personal and family law, suggesting that 
the private convictions of people living in accordance with a particular religion can be 
incorporated into the public sphere by way of legal recognition.  
Du Plessis255 and Bilchitz and Williams256 argue that the Constitution envisioned an 
accommodation model where the state and religious communities work together to ensure 
that everyone is afforded the right to practise their religion without infringing on the rights of 
others. The values of equality, human dignity and freedom support this understanding. This 
means that the state must treat all religions equally. The favouring of one religious word-view 
over another257 is prohibited as it results in indirect coercion towards the favoured religion258 
and a nation that is divided into “insiders who belong, and outsiders who are tolerated.”259 
Similarly, the value of human dignity must inform the right to religious freedom.  
Bilchitz and Williams260 argue, with reference to the Constitutional Court’s judgment in 
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs261 and the connection the case draws between dignity and 
family life, that religion is a central aspect of life and has a personal significance for 
individuals. This was unequivocally accepted by Sachs J in Christian Education262 when he 
stated that for many believers, their religious convictions are central to all their activities, 
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awakening “concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human 
rights.” Accepting the religious identity of others is consequently a way of respecting and 
affirming their human dignity. It means that diversity is not simply tolerated, but is celebrated 
as part of a democratic society.263 
Bilchitz & Williams264 provide perhaps the best interpretation of the model of state-
religion interaction that must exist under the final Constitution. Criticising the term 
“accommodation” for implying a purely passive tolerance of religious freedom, they suggest 
a model of “positive recognition” which is rooted in equality, human dignity and freedom. In 
my opinion, the term “accommodation” is broad enough to encapsulate the elements of the 
“positive recognition model.” They however identify key elements of the model that can aid 
in interpreting section 15(2) and the question of the constitutionality of religious observances 
in public schools. Firstly, the model is rooted in the idea of the equal worth of individuals, 
regardless of their differences.265 Secondly, individuals must be protected from coercion by 
the state that could possibly violate beliefs that are of significant importance to them.266  
Thirdly, the model places an obligation on the state to create enabling conditions for the 
positive expression of identity.267 The state is not necessarily required to construct religious 
structures for religious communities, but must create an environment in which people can do 
so for themselves.268 Fourthly, the state should not impose a separation between itself and 
religion, but must allow for religion to enter the public domain as long as it is done on an 
equitable basis and the rights of all religious followers are respected.269 Fifthly, the model 
requires the state to adopt an even-handed approach between religions.270 Sixthly, equal 
positive recognition must be afforded to all identities, and accommodation, advantages and 
exemptions may be conferred on some groups as long as it is fair and not to the disadvantage 
of others.271 Finally, neutrality in terms of this model is understood as equal recognition of all 
religions by the state and not a complete withdrawal of religion from the public sphere.272  
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6 Conclusion 
The model of state-religion interaction that is envisioned by the Constitution aims to 
balance the rights to religious freedom, equality and human dignity in a way that is a far cry 
from the relationship that existed between the state and religion during South Africa’s 
colonial- and apartheid past. The history of religion and education in South Africa is marked 
by suppression, overt coercion and racial segregation. Unlike CNE, the accommodation 
model recognises the importance of religion to individuals and communities and attempts to 
foster acceptance and celebration of religious differences. Section 15 of the Constitution 
creates a framework for state-religion interaction that ensures that all people are treated with 
dignity and respect, irrespective of the religious convictions they hold. It is against this 
framework that religious observances in public schools must be analysed and understood.  
The Constitution does not prohibit religion in public schools, but does regulate the way in 
which it may be observed. This ensures that religion cannot be used to further the political 
goals of the ruling elite, but rather requires equity and voluntariness in the conduct of 
religious observances. The exact meaning of these requirements will be discussed in later 
chapters,273 but it is important to note that the meaning afforded to them, must always be 
reflective of the accommodation model of state-religion interaction.  It is also submitted that 
any interpretation of religious freedom in the context of education, must be informed by the 
history of racial discrimination, social exclusion and political disempowerment274 that 
characterised religion and education during the colonial- and apartheid eras. The aim should 
always be to steer away from an interpretation that would create a similarly racist, unequal 
and inhumane dispensation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 
1 Introduction 
Religious observances in South African public schools are regulated within a very 
particular constitutional-, legislative- and policy framework. As has already been mentioned, 
the Constitution stands at the centre of the inquiry into religious observances as it provides 
for freedom of religion1 and the performance of religious observances in state- and state-
aided institutions.2 Much of the inquiry into the constitutionality of religious observances in 
public schools will be determined by the way in which section 15(1), and especially section 
15(2), is interpreted. These provisions should, however, not be viewed in isolation as they are 
supported and enhanced by inter-related provisions in the Bill of Rights. These include the 
right to equality, human dignity, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
association, the right to form part of a religious community, the best interest of the child and 
the general limitation clause. 
Apart from the Constitution, the Schools Act makes specific provision for school 
governing bodies to make rules relating to religious observances. A further important 
instrument is the National Policy on Religion and Education which was published in 2003 
with the express purpose of regulating the manner in which religious observances are 
conducted at public schools. Furthermore, there are a number of international law instruments 
that relate to the right to religious freedom and religious observances. South African courts 
are obliged to consider these instruments when interpreting the Bill of Rights3 and the 
interpretation of these documents may aid the courts in establishing the parameters of 
religious observances in South African schools. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the constitutional, legislative and policy 
framework that regulates religious observances. Firstly, the constitutional provisions relating 
to religious observances will be analysed and the nature and scope of the right to religious 
freedom, as well as all the relevant supporting rights, will be considered. The aim is to 
establish the role of the supporting rights in religious observances and the manner in which 
these rights overlap with section 15 of the Constitution. Thirdly, the Schools Act will be 
discussed, after which the focus will fall on the National Policy on Religion and Education 
and its impact on religious observances in schools. Relevant international law documents will 
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also be analysed to determine the role of these instruments in interpreting the right to conduct 
religious observances. Although section 15(2) will form the primary focus of this study, it 
does not exist in isolation and must be informed and influenced by the larger legal context in 
which it is situated. The aim of this chapter is to determine all the rights, legislation and 
policies that interplay when religious observances are conducted within a school setting.  
 
2 The Constitutional Framework 
The Constitution is regarded as a symbolic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society and a future founded on the recognition of human rights and reconciliation between 
all South Africans.4 It is also meant to transform the legal system from a system based on 
parliamentary sovereignty to one governed by constitutional supremacy. Section 2 of the 
Constitution states that “[t]he Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic [and] law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid”. When considering the legal and policy framework 
governing religious observances in South Africa, it is thus imperative to consider the 
Constitution first. 
 
2 1 The right to religious freedom  
As has already been mentioned, section 15 of the Constitution governs religious freedom 
in South Africa and states inter alia:  
 
“(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. 
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that 
a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public 
authorities; 
b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and 
c) attendance at them is free and voluntary 
(3)(a) This section does not prevent legislation –  
i)   marriages concluded under any traditional, or a system of religions, 
       personal or family law; or 
ii)  systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by 
       persons professing a particular religion.    
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this 
     section and other provisions of the Constitution.” 
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 Section 15(1) has a rather broad scope, protecting not only religion, but also the freedom 
of conscience, belief and opinion. Currie and De Waal5 argue that the inclusion of these 
rights makes a debate about the meaning of “religion” unnecessary as nothing in the realm of 
liberty of conviction is left unprotected.6 “Conscience” is usually interpreted to include 
systems of belief, or a set of personal moral beliefs, that are not centred on a deity and not 
classified as religious.7 Agnosticism and atheism, for example, will be protected under 
“belief” and “conscience”.8 The presence of a right to freedom of “opinion” in a clause 
centred on the protection of convictions is without precedent in international and foreign 
jurisprudence.9 Farlam,10 however, argues that a set of deeply held opinions can form a 
comprehensive view of the good life that is comparable to conventional religious faiths. 
“Thought” refers to the application of human reason and, together with opinion, conscience 
and belief, introduces a notably secular element into section 15(1).11  
Du Plessis12 observes that the inclusion of freedom of “conscience,” “thought” and 
“belief” amplifies the protection of religious freedom by extending the right to related 
spheres of protection. This rather extended formulation of religious freedom and the inclusion 
of secular rights denotes both a positive and a negative element to religious freedom. The 
bearers of the right may choose to adhere to a religion or denomination – the positive right – 
or not to believe in any religion – the negative right.13 The right to religious freedom may be 
manifested individually, collectively or institutionally.14 The individual may practise and 
observe his religion completely on his own or as part of a religious community where the 
right is exercised collectively with other believers.15 Furthermore, religious freedom includes 
the right to establish religious associations like a church or a missionary organisation, 
affording the right an institutional dimension.16  
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Religious freedom also consists of an internal and an external element.17 The internal 
element is centred on the individual’s “spiritual integrity” which is found in the conscience of 
the individual,18 and section 15 protects this internal belief system. However, religious beliefs 
also manifest externally in the form of religious convictions, practices and observances.19 
These expressions of the internal beliefs of the individual are also protected under section 
15(1), and even more so under section 15(2) of the Constitution. This coincides with the 
interpretation the Constitutional Court has attached to religious freedom when Chaskalson P 
in Lawrence explained the essence of the right as: 
 
“[…] the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare 
religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest 
religious beliefs by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.”20 
 
Freedom of religion thus includes the right to have a belief, to express that belief publicly 
and to manifest such belief by worship and practice, teaching and dissemination.21 It also 
prohibits coercion or constraint that might force people to act or refrain from acting in a 
manner contrary to their religious beliefs.22 Van der Schyff23 analyses the right even further, 
arguing that religious freedom is composed of five distinct, yet related, freedoms. These are 
the freedom of religious autonomy, choice, observance, teaching and the right to propagate a 
religion.24 The right to religious autonomy includes the right to state non-identification which 
prohibits the state from aligning itself with a particular religion. Autonomy further implies 
the right of individuals to regulate their own affairs,25 which means that the bearers of the 
right may establish, constitute and maintain their own religious bodies and organisations.26 
They are also allowed to regulate their own doctrine27 and set guidelines for the admission of 
members to their religious organisations.28  
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Secondly, the freedom of religious choice protects the right of an individual to adhere to a 
particular religion,29 as well as the right to religious non-adherence and religious objection.30 
Thirdly, the right to religious freedom includes the right to freedom of religious observance.31 
This component protects the acts motivated by and associated with religion like the right to 
worship and observe religious rites.32 Furthermore, the right to observe religious days of rest 
and holy days is also part of the right to religious freedom as the celebration of these religious 
days often constitutes a central component of individuals’ ability to practise their religion.33 
Although the right to religious observance is a component of religious freedom, it is also 
afforded special protection in section 15(2) of the Constitution. 
As has already been mentioned, section 15(2) limits religious observances in state and 
state-aided institutions to observances that are free and voluntary and conducted on an 
equitable basis.34 It is however important to note that although the right to religious 
observances is part of the right to religious freedom, it is limited when practised in state and 
state-aided institutions. The fourth freedom is the freedom of religious training and 
upbringing.35 This encapsulates the training and teaching of individuals by religious 
organisations such as churches, as well as the rights of parents to ensure and design the 
upbringing of their children in conformity with their religious convictions.36 Parents are thus 
allowed to create a home environment that is conducive to religion and may even enrol their 
children at religiously minded schools or choose to have their children exempt from religious 
activities that are incompatible with their religious views.37 Arguably, this right also includes 
the right of parents and children to refrain from religious training and upbringing altogether. 
Parents thus have the right to refrain from instructing their children in religion, and to give 
them a secular education and upbringing. 
One of the arguments in support of religious observances in public schools is that these 
observances are a manifestation of parents’ and learners’ right to a religious upbringing. On a 
broad interpretation of section 15(1) it would be possible to argue that public schools can aid 
religious parents in ensuring that their children receive a religious upbringing. This may for 
example be done through the honouring of religious holy days or the conducting of religious 
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observances. Within the public school setting, any religious observances must however be 
conducted in accordance with section 7 of the Schools Act, read with section 15(2) of the 
Constitution. Consequently, the wish of parents to have their children exposed to religion as 
part of their formal education, may not override the specific provisions of voluntariness and 
equity. It may also not infringe on the rights of non-adhering parents to exempt their children 
from a religious education. In this instance the right to religious freedom is a double edged 
sword that can both advance the religious activities of religious adherents and similarly 
protect the rights of non-adhering parents and learners.  
Lastly, religious freedom also protects the freedom to propagate a religion or 
denomination with the aim to convert people to that religion.38 The propagation of religion is 
considered an important part of many religions and is aimed at attracting people to a 
particular faith in the hope that they will convert to that religion. Consequently, bearers of the 
right to religious freedom are entitled to spread information about their religion and express 
and display their religious convictions publically. The right to spread information about 
religion is also extended to non-believers. The right to religious freedom thus allows religious 
non-adherents to promote their secular views of the world and criticise the nature and content 
of religions.  This component of religious freedom is very closely related to freedom of 
expression which will be discussed below.39  
Learners, parents and teachers often cite the right to propagate a religion as entitling them 
to conduct religious observances in public schools. It is argued that the proselytising of non-
believers forms an important part of many religions and may be achieved by conducting 
religious observances that will expose non-believers to religious practices and inform them of 
the nature and the content of a particular religion. This argument may, however, not be used 
to circumvent the specific provisions of section 7 of the Schools Act, read with section 15(2) 
of the Constitution. The right to propagate a religion as an element of religious freedom does 
not imply that religious observances may be conducted in state or state-aided institutions in 
contravention of the requirements of free and voluntary and equitable basis in 7 and section 
15(2). Section 15(1) and section 15(2) must be read in harmony and not as conflicting 
provisions. The right to propagate a religion by way of religious observances is thus limited 
by section 15(2) of the Constitution and section 7 of the Schools Act. 
Lawrence was the first case on the right to religious freedom to be heard by the 
Constitutional Court and dealt with certain provisions of the Liquor Act 27 of 1989 that 
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prohibited the sale of alcohol on Sundays. In terms of the Liquor Act,40 Sundays, Good 
Friday and Christmas Day were regarded as “closed days”. The wine licence of a grocer did 
not permit the sale of alcohol on these days. The closed days identified in the Liquor Act 
coincided with the Christian holy days and in this case a holder of a grocer’s licence argued 
that these provisions contravened the right to economic activity in section 26 of the Interim 
Constitution and the right to religious freedom in section 14(1) of the Interim Constitution.41 
As has already been mentioned in Chapter 2, a majority of the judges in Lawrence found that 
section 14 did not include an establishment clause and that the South African Constitution did 
not envision an absolute separation between the state and religion.  
Chaskalson P held that the definition of “closed days” in the Liquor Act did not constitute 
an infringement of the right to religious freedom. He stated that while he had no difficulty in 
finding that a law compelling observance of the Christian Sabbath offends the religious 
freedom of non-Christians,42 the Liquor Act was not such a law. He found that Sundays have 
both a religious and a secular character in South Africa.43 The purpose of the provision was to 
reduce the consumption of alcohol on certain days and Sunday was a logical choice as it has 
become a universal day of rest. There was no evidence that the Liquor Act interfered with the 
freedom of religion or served any religious purpose.44 Furthermore, the provisions did not 
compel sabbatical observances and did not promote any particular religion.45 Grocers were 
still allowed to conduct any other business on Sundays and no-one was forced to act or to 
refrain from acting in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs.46  
O’Regan J (Goldstone J and Madala J concurring) in her separate judgement found that 
the definition of “closed days” clearly favoured Christianity over all other religions.47 
According to her, a law infringes the right to freedom of religion if it does not treat all 
religions fairly and in an even-handed manner.48 She found that the choice of closed days was 
premised on their significance to the Christian faith and that the purpose of the selection was 
not secular, resulting in the state endorsement of Christianity.49 Having found that the Liquor 
Act did infringe the right to religious freedom, O’Regan J proceeded to determine whether 
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this was a legitimate limitation of the right in terms of section 33 of the Interim Constitution. 
She accepted that one of the purposes of the Liquor Act was to restrict the consumption of 
alcohol on closed days, but found that this could not have been the primary purpose since 
alcohol could still be sold in restaurants and hotels. She consequently found that the 
provisions of the Liquor Act unjustifiably limited section 14 of the Constitution.50 
Sachs J (Mokgoro J concurring) in his separate and dissenting judgment held that the 
objective of section 14 is to “keep the state away from favouring or disfavouring any 
particular world-view” and that there was an obligation on legislators and legislative drafters 
to be neutral.51 He argued that the prohibition on the sale of liquor by grocery stores on 
Sundays amounted to an endorsement of one religion, namely Christianity, over others in as 
far as it sends a symbolic message that is “inclusionary for some and exclusionary for 
others.”52 This constituted an infringement of section 14, but Sachs J found this infringement 
justifiable in terms of section 33 of the Interim Constitution. Weighing the symbolic effect of 
choosing Christian closed days against the evils of alcohol abuse, he held that the 
endorsement of Christianity in this case was relatively mild in comparison to the importance 
of curtailing alcohol consumption.53 Consequently, the Liquor Act constituted a justifiable 
infringement of the right to religious freedom. 
The judgment in Lawrence established some important principles with respect to religious 
freedom that will be discussed in the course of this study. As for now, it is sufficient to note 
that the case laid the foundation for understanding the interaction between the state and 
religion under the Constitution and the nature and scope of the right to religious freedom. 
Christian Education was the second notable constitutional decision dealing with the right to 
religious freedom. The case concerned a challenge to section 10 of the South African Schools 
Act which prohibits corporal punishment in schools. The parents of children in a Christian 
private school averred that the prohibition infringed on their religious and cultural rights in so 
far as they regarded corporal punishment and its application in the school environment as part 
of their religious duty to discipline their children. The court assumed that the prohibition 
limited the religious rights of the parents, but found that this infringement was justifiable 
under the general limitation clause in section 36.  
The Constitutional Court held that corporal punishment in schools violated learners’ 
human dignity and the protection against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
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punishment in section 12 of the Constitution. According to the court the whole symbolic, 
moral and pedagogical purpose of the ban on corporal punishment would be undermined if 
exemption was allowed for certain learners in certain schools.54 Furthermore, it would be 
difficult to monitor and control the administration of corporal punishment resulting in 
learners being vulnerable to abuse. This case clearly illustrates the fact that, although parents, 
teachers and learners are the bearers of religious freedom, this right is not absolute and may 
in some instances have to submit to other important rights and considerations.  
As will be illustrated below, the right to religious freedom is not an isolated right, but is 
related to numerous other rights and freedoms that could enhance or inhibit an individual or a 
groups’ religious freedom. As the court noted in Christian Education, the religious 
community that wanted corporal punishment in schools could not use the right to religious 
freedom to shield them from an attack on their constitutionally offensive group practices.55 In 
this context, the right to human dignity and the protection against cruel and inhuman 
punishment outweighed the religious freedom of the parents.  
Furthermore, there is an obligation on the state to prohibit practices that cause physical 
and emotional harm to individuals56 and especially children that are vulnerable to abuse. This 
is illustrated by another landmark decision dealing with religious freedom. In Prince, the 
Constitutional Court had to decide whether a decision by the Cape Law Society not to 
register the applicant’s contract of articles in terms of the Attorney’s Act 53 of 1979 was an 
infringement of the right to religious freedom. The applicant was a Rastafarian who had 
previously been convicted for the possession of dagga and the Law Society argued that he did 
not qualify as a “fit and proper person” as is required for the registration of a contract of 
articles. The applicant averred that the use of dagga was constitutionally protected as an 
exercise of his religious freedom.  
The court found that the general statutory prohibition on the possession of dagga restricted 
the right to religious freedom as the use of dagga was central to the practice of the 
Rastafarian religion. The prohibition thus limited the ability of Rastafarians to manifest their 
religion through worship and practice, teaching and dissemination.57 However, the court, on a 
narrow margin, found that this limitation was justifiable in terms of section 36 as it would be 
unfeasible to allow an exemption for Rastafarians without undermining the general 
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prohibition.58 The court also felt that it would be practically difficult to police the use of 
dagga if exceptions are made on religious grounds.59 Consequently, the prohibition was found 
to be constitutional as it justifiably limited the appellant’s religious freedom. 
Just as Christian Education, the Prince judgment illustrates that the right to religious 
freedom is not unlimited and may be restricted by other rights and interests. This is an 
important consideration when interpreting the right to religious observances in public 
schools. Religious observances associated with a particular faith, may have a damaging effect 
on the rights of learners, teachers and parents who do not conform to the prevailing religion.  
The religious freedom of the majority must thus be weighed against the minority’s right to be 
free from religious coercion. This balancing act will inevitably mean that the nature and the 
content of religious observances in public schools must be adjusted to ensure the least 
strenuous infringement on the rights of religious minorities. The Constitutional Court 
judgment in MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay60 provides some guidance on 
achieving this balance. Although the case did not deal specifically with religious observances 
in terms of section 7 of the Schools Act or section 15(2) of the Constitution, it did establish 
general principles that may guide the interpretation of religious observances in the school 
setting.  
The Pillay case dealt with the prohibition on the wearing of a nose-stud in a schools 
uniform code. The appellant was a member of the Hindu faith and regarded the wearing of a 
nose stud as a central tenet of her religion and culture. The court held that, in weighing the 
relative importance of the religious practice of wearing a nose-stud against the hardship that it 
caused the school, an exemption should be allowed on grounds of religious freedom and 
culture.61 Furthermore, the court applied the principle of “reasonable accommodation” as a 
means to settle the dispute.62 Reasonable accommodation is the notion that the state, 
community or a school must sometimes “take positive measures and possibly incur additional 
hardship or expense in order to allow all people to participate and enjoy all their rights 
equally.”63 This prevents people from being relegated to the margins of society because they 
do not, or cannot conform to certain social norms.64 The principle of reasonable 
accommodation may be a helpful mechanism in the structuring of religious observances in 
                                                                 
58
 Para 133. 
59
 Para 133. 
60
 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) (“Pillay”). 
61
 Para 114. 
62
 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 325. 
63
 Pillay para 73. 
64
 Para 73. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
59 
 
public schools and will be elaborated on later in the study.65 For now, it is only important to 
note that reasonable accommodation may aid the state and public schools in conducting 
religious observances in line with section 7 of the Schools Act and section 15(2) of the 
Constitution, as it has the potential to inform the equitability requirement.  
Du Plessis66 argues that section 15 invites an interpretation that links it to related rights in 
the Bill of Rights in order to maximise its protection. Religious freedom must thus be viewed 
contextually in order to understand the generous protection it affords.67 These contextual or 
supporting rights include the rights to equality, human dignity, freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and petition, freedom of association, the right to be part of a religious 
community, and, with reference to children, the best interest of the child. Supporting rights 
are usually relevant in one of two ways. Firstly, any interpretation of section 15 must be done 
in view of the supporting rights as these rights intersect with religious freedom and reinforce 
and inform its interpretation on a variety of levels.68  
Secondly, a constitutional challenge founded on section 15 may very well be based on 
some of the supporting rights as well. It is easy to conceive a scenario where one party relies 
on the right to religious freedom while the other party argues that the right to freedom of 
expression affords him the right to criticize others’ religious convictions. In these cases, the 
supporting rights could overlap, reinforce each other, or conflict. This will call for a delicate 
balancing of supporting and conflicting rights where the weight attached to each is 
determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the rights in question. It is however 
important to note that all the supporting rights must be interpreted in the context of section 
15(2). The rights must thus be aligned to the particular provisions on religious observances 
and must be interpreted to shed light on the restrictions in section 7 of the Schools Act and 
section 15(2) of the Constitution. 
 
2 2 The right to equality 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right of everyone to equal protection and 
benefit of the law.69 Subsections (3) and (4) prohibit both the state70 and any person71 from 
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unfairly discriminating directly or indirectly against anyone on various grounds, including 
religion, conscience and belief. Du Plessis72 contends that the protection of religious rights 
and freedoms under the equality clause is as significant and indispensable as their protection 
under section 15(1). It ensures the equal treatment of all people, regardless of the religious 
convictions they hold and protects people, communities and organisations form unfair 
discrimination based on religion. It also protects conduct associated with religious beliefs, 
which includes religious observances and practices.73 Albertyn74 suggests that this would 
include protection against prohibitions on forms of dress associated with a particular religion, 
for example a headscarf worn by Muslim schoolgirls. Furthermore, section 9 implies the 
even-handed treatment of religions.75  
Religion cases have, however, not often come before court under the constitutional 
guarantee of religious equality76 and most cases have been considered under section 15(1).77 
Consequently, most of the claims have been based on the substantive right of freedom rather 
than unfair discrimination.78 In instances where religious equality and unfair discrimination 
have played a role, the cases have related to questions of religious diversity, tolerance and 
freedom.79 In Christian Education the Constitutional Court addressed the issue of religion 
and equality. The Minister of Education argued that allowing for a special exemption in 
favour of religious practices would violate the equality provision in section 9 as it would treat 
some children differently from others based on their religion or the type of school the 
children attended.80 In response to this argument, Sachs J explained the relationship between 
freedom of religion and the right to equality as follows: 
 
“It is true that to single out a member of a religious community for disadvantageous treatment 
would, on the face of it, constitute unfair discrimination against that community. The 
contrary, however, does not hold. To grant respect to sincerely held religious views of a 
community and make an exception from a general law to accommodate them, would not be 
unfair to anyone else who do not hold those views. As the court said in Prinsloo v Van der 
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Linde & Another, the essence of equality lies not in treating everyone in the same way, but in 
treating everyone with equal concern and respect. Permission to allow the practice to 
continue, would in these circumstances, not be inconsistent with the equality provisions of the 
Bill of Rights.”81 
 
In the Lawrence case, O’Regan J also elaborated on the role of equality in the context of 
religious freedom. She held that section 15(1) required the state to act fairly and equitably in 
its interaction with the different religions in South Africa.82 According to O’Regan, the state 
must act even-handedly in relation to different religions, which does not necessarily require 
complete neutrality on the side of the state or “a commitment to scrupulous secularism”.83 
Instead, even-handedness will sometimes “require specific provisions to protect the adherents 
of particular religions.”84 Accordingly, religious freedom entails that there be no inequitable 
or unfair preference of one religion over others.85 Sachs J in his dissent also addressed the 
right to equality in the context of religious freedom. He suggests that the Constitution 
requires the state to acknowledge different belief systems and to accommodate them within a 
non-hierarchical framework of equality and non-discrimination.86  The state is thus not 
allowed to take sides in matters of religion and may not “impose belief, grant privileges to or 
impose disadvantages on adherents or any particular belief”.87  
Furthermore, the state may not marginalise people for having different beliefs or expect 
people to conform in matters of religion.88 It is important to note that the plaintiffs in the 
Lawrence case did not rely on section 9 of the Constitution, but based their argument on 
section 14(1)89 of the Interim Constitution. It thus seems as if the court read religious equality 
as an element of religious freedom, without employing section 9 as a separate right in this 
case.90 Currie and De Waal91 argue that this step is unnecessary as section 9 could easily have 
provided the protection that the court has now attributed to section 15(1). Regardless of the 
method, the right to religious freedom is closely associated with the right to equality and 
implies that religions must be treated in an even-handed and equal manner. As a supporting 
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right it enhances the protection provided by section 15(1) and can be a helpful mechanism to 
eradicate unfair discrimination based on religion, culture and opinion. Furthermore, it reflects 
the model of state-religion interaction envisioned by the Constitution by ensuring that the 
state affords equal recognition to all religions and respects the rights of religious followers.92 
However, within the context of religious observances in public schools, the right to 
equality has a particular meaning in as much as section 7 of the Schools Act and section 
15(2) of the Constitution require religious observances to be conducted on an equitable basis. 
Apart from the general protection learners, teachers and parents have to religious equality in 
terms of section 9 and section 15(1), the requirement of “equitable basis” envisions a 
standard of equality unique to religious observances. Chapter 6 will deal extensively with the 
interpretation of “equitable basis” and the manner in which it finds application in the public 
school system. Closely associated with the right to religious freedom and equality, is the right 
to human dignity. 
 
2 3 The right to human dignity 
Section 10 of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to 
have their dignity respected and protected.” The close link between human dignity and 
religious freedom is highlighted by Sachs J in Christian Education, when he states that for 
many believers their religious convictions are central to all their activities, awakening 
“concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights.”93 It 
provides “support and nurture, and a framework for individual and social stability and 
growth,” allowing people to relate “in an intensely meaningful way to themselves, their 
community and their universe.”94 Human dignity manifests most prevalently in relation to the 
autonomy which underlies religious freedom. It is expressed by the free development of an 
own identity which is closely related to the freedom to choose to adhere or not to adhere to a 
particular religion or denomination.95  
Human dignity may function either as an independent right or as a contextual right.96 
Dignity may thus be independent from religious freedom97 or act contextually to advance the 
protection afforded by religious freedom. This is illustrated by the following example. If a 
school community decides to conduct religious observances in accordance with the Christian 
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faith and a Jewish learner is expected to participate as well, his dignity is infringed in two 
ways. Firstly, this is an infringement of section 10 of the Constitution, as the coercion of a 
learner to participate in actions contrary to his religious convictions, constitutes a violation of 
his inherent human dignity. In this case the religious freedom enjoyed by the adherents of the 
majority religion, directly impacts on the dignity of those learners who do not adhere to the 
prevailing religion. This is an example where the two rights conflict.  
Secondly, the learner enjoys a right to religious dignity. This means that the religious 
freedom he enjoys is further enhanced by the protection of the dignity of his beliefs and 
convictions. The close relationship between the right to religious freedom and dignity 
strengthens his right to refrain from participating in observances that contravene his own 
religious beliefs. In principle, the right to religious dignity guarantees complete and total 
respect and dignity to the bearers of the right.98 Van der Schyff99 argues that any move to 
protect religious dignity should be aimed at protecting the dignity of all the bearers of the 
right and not merely the largest or the most favoured persuasions in the religious community.  
This is an important consideration when addressing the constitutionality of religious 
observances in public schools. As all learners, teachers and parents are bearers of the right to 
human dignity, religious observances must be devised in such a way so as not to infringe on 
their dignity. This will entail sensitivity to the differences that exist between religions and a 
concerted effort to accommodate adherents of minority religions. Correctly applied, the 
requirements of voluntariness and equity in section 7 of the Schools Act and section 15(2) of 
the Constitution has the potential to protect the dignity of all learners, regardless of their 
faith. One way to achieve this is by conducting religious observances on an equitable basis as 
envisioned by section 15(2) of the Constitution. The interpretations afforded to these 
requirements must thus be informed and infused with the need to protect the inherent dignity 
of both religious and non-religious individuals in the school system. 
 
2 4 Freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression in section 16 of the Constitution allows for views and 
ideas to be spread and communicated.100 As a supporting right to religious freedom it 
strengthens the right of people and organisations to freely criticise, support and challenge 
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social and political structures and policies in terms of the teachings of their religion.101 
Similarly, it affords the right to non-believers to criticise, support and challenge the beliefs of 
religious followers or religious groups and organisations. It also enhances the right of 
believers to propagate their religion and to attract converts. In this sense the right to freedom 
of expression aids the manifestation of religious rights. 
The right to freedom of expression is however limited, and expressly excludes expression 
that constitutes propaganda for war,102 incitement of imminent violence,103 or the advocacy of 
hatred that is based on race, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause 
harm.104 The scope and content of these limitations are not exactly clear within the context of 
religious freedom. The court in Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting 
Authority105 suggests that not all expressions that are likely to prejudice relations between 
sections of the population would necessarily be viewed as the “advocacy of hatred” based on 
religion. A certain amount of freedom is thus allowed for expression that criticises or 
denounces religious beliefs, observances and practices, although the exact extent of this 
freedom is somewhat uncertain.106 
A religious message may however also be limited under section 36 to avoid the 
denigration and belittlement of other religions and to protect the right to religious dignity of 
others.107 Van der Schyff108 points out that the content of a message may be so malicious and 
crude that it can cause grave offence and hurt to the followers of the targeted religion. In 
these instances the aim is usually to insult people and religions rather than raising genuine 
arguments or issues pertaining to faith.109 These messages may be limited by requiring their 
modification, or in severe instances, their removal from the public sphere. The method used 
to propagate a message pertaining to religion, may also be limited when it is reasonable and 
justifiable to do so in a democratic society. This is particularly important in the context of 
religious observances in public schools. Although the right to freely express religious 
messages or even propagate religion cannot be taken away completely, the content of the 
message and in particular, the method of expression may be limited.  
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As will be argued later in this study, it would be appropriate for learners to have a moment 
of silence as part of a school assembly to observe a religious prayer or simply use the time for 
non-religious reflection. What may be limited is the use of microphones to broadcast a prayer 
to the entire school community as this may have a potentially coercive effect on religious 
minorities. In the school context the right to religious freedom and non-coercion of minorities 
may often be in conflict with the right to freedom of expression of the religious majority. In 
these instances it is important to achieve a proportionate balance, underscored by practical 
methods, to mitigate the adverse effect of freedom of expression on religious minorities. A 
limitation of the right to freedom of expression will have to be allowed in order to protect the 
right to religious freedom. Conversely, the right to religious freedom and freedom from 
coercion may also have to be limited in some rare instances in order to ensure that freedom of 
expression is afforded recognition.  
 
2 5 Right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and petition 
The right to assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition in section 17 of the 
Constitution is also relevant to religious freedom. Religious observances and practices are 
usually conducted at gatherings of religious followers. The right to assembly is thus a 
supporting right to religious freedom as it allows adherents of a particular faith to practise 
their religion together with other believers. It enhances the right of religious followers to 
assemble for sermons in a church or to gather in a place of religious significance. This right 
would be equally applicable to learners, teachers and parents who want to assemble in the 
school context to perform religious observances. However, just like the other supporting 
rights, the right to assemble in order to observe religion, must be subject to the requirements 
in section 7 of the Schools Act and section 15(2) of the Constitution.  
This means that although religious adherents may have the right to assemble and observe 
their religion, they may not force non-adherents to attend. The assembly must also be 
structured in such a way that it does not have an overtly coercive effect on non-adhering 
students, teachers and parents. The nature and content of coercion will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5, but it would arguably not be appropriate to assemble on the school 
playground during break time and conduct religious observances in an open area where it 
would be obvious to identify the students who are not participating. It would be more 
appropriate to assemble in a space and at a time where it would be less obvious who are not 
attending and participating in the religious observances. The right to assemble thus needs to 
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be aligned with the requirements of voluntariness and equity in order to ensure that the 
religious freedom of non-adhering learners is protected. 
 
2 6 Freedom of association  
Linked to the right of assembly, is section 18 of the Constitution that guarantees the right 
to freedom of association.110 The right to associate with a particular religion and its followers 
is instrumental in the practise and protection of religion freedom. When people associate 
themselves with a religious group, a sense of belonging is fostered. The right to publically 
acknowledge this association without fear of judgment or retribution is fundamental to 
religious freedom. Freedom of association naturally also entails the right not to associate with 
any religion at all and to refrain from membership or association with a religious 
organisation, practice or observance. It further guarantees religious followers the right to 
associate and organise according to their own wishes and affords contextual support to the 
institutional element of religious freedom.111  
The court in Wittmann112 said that freedom of association entails the right with others to 
exclude non-conformists. It also includes the right to require those who join an association to 
conform with its principles and rules.113 This judgment was delivered with reference to a 
private school where the relationship between the school and the learners is vastly different 
from that of a public school. In private schools learners, parents and teachers contractually 
bind themselves to the rules and religious practices of the school. In public schools, this 
contractual relationship does not exist and the school delivers a public service to the learners 
and parents. The right to freedom of association may be limited in this context. A public 
school does not have the right to exclude non-conformists or to require everyone in the 
school to adhere to the rules of a particular religious “association.” Even though nothing can 
stop learners, parents and teachers from associating with people that share their religious 
views, forced association may not be implemented at an institutional top-down level.  
When learners conduct religious observances together with other learners and teachers, 
they are exercising their right to freedom of association. This right is however subject to 
section 7 of the Schools Act and section 15(2) of the Constitution and must be exercised in a 
manner that does not place a coercive burden on those who do not associate with the 
prevailing religion. The right is consequently limited by the context in which it is exercised. 
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A public school is not a religious association and although the learners, teachers and parents 
each have the right to associate with the religions of their choice, the school may not force 
learners, parents and teachers to associate with a particular religion. Freedom of association 
may enhance the right to religious freedom, but just as most of the supporting rights, it may 
also be limited in order to protect the rights of religious minorities in the school system.  
 
2 7 Right to a religious community 
Section 31(1) of the Constitution recognises the right of persons “belonging to a cultural, 
religious or linguistic community” […] “with other members of that community”, to: 
  
“(a) enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and 
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society. 
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any  
            provision of the Bill of Rights.”  
 
It is clear that section 31(1)(b) provides a measure of protection for the communal and 
institutional manifestations of religious rights,114 but the language of section 31 is not as 
forceful as that of section 15. The right is formulated negatively and simply states that these 
rights “may not be denied,” but places no positive obligation on the state or any other party to 
actively promote and protect the rights of religious communities. There was no equivalent to 
section 31 in the Interim Constitution115 and until the decision in Prince the nature of the 
relationship between section 15(1) and section 31 was uncertain. In Prince, Ngcobo J 
suggests that section 15(1) and section 31 complement each other.116 Section 31(1)(a) 
“emphasises and protects the associational nature of cultural, religious and language 
rights,”117 and “in the context of religion, it emphasises the protection to be given to members 
of communities united by religion to practise their religion.”118  
Van der Schyff119 also suggests that the right to form religious communities and join 
religious organisations is a manifestation of the autonomy which is a necessary element of the 
right to religious freedom. It implies that religious communities and organisations are 
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allowed to regulate their own internal affairs and practise religion in accordance with their 
own convictions. The nature of section 31 within the public school system is unclear. It is 
submitted that, although all learners, parents and teachers are bearers of this right, it is 
somewhat limited in the school context. As has already been mentioned, there is no positive 
obligation on the state to actively promote and protect the rights of religious communities. 
Although learners, teachers and parents may not be barred from forming a religious 
community or organisation, the extent to which they are allowed to conduct religious 
observances and practices in public schools as part of this community or organisation, is 
limited by the requirements of “free and voluntary” and “equitable basis.”  
A public school is a public forum and even in instances where the majority of the school 
adhere to a particular religion and form a religious organisation or identify themselves as a 
religious community, their action may not infringe on the rights of dissenters to be free from 
religious coercion and to conduct their own religious observances. This is a justifiable 
limitation of section 31 as it does not negate the rights of religious communities entirely, but 
simply limit their ambit in the school system, so as to ensure that their conduct is in 
accordance with the Schools Act and the Constitution. In this way the rights of adherents to 
minority religions are protected and they are not subjected to the convictions of the majority. 
 
2 8 Best interest of the child 
Finally, it is important to take note of the best interest of the child when considering 
religious observances within the public school system. The “best interest of the child” is a 
well-established standard in international human rights law.120 It initially developed from a 
mere international aspiration voiced in the Geneva Declaration of 1924 to an almost universal 
principle that finds special recognition in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).121   
Section 3(1) of the CRC states that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken 
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.” It is also 
recognised in section 4 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC),122 which was drafted as a regional human rights instrument to address specific 
problems experienced by children in Africa.123 The ACRWC provides that the best interest of 
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the child be of “primary importance” in all matters concerning the child. It seems like the 
ACRWC affords more weight to the principle than the CRC, substituting “consideration” 
with “importance.”  
Section 28(2) of the Constitution, however, provides the most comprehensive protection to 
the rights of the child by stating that “[a] child’s best interests are of paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child.”  The use of the word “paramount” in the Constitution 
illustrates the weight attached to the “best interest of the child” and makes it a very important 
consideration when evaluating the role of religious observances in South African public 
schools. There are two prevailing theories as to how the “best interest of the child” must be 
interpreted. On the one hand, the more traditional view says that parents are responsible for 
the raising of their children, which include the right to educate them and transmit their values, 
including religious values, to them.124 In terms of this approach, parents and teachers at 
school must act in the best interest of the child and their views prevail as long as they act 
lawfully.125 
The other approach is founded on a rights-based or autonomous view of children, and is a 
more recent development in child law. In terms of this approach children are regarded as 
having their own view on what is in their best interest and they are accorded varying degrees 
of autonomy in accordance with their capacity to act and decide on their own.126 This does 
not mean that parental authority is completely absent, but envisions that children will at least 
be consulted and their views acknowledged in any decisions affecting their physical, 
intellectual, emotional or moral upbringing. This accord with the notion that, in court cases 
affecting children, it is desirable and sometimes vital to allow the voice of the child to be 
heard as it will ensure a more nuanced interpretation of the best interest of the child.127 
In South Africa, there is currently no legislation regulating the right of children to choose 
to be religious or not. In Germany for example, learners are allowed to choose to receive 
religious instruction in schools, or refrain from it, once they reach the age of 14 years. The 
CRC makes specific provision for the opinions of the child to be taken into account in any 
matters concerning them.128 The weight that is attached to their opinion depends on various 
factors like their age and maturity. Within the context of religious observances in schools, it 
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might be advisable for the state to issue legislation that determines an age at which learners 
can decide for themselves whether they want to participate in observances or not. Learners 
often feel pressured by their parents, teachers, and peers, to adhere to the religion in which 
they were brought up. Allowing children, at a certain age, to elect to exercise their right to 
religious freedom could provide them with more autonomy over their spiritual lives.  
Malherbe129 suggests that what exactly is in the best interest of the child has to be 
determined in every individual case, based on all the relevant factors and considerations. 
Similar to adults, children are also bearers of the rights in the Bill of Rights, including the 
right to religious freedom. The application of religious freedom would, however, have to be 
informed by the best interest of the child. Religious practices or observances that could 
potentially endanger children or cause physical or emotional harm are not protected by 
section 15 of the Constitution, simply because it is not in the best interest of the child or 
children involved. When evaluating the right to conduct religious observances in public 
schools, cognisance must thus be taken of the particular impact it may have on children in 
light of their limited mental, emotional and physical capabilities.  
One of the factors to consider is the nature of the relationships that prevail in a public 
school. The relationship between learners and teachers is one of authority, with teachers and 
the school at large, occupying a position of authority from where they must act in the public 
interest to protect learners’ rights.130 In Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development (NICRO as amicus curiae)131 Cameron J emphasised the 
relevance of section 28 in protecting children in unequal, authoritative relationships.132 He 
found that “[a]mong other things section 28 protects children against the undue exercise of 
authority.”133 This is an important consideration with reference to religious observances. This 
authoritative relationship can easily be abused by teachers to coerce non-adhering learners to 
participate in religious observances contrary to their faith or beliefs. Children might feel 
obliged to comply with the order of a teacher to participate on account of the teacher’s 
authoritative position. 
Sometimes the authority can be abused in a much more subtle way. A teacher that exempts 
a non-adhering student from participation in a class prayer, but does so in front of all his 
peers, might be seen to respect the child’s religious freedom, but the manner in which the 
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exemption is carried out, can still be unduly coercive and in contravention of the child’s best 
interest.134 Although the coercion is not directly visible, the fear of being singled out might be 
so overpowering that the learner rather elects to stay in the class than suffer the 
embarrassment of leaving. Coetzee and Minnie135 suggest that the attitude of the school 
community with regard to culture and religion is another factor to consider when assessing 
the best interest of the child in the context of religious observances. They argue that the best 
interest of the child is an important consideration when a child is admitted to a school where 
a religion or culture, other than their own, is dominant.136 In these cases it is important to 
understand the isolating impact this might have on the non-adhering child and to consider 
carefully whether it would be in the child’s best interest to expose them to possible alienation 
from their peers.  
Later in this study, it will be argued that, upon a proper interpretation of section 7 of the 
Schools Act, read with section 15(2) of the Constitution, adequate protection can be afforded 
to the best interest of the child. When interpreting the restrictions of voluntariness and equity, 
the best interest of the child must inform the interpretation. In order to adhere to section 
28(1), “equitable basis” and “free and voluntary” have to be interpreted in a way that 
mitigates the impact of religious observances on non-adhering students. Such an 
interpretation will aim at affording children a more or less equal opportunity to participate in 
the religious observances of their choice or allow for appropriate and non-coercive 
alternatives to those students who are not religious at all.   
 
2 9 General limitation clause 
From the discussion above, it is clear that religious freedom does not entitle the bearers of 
the rights complete freedom in the exercise and manifestation of their beliefs.137 The rights in 
the Bill of Rights, including section 15, may be limited under the general limitation clause in 
section 36. Section 36(1) reads as follow: 
 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including- 
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(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
Religious freedom may be limited in terms of “law” which includes legislation, common 
law and customary law.138 The limitation must be “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.” This provides the 
standard against which infringements of religious liberty are measured in order to determine 
whether the limitation is constitutional.139 The standard requires that a proportional balance140 
be achieved between the limitation and the purpose of the limitation. In order to do so, the 
factors listed in section 36(1)(a) to (e) must be considered. These factors are not separate 
tests, but simply underscore the general substantive limitations test.141 The weighing up of 
competing rights and interests is done on a case-by-case basis and the proportionality analysis 
is influenced by the unique circumstances of every scenario. 
The nature of the right refers to what is being protected by the right and its general 
importance.142 The more important the right is that is being infringed, the more compelling 
the justification for its limitation must be.143 The Constitutional Court has pointed to the 
importance of religious freedom by describing it as having the “capacity to awake[n] 
concepts of self-worth and human dignity which forms the cornerstone of human rights.”144 
The next factor relates to the importance of the purpose of the limitation and requires that the 
purpose of the limitation be identified, and its importance be established.145 In light of the 
importance of religious freedom, the goal or purpose of a limitation of the right must not 
simply be marginal or trivial but must be of such grave importance that it justifies the 
infringement. Certain goals have been identified as possible reasons for limiting religious 
freedom. These include the promotion of equality, dignity and national unity,146 the 
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protection of children from the indignity of corporal punishment,147 the maintenance of 
public order,148 the best interest of the child,149 and the protection of the beliefs or rights of 
others.150  
The third factor is the nature and extent of the limitation. This refers to the method used to 
limit the right and the impact it has on the protected right or interest.151 The more invasive an 
infringement is, the more powerfully it must be justified.152 The duration of the limitation can 
be important to determine the extent of the limitation. An infringement that lasts for a brief 
period of time may be more easily justifiable than a permanent limitation or one that lasts for 
a considerable period of time. Where the right is taken away completely, a very compelling 
justification needs to be provided.153 Furthermore, a limitation that impacts on the core values 
underlying a particular right is not likely to be constitutional, while a limitation that just 
impacts on the periphery of the right will more than likely be considered justifiable.154 
Sometimes the position of the individual or group whose rights are being limited may also be 
important to determine the extent of its impact.155 If the limitation targets or has a 
disproportionate impact on a vulnerable group in society such as religious minorities,156 a 
higher level of justification will be required.157  
The fourth factor is the relationship between the limitation and its purpose. This factor 
establishes whether the limitation can protect or promote the purpose.158 The question is thus 
whether the means employed to achieve the purpose of the limitation are rationally related to 
the purpose, or at least reasonably capable of achieving the purpose.159 Limitations of 
religious freedom must therefore at least be capable of achieving the object of the limitation 
and must not be so far removed from the purpose that no rational connection can be found.160 
The limitation must thus fit the objective as neatly as possible.161  
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Lastly, less restrictive means to achieve the purpose must be considered. Here the question 
is whether the same purpose can be achieved equally effectively by employing means that 
will have a less dramatic impact on the right that is being limited.162 In the Prince case the 
court found that there were no other, less intrusive, means to achieve the purpose of 
combatting drug use. Lifting the ban on the use of dagga for Rastafarians was not considered 
a viable option and therefore no other, less restrictive measures were available.163 There 
would usually be a range of alternatives that would be capable of achieving the same purpose 
and the consideration of these alternatives is aimed at ensuring that limitations of the rights in 
the Bill of Rights are narrowly tailored and do not restrict rights in an unnecessarily 
burdensome manner.  
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on religious freedom usually includes a 
limitation analysis,164 once a restriction of freedom of religion in section 15(1) has been 
established.165 The nature of the interaction between section 15(2) and section 36 has 
however never been addressed in case law. The internal requirements of voluntariness and 
equity in section 15(2) can act as internal modifiers. Internal modifiers establish the content 
of the right,166 which means that religious observances that are performed equitably and 
where attendance is free and voluntary, will comply with the right to religious freedom in 
section 15(1). Section 36 will play no role in these circumstances as the religious observances 
in question do not limit section 15(1) and can therefore not be challenged on the basis that 
they are not reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. This seems to be 
the most logical reading of the requirements in section 15(2), as it will be highly unlikely that 
observances that are conducted on an equitable basis and the attendance of which is free and 
voluntary, will still amount to a limitation of the right to religious freedom that must be 
justified in terms of section 36. 
Section 36 may however have a role to play if the religious observances do not meet the 
requirements in section 15(2). This will depend on how widely or how narrowly the courts 
will read the restriction of “equity”.  On a wide reading of “equity” many of the factors listed 
in section 36, as well as the values of human dignity, equality and freedom, will already be 
considered when determining whether the observances are conducted on an equitable basis 
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and comply with section 15(2). On such a reading, a court, in considering whether religious 
observances are conducted on an equitable basis, will already weigh up the conflicting rights 
and interests of the school community and those of individual learners, and ask whether the 
aims of such observances could not be achieved in a manner that is less restrictive of the 
rights of the latter. A wide reading of “equity” will thus make section 36 redundant as many 
of the contextual considerations raised under section 36, would have already been addressed 
under section 15(2).167  
Van der Schyff168 illustrates this when he states that, by requiring the method of limitation 
to be “rules,” the general provision that rights may only be limited by a law of general 
application is qualified. It narrows and refines the general requirement in section 36 and sets 
a higher standard for the exercise of religious observances. Furthermore, the requirements of 
“free and voluntary” and “equity” refine the general substantive test in section 36. It sheds 
light on the content of the reasonableness standard169 and identifies what is considered a 
reasonable exercise of the right to religious observances. The restrictions also identify the 
purpose of the limitation of the right to religious observances. It is clear that they are aimed at 
achieving a measure of equity amongst religions and protecting individuals or groups from 
religious coercion. The fact that the purpose of the limitation is expressly mentioned 
amplifies the importance of the limitation of the right to conduct religious observances.170 
When considering the meaning of the restrictions in section 15(2), it is thus clear that many 
of the considerations related to section 36 have already been addressed and even refined 
within the particular context of religious observances. 
Should “equity” be read narrowly, it could be argued that section 36 could still make a 
meaningful contribution in establishing the constitutionality of religious observances. It 
would then be possible for a court to find that the religious observances are not equitable or 
free and voluntary, but may still be reasonable and justifiable under section 36. Different 
contextual considerations will however have to be taken into account when establishing the 
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parameters of “equity”, so as to ensure that section 36 still has a legitimate role to play in the 
inquiry.  
Apart from the Constitution, the Schools Act forms an integral part of regulating religious 
observances in South African public schools. 
 
3 South African Schools Act 
The Schools Act was promulgated in 1996 in an effort to create a new national system for 
schools which will redress past injustices in educational provision, advance the democratic 
transformation of society and our diverse cultures and languages and uphold the rights of all 
learners, parents and educators.171 Section 7 of the Schools Act addresses freedom of 
conscience and religion at public schools and states that: 
 
“Subject to the Constitution and any applicable provincial law, religious observances may be 
conducted at public schools under rules issued by the governing body if such observances are 
conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them by learners and members of staff is 
free and voluntary.” 
 
The Schools Act delegates the power to make rules regarding religious observances in 
schools, to the school governing body. Governing bodies are thus the “appropriate public 
authorities” referred to in section 15(2) of the Constitution. Section 7 also imposes certain 
requirements for the way in which religious observances must be conducted. These 
requirements are almost identical to those in section 15(2) of the Constitution and also 
provide for “rules” to be issued by the governing body that must be “free and voluntary” and 
allow for religious observances to be conducted on an “equitable basis.”  
It is important to take note of the principle of subsidiarity in this context as it will explain 
the interaction between the Constitution and section 7 of the Schools Act. Subsidiarity, also 
sometimes called the principle of avoidance, was first laid down in S v Mhlungu172 which 
stated that “where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a 
constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.” Where there is thus a piece 
of legislation that makes provision for the protection of a particular right, the relief must 
principally be applied for in terms of the relevant legislation rather than placing direct 
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reliance on the particular constitutional right.173 The legislation may be challenged based on 
its non-compliance with the Constitution, but then the relief must be phrased as a 
constitutional challenge based on the premise that the legislation does not properly give effect 
to the constitutional right it seeks to protect.174 
In the context of the public school system, section 7 of the Schools Act gives effect to 
section 15(2) of the Constitution and is an almost identical reflection of the wording of 
section 15(2). However, should any challenge be brought against the religious policy of a 
public school reliance would firstly have to be placed on section 7 of the Schools Act. The 
interpretation of section 7 will however be guided and informed by section 15(2) of the 
Constitution, read with the supporting rights in the Bill of Rights. Section 15(2) will only 
become directly relevant if the constitutionality of section 7 of the Schools Act is being tested 
for its compliance with the Constitution. Whereas legislation enacted to give effect to 
constitutional rights is often a comprehensive and detailed extension of the particular right, 
the legislature drafted section 7 of the Schools Act as a direct reflection of section 15(2). The 
interpretation afforded to section 7 of the Schools Act is therefore equally applicable to 
section 15(2) of the Constitution as they speak to the exact same requirements.  
Furthermore, section 7 of the Schools Act specifies that governing bodies are also subject 
to the Constitution and applicable provincial law, which means that they are not allowed to 
conduct religious observances in a way that infringes any of the rights in the Bill of Rights or 
any provincial legislation regulating observances. Chapter 4 will deal with the nature and 
extent of the power of governing bodies to make rules on religious observances and will 
provide a more extensive discussion on the role of the Schools Act.  
While the Constitution and the Schools Act did create a framework for religious 
observances in public schools, it did so in very general terms. What constituted “free and 
voluntary” and “equitable basis” was not specified. Many schools have abused the 
uncertainty of the constitutional and legislative framework to justify observances that 
arguably fall short of the constitutional and statutory requirements. It was only in 2003 that 
the Department of Education, under the leadership of Professor Kader Asmal, addressed the 
issue175 when the National Policy on Religion and Education (2003) was published on 4 
August 2003. The policy was the result of consultation with various stakeholders, including 
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religious groups, schools, parents and learners. It was heralded as a step in the right direction, 
but certain provisions created more difficulties and do not comply with Section 15 of the 
Constitution. 
 
4 The National Policy on Religion and Education 
From the outset, the Policy proposes that the interaction between religion and public 
education must be based on the co-operative model of religion-state interaction.176 In the 
foreword to the Policy, the diversity of the South African population is stressed.177 This 
diversity must be particularly evident in public schools where no particular religious ethos 
should be dominant over, and suppress others.178 The Policy draws a clear distinction 
between the educational responsibility for learning about religions (religion education), and 
religious instruction and nurture that is provided by the home, family, and religious 
community.179 Religion education is a curricular programme with educational objectives for 
teaching and learning about religion, religions and religious diversity in South Africa and the 
world, and is justified by the educational character of the programme.180 
On the other hand religious instruction is understood to include instruction in a particular 
faith or belief, with the view to the inculcation of adherence to that faith or belief.181 This is 
primarily the responsibility of the home, the family and the religious community and 
religious instruction may not be part of the formal school programme.182 The Policy also 
makes provision for religious observances, which include voluntary occasions when the 
school community (teachers and pupils) gather for religious observances; observances held in 
a voluntary gathering of pupils and/or teachers during a school break; and observances that 
may be ongoing such as dress, prayer times and diets, which must be respected and 
accommodated in a manner agreed upon by the school and relevant faith authorities.183 
School governing bodies are required to determine the nature and content of religious 
observances for teachers and pupils in alignment with the Policy and applicable legislation.184 
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Religious observances may be part of a school assembly, but must at all times 
accommodate and reflect the multi-religious nature of the country.185 The Policy proposes 
various ways of accommodating religious diversity,186 and clearly prohibits public schools 
from violating the religious freedom of pupils and teachers by imposing religious uniformity 
on a religiously diverse population in school assemblies.187 Section 61 contains “[a]ppropriate 
and equitable means of acknowledging the multi-religious nature of a school community” by 
suggesting ways in which religious observances could be conducted in the public school 
setting. This includes:  
 
“1. The separation of learners according to religion, where the observance takes place outside 
of the context of a school assembly, and with equitably supported opportunities for 
observance by all faiths, and appropriate use of the time for those holding secular or humanist 
beliefs; 
2. Rotation of opportunities for observance, in proportion to the representation of different 
religions in the school; 
3. Selected readings from various texts emanating from different religions 
4. The use of a universal prayer; or 
5. A period of silence.” 
 
Other forms of equitable treatment may also be developed and where the segregation of 
learners is contemplated, a school has to consider and mitigate the impact of peer pressure on 
learners.188 Learners may be excused on grounds of conscience from attending these 
observances and schools must make equitable arrangements for them.189 Apart from these 
suggestions, the Policy does not prescribe specific ways in which religious observances at 
public schools must be organised, but rather encourages schools to devise creative and 
innovative approaches in this area.190 Even though the Policy does provide some clarity on 
the format of religious observances, it still grants a wide discretion to governing bodies to 
determine the exact content of the observances and the rules governing the process. 
The suggestions made by the Policy on equitable ways of treating religious observances 
are also constitutionally problematic. The Policy is subject to the Constitution and the 
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requirements of section 15(2) and must provide for observances and practices that do not 
violate any constitutional provisions. It will be argued in Chapter 6 that the idea of “rotation 
of opportunities for observances in proportion to the representation” and the “use of a 
universal prayer” does not necessarily amount to the equitable treatment of religions and can 
be unduly coercive.191 It also seems as if the Policy endorses religious observances that 
reflect the multi-religious nature192 of South Africa. It is unclear what exactly is meant by this 
section, but it almost seems to exclude single-faith events.193 The Constitution does not 
prohibit observances in accordance with a single faith, but simply says that the observances 
may not be coercive or inequitable. Subjecting learners to multi-religious observances may be 
just as coercive as subjecting them to religious observances outside of their own faith. 
Denying all religions their section 15(2) right in favour of a multi-religious approach that 
does not satisfy anyone is constitutionally impermissible.194 
Questions also arise as to the binding nature of the Policy. The Policy is not prescriptive, 
but rather creates a framework for schools and governing bodies to determine policies, and 
while schools are strongly encouraged to make use of the Policy, it does not seem to be 
legally enforceable.195 Given the fact that governing bodies are independent from state 
control, with the mandate to manage the school, it is uncertain whether a school that fails to 
adhere to the Policy could be forced by the Department of Education, the Minister of 
Education, or a court to adopt a framework of religion-education interaction that reflects the 
Policy. This will presumably be subject to the extent to which the Policy itself survives 
constitutional scrutiny as it contains various problematic provisions. The discussion of 
voluntariness and equity later in the study will further address the problems with the Policy. It 
is submitted, however, that a review of this Policy is imperative, so as to bring it in line with 
section 15(2) of the Constitution. 
 
5 International law 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution states that courts must take notice of international law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Various international law human rights instruments 
include sections pertaining to the right to religious freedom, religious education and the 
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liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity 
with their own convictions. One of the most important international documents that South 
African courts have to take cognisance of is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948). Article 18 guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which 
includes the freedom of the individual to change his religion or belief. Furthermore, it 
includes the right, either alone or in a community with others and in public or in private, to 
manifest religion or belief through teaching, practice, worship and observance.196 Article 26 
of the Declaration states that everyone has the right to education, while subsection (3) affords 
parents a right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. This 
article presumably includes the right of parents to send their children to religious schools and 
to have them educated in accordance with a particular religion.  
The ICCPR makes provision in article 18(1) for the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion of everyone. This includes the right not to be subjected to coercion which would 
impair the individual’s freedom to have or adopt a religion or a belief of their choice.197  
Religious rights may only be limited by prescribed laws and only to the extent that is 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others.198 Furthermore, article 18(2) places an obligation on all the state parties 
to the Covenant to respect the liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their own convictions. This includes the right of parents to 
send their children to religious schools. It does not necessarily imply that parents can insist 
that public schools provide religion-based education as the right in section 18(4) is not 
absolute and may be limited in order to protect the freedom of other individuals.  
Article 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief also determines that everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Article 5 makes special provision for the religious 
rights of children. Article 5(1) gives parents the right to organise the life within the family in 
accordance with their religion or belief, bearing in mind the moral education in which they 
believe the child should be brought up. Children also have the right to receive education in 
matters of religion or belief and may not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or 
belief against the wishes of their parents, the best interest of the child being the guiding 
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principle.199 Article 5(3) also protects children against discrimination based on religion or 
belief. The right to receive education on matters of religion in section 5(2) does not 
necessarily mean that public schools must provide children with a religion-based curriculum. 
It simply means that children may be educated about their religion by their parents, religious 
associations and institutions and, where the parents choose so, a religious school. 
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights also protects the freedom of 
conscience and the free profession and practice of religion.200 A very important international 
document relating to the religious rights of children is the already mentioned CRC. Apart 
from the emphasis on the best interest of the child, the CRC obliges the state to respect 
children’s right to religious freedom and their parents’ duty to provide direction to the child 
in the exercise of the right.201 This right is however not absolute and the manifestation of 
religious beliefs may be limited by any law that is necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health or morals, or the fundamental freedom of others.202 Furthermore, the CRC protects 
children from discrimination based on the religion or beliefs of the child or/and child’s 
parents.203 As mentioned above, the CRC makes special provision in article 12 for children 
who are capable of forming their own views, to express them freely in all matters affecting 
them. The weight attached to these views must be determined with reference to the age and 
maturity of the child. Children also have the right to freedom of expression204 and the right to 
freely associate and assemble peacefully.205 
The rights in the CRC are especially important as they are specifically aimed at protecting 
children. It creates a broad paradigm in which children may exercise their right to religious 
freedom, but makes the manifestation of religion subject to limitations imposed by law. The 
requirements for the conduct of religious observances in section 7 of the Schools Act, read 
with section 15(2) of the Constitution may be regarded as such a limitation. The requirements 
that it is free and voluntary and conducted on an equitable basis are aimed at protecting the 
fundamental freedoms of those that do not adhere to the prevailing religion. The emphasis on 
the best interest of the child in the CRC is also an important consideration and must be 
afforded considerable weight when evaluating the constitutionality of religious observances 
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in public schools. When children are exposed to religious observances that can threaten their 
physical or emotional well-being, or be overtly coercive, the best interest of the child would 
prevail over any religious rights that may be infringed.  
These international law instruments are important mechanisms to aid courts in striking the 
correct balance between the rights of children and their parents to participate in religious 
observances and the right of children to be free from religious coercion. South Africa, which 
is a party to all these international law instruments, must use them to inform the interpretation 
of section 15, and to help give content to the requirements of “free and voluntary” and 
“equitable basis.” 
 
7 Conclusion 
The right to religious freedom is not a stand-alone right. Its interpretation must be 
informed by various other constitutional provisions, as well as international instruments. The 
right to equality, human dignity, freedom of expression, the right to assemble and 
demonstrate, the freedom to associate, the best interest of the child, the right to a religious 
community and the general limitation clause are all important constitutional provisions that 
must be taken into account when interpreting religious freedom and the right to conduct 
religious observances. Where rights compete, they must be weighed against each other to find 
an outcome that will best serve the interest of those whose rights are affected.  
In the context of the school system, section 7 of the Schools Act gives effect to the right to 
conduct religious observances while the National Policy on Religion and Education attempts 
to guide governing bodies in the drafting of rules on observances. The National Policy on 
Religion and Education is however vague and contains provisions that are constitutionally 
problematic. It must comply with the requirements of the Schools Act and the Constitution 
and as suggested a review of the policy is imperative to bring it in line with the requirements 
of voluntariness and equity. The crux of the right to conduct religious observances in public 
schools remains section 7 of the Schools Act and section 15(2) of the Constitution. The next 
chapter aims to give content to these provisions and the way in which schools must 
practically go about the drafting of rules on observances. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERPRETING SECTION 15(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
1 Introduction 
Section 15(2) of the Constitution, read with section 7 of the Schools Act, forms the core of 
the inquiry into the constitutionality of religious observances in public schools. It states that: 
 
“Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that- 
(a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities; 
(b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and 
(c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.” 
 
Determining the meaning and scope of this section is central to establish the manner and the 
form religious observances must take in the public school context. As has already been 
mentioned, section 15(2) must not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in such a way 
that it takes cognisance of the broader constitutional, legislative, and policy framework in 
which it functions.  
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse and interpret section 15(2) within the context of 
the public school system. A definition of “religious observances” has already been provided 
in Chapter 11 and in this Chapter the focus will rather be on the other elements of section 
15(2). Firstly, the definition of “state and state-aided institutions” will be established in order 
to determine which schools fall within the scope of section 15(2) and have to adhere to the 
requirements set out in the Constitution. Secondly, the focus will fall on the meaning of 
“rules” and the question whether these rules must adhere to the principles of the rule of law. 
Lastly, “appropriate public authorities” will be analysed. This will include a discussion on 
section 7 of the Schools Act and the extent of the power of governing bodies to make rules 
about religious observances. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will respectively deal with the meaning 
of “free and voluntary” and “equitable basis” in section 7 of the Schools Act and section 
15(2) of the Constitution.  
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2 Definition of “state or state-aided institutions” 
Section 15(2) identifies “state and state-aided institutions” as the setting at which religious 
observances may be conducted. While is it clear that state institutions refer to the 
functionaries of the state that are controlled and funded by the state, the meaning of “state-
aided institutions” is less evident. The court in the Wittmann case dealt extensively with the 
interpretation of “state-aided institutions”. The case concerned a German school that was 
registered as a private school in terms of the Private Schools Act (House of Assembly) 104 of 
19862 and received a discretionary subsidy from government, which at the time of going to 
court, amounted to more than R1 million annually.3 The argument was that the financial 
support by government located the school within the parameters of a “state-aided institution” 
subject to the limitations of section 14(2) of the Interim Constitution. Van Dijkhorst J, 
however, found that this term had a very specific and narrow meaning within the context of 
education. State-aided institutions are neither public in the sense of completely state-funded 
and state-controlled, nor are they private institutions free from state-control.4 These 
institutions lie somewhere in between and although they are not necessarily public, they are 
funded by the state to an appreciable extent and are subject to state regulation.5 On this 
definition, all schools that are commonly known as “government”6 or public schools will be 
considered as state-aided institutions subject to section 15(2) of the Constitution.  
Private schools, although partially subsidised by government, are private institutions. 
Children attend these schools on a strictly contractual basis. This means that, should the 
school have a specific religious character or allow for religious observances associated with a 
particular faith, parents and children validly waive their rights under section 15(2) by 
agreeing to the terms of enrolment and subjecting themselves to the school’s constitution and 
regulations.7 In the Wittmann case the daughter of an agnostic mother was therefore not 
exempt from attending a religious education class as the court found that section 14(2) of the 
Interim Constitution was not applicable. The school was not a state-aided institution and the 
mother had waived her right to rely on section 14(2) by contractually agreeing to membership 
of the school within the limits of its constitution.8 
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3 Meaning of “rules” 
Section 15(2)(a) of the Constitution and section 7 of the Schools Act specifies that 
religious observances must be conducted under “rules” issued by the appropriate public 
authority. Neither the Constitution nor the Schools Act specifies what form these rules must 
take. They are often incorporated as part of the mission statement or ethos of the school9 or as 
a separate policy compiled by the governing body, ideally in consultation with parents, 
learners and teachers.10 Whether these rules must comply with the requirements set for law of 
general application is however unclear.11 Whereas mere policies, norms and practices issued 
by statutory bodies are not always viewed as laws of general application,12 the use of the 
word “rules” is instructive, as it implies a certain formality of status. Governing bodies are 
organs of state,13 performing a public function when formulating rules on religious 
observances. It can be argued that these rules must ensure parity of treatment; be enforced in 
terms of a discernible standard ensuring that there is no arbitrary exercise of power; be 
precise; and lastly, accessible to the affected individuals.14 
The word “rules” in the Constitution and the Schools Act seems to oblige governing 
bodies to formulate a document that provides clarity to parents, teachers and children about 
the content and extent of religious observances, so as to ensure that the requirements for a 
law of general application are met. Firstly, these rules must ensure parity of treatment by 
treating similarly situated individuals alike, and provide the same privileges and impose the 
same restrictions on all stakeholders.15 Governing bodies are consequently prohibited from 
formulating rules that have the effect of treating certain religions differently from others or 
differentiating between individuals based on their religious affiliation. Should the rules thus 
allow for Muslim learners to practise their religion separately from the Christian majority, the 
school must also allow Jehovah’s Witness or Hindu learners to be accommodated in a similar 
manner. 
The rules must also extend to all the parties involved in the school community. Should a 
teacher or the principal be the one to object to religious observances on grounds of 
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conscience, they too must be given the opportunity to be excluded from attending  single-
faith events or from conducting religious observances in class that are contrary to their own 
beliefs. It would not be fair to expect a Christian teacher to read to his class from the Koran 
every morning, while Christian learners are exempt from attending these readings. 
Secondly, the rule of law requires that rules are enforced according to a discernible 
standard to ensure that there is no arbitrary exercise of power.16 This means that the decisions 
made by the governing body about the content and extent of religious observances must be 
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given.17 The Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers case makes it clear that determining rationality is an objective inquiry, which 
means that a mistaken or bona fide belief in rationality is not important when determining the 
arbitrariness of the rules in question.18 Governing bodies are expected to act rationally, justify 
their choices and refrain from formulating rules that show a naked preference19 or serve no 
discernible purpose.  
Although this inquiry is objective, it is also context specific. Whether the rules formulated 
by the governing body meet the standard of rationality will depend on factors such as the 
religious demographic of the school community and the nature and form of the religious 
observances in question. The purpose of formulating the rules is to ensure the full enjoyment 
of religious freedom within the public sphere. Rules that negate this purpose will not pass 
constitutional muster. It is clear that preference can be given to a particular religion on the 
premise that the majority of the school community adhere to that religion. This choice must, 
however, be rational. It would arguably be more rational to conduct religious observances 
associated with the Christian faith when 90% of the children and teachers are Christian. In a 
school where 50% of the learners and teachers are Muslim, while 50% are Christian, it will 
be more difficult to justify rules that only allow for Christianity. And even where 90% of the 
school is Christian, religions must be treated equitably in terms of section 15(2) of the 
Constitution and section 7 of the Schools Act. If the rules around religious observances are 
not voluntary and equitable, they will not rationally meet their purpose. 
Where provision is made for exemption on religious grounds, these rules must also be 
rationally related to the purpose for which they are formulated. Therefore, a school that 
conducts religious observances associated with Christianity cannot only allow for exemptions 
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for Muslim students while attendance is mandatory for learners adhering to African 
traditional religions. A provision like that will not only draw an unfair and unequal 
distinction between religions, but will be very difficult to relate rationally to the purpose of 
religious freedom. It is thus imperative that a governing body, when formulating these rules, 
take cognisance of the rationality requirement and the way in which it is informed by the 
unique circumstances of the school community in question.  
Thirdly, the rules must be precise enough to allow individuals to conform their conduct to 
their dictates.20 This means that they must be formulated and stated in a clear and accessible 
manner21 and not be so vaguely worded that reasonable people differ fundamentally over 
their scope and extension.22 The rules may also not be so broadly phrased or so far-reaching 
that it is difficult beforehand to know what exactly is allowed or prohibited.23 Furthermore, 
rules may not grant officials, or in this case, governing bodies, principals and teachers, the 
unfettered discretion to use their powers as they see fit. Where discretion must be exercised, 
guidelines should be provided.24 This requirement has a fundamental impact on the way in 
which rules surrounding religious observances in schools are formulated and presented to the 
school community. It would arguably not be appropriate for a governing body simply to 
determine that the school has a Christian ethos or character without formulating rules 
explaining the exact extent of the school’s religious policy. 
It seems that this requirement makes it imperative for governing bodies to formulate a 
document setting out the time, place and content of religious observances and provide a 
procedure for exemption on grounds of conscience. What is required is a clearly formulated 
policy that informs parents, learners and teachers about the nature of the school’s religious 
ethos and character and the manner in which religious observances will be conducted during 
the school day. A properly drafted policy will eliminate many of the problems associated 
with religious observances as it will ensure that all stakeholders are clear on the nature of the 
religious observances that are conducted at the school and are able to follow the correct 
procedures should they wish to be exempt from participation.  
It is also important that, should discretion be bestowed on an official of the school to 
decide something in respect of the religious policy, guidelines are provided for the exercise of 
this discretion. For example, should the principal have the final say with respect to the 
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accommodation of a learner of a minority religion, he must do so with reference to certain 
criteria. These can include factors such as proof of a different religious affiliation, the wishes 
of the learner/parents and the suggestions made by them as to how the learner can be 
accommodated, as well as the practicability of providing an alternative to the attendance of 
the school’s religious observances. In particular, weight must be afforded to the wishes of the 
learner and the parents. Where a learner or his parents insists that the learner be exempt from 
participating in religious observances of the majority, the discretion must be exercised in 
favour of the learner and the parents. A school that exercises its discretion against allowing 
an exemption from participation will infringe on the religious rights of the particular learner. 
Finally, the rules must be accessible to the school community.25  This requires that the 
policy be made publically available so that the school community can avail themselves of its 
content. A policy that is kept behind lock and key, and is only accessible to certain teachers, 
parents or learners will not meet constitutional standards and will arguably infringe on the 
right to religious freedom. In order to satisfy this requirement, it would be desirable that the 
school make the policy available to all potential parents, learners and teachers considering 
attending the school. This will enable them to make an informed choice when deciding to 
attend or to apply for a post at the school.  
Procedures for exemption must also be explained from the outset, assuring parents, 
teachers and learners of the school’s commitment to religious freedom. The power to make 
rules about religious observances, which is derived from the Constitution itself, must be 
exercised in a constitutional manner, taking cognisance of the rule of law and the 
requirements for a law of general application. A poorly drafted religious policy containing 
vague and arbitrary rules can potentially form the basis of a finding of unconstitutionality for 
its failure to comply with the standard and formalities implied by “rules” in the Schools Act 
and the Constitution.  
 
4 The governing body as an “appropriate public authority”  
The power to determine the religious observances of public schools in South Africa vests 
in the governing body of a public school. Section 7 of the Schools Act states that: 
 
“Subject to the Constitution and any applicable provincial law, religious observances may be 
conducted at a public school under rules issued by the governing body if such observances are 
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conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them by learners and members of staff is 
free and voluntary.”  
 
The Schools Act delegates the power to make rules regarding religious observances to the 
school governing body. Governing bodies are thus the “appropriate public authorities” 
referred to in section 15(2) of the Constitution.  Section 16 of the Schools Act makes 
provision for the creation of school governing bodies. The system of governing bodies was 
introduced after 1994 with the primary aim of democratising schooling in South Africa.26 
The idea was that democratic governing bodies would involve various stakeholders in the 
school community which would ideally be representative of the diverse compilation of the 
school itself.27 Governing bodies are intended to be sites of representative and participatory 
democracy28 and the Schools Act provides governing bodies with considerable managerial 
power. They are able to determine the language policy of the school,29 a code of conduct for 
learners,30 admission policies, decisions pertaining to the appointment of staff31 and the 
power to issue rules on religious observances.32 These powers are a manifestation of the 
intended democratisation of the school system and the political drive to decentralise the 
management of public schools in South Africa.33  
The principal in his or her official capacity must be a member of the governing body.34 
The other members are elected and must be representative of members of the following 
categories: parents of learners at the school,35 educators at the school,36 members of the staff 
at the school who are non-educators,37 and, in the case of secondary schools only, learners 
must also be represented.38 The chairperson of the governing body must be a parent and 
regardless of the size of the school, parents must always hold a majority of the member 
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representation. Members are elected for a three year term of office.39 School governing 
bodies have the authority to make community-based decisions and are a popular means of 
political participation.40 In affording parents, caregivers and learners who form part of the 
school community and live together in the area of the school, the opportunity to make 
decisions, they enhance participatory democracy.41  
In terms of section 15 of the Schools Act, a public school is a juristic person with legal 
capacity to perform its functions.42 The governing body is the functionary vested with 
original power in terms of the Schools Act to act as a duly appointed agent of a public 
school.43 The power of a governing body refers to its legal capacity to perform its functions 
and fulfil its obligations in terms of section 16 of the Schools Act.44 The courts have 
recognised the independence of governing bodies finding that, while they are organs of state 
performing a public function,45 they are intended to be independent of state or government 
control in the performance of their functions.46 Although governing bodies are subject to the 
Constitution, the Schools Act and any other provincial law, they are not part of the 
governmental hierarchy and are not, in relation to their functions, subject to executive control 
by the national, provincial or local spheres of government.47  
Governing bodies do not, however, have absolute autonomy and the courts have suggested 
that there is a constitutional obligation on all partners in education to engage in good faith 
with each other.48 In recent years a body of case law has developed dealing with the extent of 
a governing body’s powers to manage schools. Although there has been no case law on the 
role of governing bodies in issuing rules on religious observances, cases around school 
language policies, pregnancy policies and admission policies have carved a framework for 
the way in which governing bodies should exercise their powers under the Schools Act. 
These cases serve as an illustration of the way in which management decisions must be taken 
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and can provide a guideline for the manner in which governing bodies must approach the 
drafting of rules on religious observances.  
 
4 1 Powers of school governing bodies: developments in case law 
School governing bodies are created by the Schools Act and are not constitutionally 
mandated establishments.49 As has already been mentioned, they enjoy extensive 
discretionary powers in the management of schools, but these powers may be limited by the 
Constitution, legislation and a decision by the state taken in terms of the legislation, or to 
protect a particular right or interest. Consequently, their functions can be altered and even 
eliminated by the state through the promulgation of legislation.50 Any legislation or state 
decision that impacts on the discretionary powers of the governing body must, however, be 
justified and may not amount to an arbitrary exercise of power.51 This creates an inevitable 
tension which has, in recent years, resulted in litigation that specifically addresses the extent 
of the powers of governing bodies and the manner in which they must be exercised. This 
section will analyse some of the case law in order to determine what impact it has on the 
manner in which rules around religious observances are formulated.   
 
4 1 1 Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool 
Ermelo and Others 
The Ermelo judgment concerned the constitutional right to be taught in the official 
language of one’s choice and the power of the Head of Department (HOD) of Education to 
withdraw the function of a governing body to determine the language policy of the school.52 
Section 6(2) of the Schools Act states that “[t]he governing body of a public school may 
determine the language policy of the school subject to the Constitution, this Act and any 
applicable provincial law.” At the beginning of the 2007 school year there was a shortage of 
space in the Ermelo area for learners wanting to be taught in English.53 Hoërskool Ermelo’s 
language policy was Afrikaans medium, which meant that the school could only 
accommodate additional learners if they were willing to be taught in Afrikaans.54 The 
Department of Education already approached the school at the beginning of 2006 requesting 
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accommodation for English medium learners.55 The school refused the request, but agreed 
that the Department could use a disused laundry on the school premises to teach the 
learners.56 
Through the course of 2006 the Department requested the school on numerous occasions 
to have the learners taught in proper classrooms, but the governing body steadfastly refused.57 
When the school year started in January 2007 the Department again requested that the 
learners be taught at Hoërskool Ermelo. The governing body refused and on 25 January 2007, 
the HOD summarily withdrew the function of the governing body to determine the school’s 
language policy.58 He then appointed an interim committee that was tasked with performing 
the section 6(2) function.59 On the same day that the committee was appointed, it changed the 
school’s language policy to parallel medium, allowing the learners to be taught in English at 
the school.  
The HOD’s decision was upheld in the High Court on the basis that the Schools Act 
vested the HOD with the authority to withdraw the power of the governing body to determine 
the language policy.60 The decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal. In the 
Constitutional Court Moseneke DCJ found that the Schools Act does give the HOD the 
power to withdraw the powers of a governing body as long as there are reasonable grounds to 
do so.61 Once the power has been withdrawn, it vests in the HOD who must then exercise the 
power for a specific remedial purpose. The court made no finding on the reasonableness of 
the decision to withdraw the power.62 It instead found that the exercise of the power to 
withdraw the function to determine the language policy was tainted by the simultaneous 
decision to appoint an interim committee in terms of section 25 of the Schools Act.63 The 
HOD did not have the power to appoint a committee to determine the language policy and the 
reliance on section 25 of the Schools Act was misplaced and incorrect. The withdrawal of the 
function and the appointment of the committee were therefore unlawful and set aside.  
The court made some important remarks about the powers of governing bodies under the 
Schools Act. Moseneke DCJ stated that the preamble to the Schools Act expresses the intent 
to advance diverse cultures and languages and to uphold the rights of learners, parents and 
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educators.64 An overarching design of the Schools Act is that public schools are run by three 
partners.65 The Minister of Education represents the national government and his primary role 
is to set uniform norms and standards for public schools.66 The provincial government is 
represented by the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Education. The MEC, 
together with the HOD in every province, exercises executive control over public schools 
through the principals.67 Lastly, parents of the learners in the school and members of the 
community in which the school is located are represented in the school governing body which 
exercises defined autonomy over some of the domestic affairs of the school.68  
The court found that the primary function of the governing body was to promote the best 
interests of the school and the learners69 as the parents of learners are better qualified to 
address the specific needs of the school. This does not, however, mean that the power to 
decide the medium of instruction in a public school is the absolute or exclusive preserve of 
the governing body.70 It is made “subject to the Constitution, the Act and any applicable 
provincial law,”71 and must be exercised subject to the limitations or qualifications in the 
Constitution and the Schools Act. The court found that the power to intervene and revoke a 
function of the governing body is authorised by the Schools Act itself as long as it is done on 
reasonable grounds and with a legitimate purpose.72 What would constitute reasonable 
grounds have to be determined on a case by case basis taking into account all the 
circumstances that actuated the HOD to revoke the specific power of the governing body.73  
In determining the reasonableness of the decision the court has to consider carefully the 
nature of the function, the purpose for which it was revoked in the light of the best interests 
of the children, and the impact of the withdrawal on the well-being of the school, learners, 
parents and educators.74 These factors have to be weighed against the broad contextual 
framework of the Constitution.75 In this case the court did not make a finding on the 
reasonableness of the decision to withdraw the power of the governing body and change the 
language policy of the school as the HOD misapprehended his powers and constituted the 
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committee in an unlawful manner.76 The court did however find that it would be just and 
equitable to all the concerned parties to direct the school to reconsider its language policy in 
light of the considerations set out in the judgment.  
The governing body was ordered to report to the Court about the outcome of the review 
process within a specified period.77 In revising the language policy, the court advised the 
governing body to take into account the interests of the community in which the school is 
located and not just the best interests of the learners that are in the school at the present 
moment.78 This meant that the school had to have regard to the community in which the 
school is situated and ensure that the language policy also reflect the needs of the broader 
community of which the school forms part. The Court also directed the Department of 
Education to report to the Court on the steps it is taking to ensure that the demand for school 
place for grade 8s in the Ermelo area is met.79 
The Ermelo decision is important as it was the first case to recognise the tripartite nature 
of school management and the need for all of these parties to cooperate in the governance of 
the school. It also clarifies that the powers the governing bodies derive from the Schools Act 
are not absolute and may be revoked or limited where it is reasonable and justifiable. The 
decision to revoke the power of a governing body must however be exercised in a 
procedurally correct way and must adhere to the rule of law. The Ermelo judgment was 
shortly followed by a case that addressed the power of governing bodies to determine 
pregnancy policies. 
 
4 1 2 Head of Department, Department of Education Free State Province v Welkom High 
School and Another; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v 
Harmony High School 
In 2008 and 2009 respectively, the governing bodies of Welkom High School and 
Harmony High School adopted pregnancy policies for their respective schools.80 In terms of 
the policies learners who fall pregnant had to leave the school for a certain period of time 
before they could be readmitted.81 Two pregnant learners approached the Department of 
Education after they were excluded in terms of the policies.82 The HOD issued instructions to 
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the principals of the schools compelling them to readmit the learners.83 The schools then 
approached the courts seeking to interdict the HOD from interfering with the implementation 
of the policies. Both the High Court84 and the Supreme Court of Appeal85 found in favour of 
the schools on the basis that the HOD did not have the authority to instruct the principals to 
act in violation of the policies adopted by the governing body of the school.  
The Department’s appeal to the Constitutional Court was dismissed and Khampepe J, 
writing for the majority, found that, as a matter of legality, supervisory authority must be 
exercised in a lawful manner and in accordance with the Schools Act. With reference to the 
Ermelo judgment, the court held that under the Schools Act, public schools are run by a 
partnership involving the state, parents of learners and the community in which the school is 
located.86 Each of these partners represents a particular interest in the school and bears the 
corresponding rights and obligations in the provision of education services to learners.87 
Khampepe J held that a governing body is akin to a legislative authority within the public-
school setting and is responsible for the formulation of certain policies and regulations.88 
These policies guide the daily management of the school and ensure an appropriate 
environment for the realisation of the right to education.89 The Minister of Education is 
provided discretion under the Schools Act to determine guidelines regarding the content of 
codes of conduct, which must be considered by the governing body when formulating its 
policy.90 This does not however mean that the HOD has any policy-making power for a 
particular school or the power to establish any binding pregnancy policies that must be 
implemented by the school.91  
The decision of the HOD to flout procedure and override the schools’ policies was 
therefore unlawful and had to be set aside.92 The court found that an HOD who had 
reservations about a policy adopted by the governing body must engage in a comprehensive 
consultative process with the governing body regarding the policy.93 If there are reasonable 
grounds for doing so, the HOD may then only take over the performance of the particular 
function in terms of section 22 of the Schools Act in order to give effect to the relevant 
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constitutional rights and the objects of the legislation.94 The HOD could also approach the 
court for an urgent interdict prohibiting the implementation of the policy, or for an order 
reviewing and setting aside the policy.95 The rule of law obliges an organ of state to use the 
correct legal procedures and in this case the court found that the HOD had failed in 
discharging its power within the constraints of the law.96  
Khampepe J however acknowledged that the policies constituted a prima facie 
infringement of the constitutional rights of pregnant learners as they violated their rights to 
human dignity, freedom from unfair discrimination and the right to receive a basic education. 
The schools were ordered to review their policies in the light of the Constitution, the Schools 
Act and the considerations set out in the judgment.97 The schools were also ordered to 
embark on a process of meaningful engagement with the HOD in reviewing the policies. The 
process of meaningful engagement had to be done in accordance with the principles of 
cooperative governance that are enshrined in the Schools Act. 
In a separate and concurring judgment, Froneman J and Skweyiya J98 agreed with 
Khampepe J’s approach. They also found that, although this is a matter between the 
governing body and the HOD, the function of these bodies is primarily to serve the needs of 
the learners.99 It was therefore argued that the matter must be approached in a way that places 
the best interests of the learners as the starting point. The duty of the parties to engage, 
cooperate and communicate in good faith must be contextualised by the learners’ best 
interests.100 Froneman J and Skweyiya J focussed on section 41(1)(h) of the Constitution that 
imparts an unequivocal obligation on organs of state to cooperate with each other in mutual 
trust and good faith.101 This requires the governing body and the HOD to assist and support 
each other, inform each other, and consult on matters of common interest.102 Their actions 
must be coordinated and they must, as far as possible, refrain from engaging in legal 
proceedings against each other.103  
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4 1 3 Member of the Executive Council for Education in Gauteng Province and Others v 
Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School and Others104  
The facts of the Rivonia case are similar to those of Ermelo and Welkom in that they deal 
with a decision of an HOD that sought to override a policy of the governing body of Rivonia 
Primary School. In 2010 a Grade 1 learner, residing within the feeder area of the school, was 
refused a place for the 2011 academic year and placed on a waiting list.105 The school argued 
that it had reached its capacity of 120 learners as determined by the admission policy.106 The 
HOD issued an instruction to the principal to admit the learner and overturned the decision of 
the school to refuse the learner admission to one of its Grade 1 classes.107 Following the 
instruction of the HOD, the mother brought the learner to school, but the school refused to 
allow the learner access to a class.108 The next day, officials of the Department of Education 
arrived at the school and physically placed the learner at an empty desk.109 This followed a 
decision of the HOD to withdraw the principal’s admission function and delegate it to 
departmental officials.110 
The school brought an application for a declaratory order stating that the governing body 
had the power to determine the admission policy of the school and admit learners in 
accordance with the policy. The High Court dismissed the application,111 but the Supreme 
Court of Appeal found in favour of the school, stating that the Department of Education did 
not have the power to override the admission policy of the school and that the HOD had acted 
unlawfully.112 In the Constitutional Court, Mhlantla J, writing for the majority, held that the 
HOD did not exercise his power in a procedurally fair manner and dismissed the appeal. The 
court again considered the three-tier partnership between the national government, provincial 
government, and the parents of the learners and the members of the community.113 The court 
found that, at school level, the governing body is, in terms of the Schools Act, responsible for 
determining the capacity of a school as part of its admission policy.114 
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With reference to the Ermelo case,115 the Court held that any power of the governing body 
must be “understood within the broader constitutional scheme to make education 
progressively available and accessible to everyone.”116 This power is, however, subject to 
other provisions in the Schools Act, which determine that the Department maintains ultimate 
control over the implementation of the admission decisions, and the MEC may consider 
admission refusals and overturn an admission decision taken at school level.117 The power of 
the governing body to determine the capacity of the school as set out in the admission policy 
does not inflexibly limit the discretion of the HOD and he did have the power to admit the 
learner to the school.118 This must however be done in accordance with the procedures set out 
in the Schools Act and must comply with the rule of law. As in the earlier judgments, the 
Court reiterated that cooperation is the compulsory norm in disputes between school 
governing bodies and national and provincial governments.119 This cooperative approach is 
rooted in the shared constitutional goal of ensuring the best interests of all learners and 
furthering the right to a basic education.120  
 
4 1 4 Federation of Governing Bodies for South African Schools (FEDSAS) v Member of the 
Executive Council for Education, Gauteng and Another121 
The Fedsas judgment was delivered in 2016 and is the latest in the series of cases dealing 
with the powers of school governing bodies. The case concerns the Regulations Relating to 
the Admission of Learners to Public Schools under the Gauteng School Education Act 6 of 
1995 that was published in 2012. The question before the Court was whether the Regulations 
are inconsistent with the Schools Act or applicable provincial law,122 irrational, or not 
reasonable or justifiable.123 In 2011 the MEC for education in Gauteng published the 
Regulations for comment.124 In their comments on the Regulations FEDSAS argued that a 
number of the provisions encroached upon the powers of school governing bodies, and that 
their remit was beyond the empowering legislation.125 They argued that the Regulations 
violated section 5 of the Schools Act that empowered the governing body to admit learners to 
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the school.126 They further argued that the amended Regulations violated the principle of 
legality and were enacted in a procedurally unfair manner.127 
The Respondents submitted that they gave the representations serious consideration and 
altered some of the draft amended regulations to meet the concerns that had been raised by 
FEDSAS and the other people and organisations that made submissions.128 FEDSAS 
approached the High Court when the amended Regulations were promulgated and managed 
to have some of the provisions struck down.129 The decision was reversed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, which found that there were no substantive or procedural discrepancies and 
that the Regulations were enacted in terms of section 11(1) of the Gauteng School Education 
Act.130 The Constitutional Court only dealt with the validity of some of the regulations. 
Regulation 5(8) of the amended Regulations provides that despite “the provisions of any 
admission policy,” the District Director may at the end of the admission period place any 
unplaced learner “at any school” that had not been declared full.131 This regulation had to be 
read together with regulation 8 that makes provision for the HOD to determine the objective 
entry level learner enrolment capacity of the school.132 This meant that the HOD now has the 
power to make a declaration on whether a school is full, or is able to accommodate more 
learners.133  
FEDSAS contended that these regulations have the effect of ousting the governing body, a 
vital partner in terms of the Schools Act, from the admission process.134 The Respondents 
argued that the powers are “narrow, defined and rational” with the purpose of placing all 
unplaced learners as required by the Constitution and the Schools Act.135 Furthermore, the 
HOD’s decision constituted administrative action that is judicially reviewable and provides a 
remedy for schools that are unhappy with a decision of the HOD.136  The Court considered 
the conflict between the national legislation, namely the Schools Act and the provincial 
legislation, namely the amended Regulations. The Court specifically focussed on section 5(5) 
of the Schools Act which states that “[s]ubject to this Act and any applicable provincial law, 
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the admission policy of a school is determined by the governing body of such school.” 
Moseneke DCJ, writing for a unanimous Court, found that this provision had two internal 
qualifiers.  
Firstly, the governing body had to exercise its power subject to the Schools Act, as well as 
any other applicable provincial law.137 With reference to the Rivonia judgment, the Court 
argued that the determination of an admission policy is subject to intervention by the 
provincial government in terms of the Schools Act or any other intervening mechanism 
provided for in provincial legislation.138 Secondly, the court considered the role of public 
schools in South African society. It found that schools are public assets that must advance the 
interests of its immediate learners, as well as help in achieving universal and non-
discriminatory access to education.139 Against this background section 3(3) of the Schools 
Act allocates the duty to place unplaced learners in schools on the MEC.140 Furthermore, the 
HOD may determine the learner enrolment capacity of a school and declare it to be full or 
not.141 The Regulations sought to achieve this goal by providing a mechanism for the MEC 
and the HOD to perform their statutory duties that could be reconciled with the scheme of the 
statute.142  
The court went on to address the specific role of governing bodies in schools. Moseneke 
DCJ stated that parents must engage in a meaningful way in the teaching and learning of their 
children.143 The Schools Act provides for governing bodies, in order to ensure the democratic 
participation of parents and stakeholders in a way that advances the best interests of the 
learners at the school.144 The Court again stressed the importance of cooperative governance 
and consultation between governing bodies and the state.145 It reiterated the argument made 
in the Welkom case that there is a need for mutual trust and good faith between organs of state 
and that governing bodies and HODs must inform and consult one another on matters of 
common interest and avoid litigating against each other.146 
4 1 5 Summary 
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The judgments discussed above have laid down core principles regulating the interaction 
between governing bodies and the state. As a point of departure, a governing body must 
exercise the power to determine a policy on a particular aspect of school governance if the 
Schools Act empowers it to do so.147 An HOD or other government functionary is not entitled 
to simply override this power where it is of the view that the policy or its implementation 
violates the Schools Act or the Constitution.148 However, this does not mean that the power 
of the governing body is absolute or that the policy is immune to intervention.149 The policy 
is also not inflexible and does not bind all decision-makers in all circumstances.150 
A functionary is only allowed to intervene in the policy-making role of the governing 
body when the Schools Act or any other relevant legislation grants the functionary that 
power.151 This serves to uphold the rule of law. Where it is necessary for an intervention the 
functionary must act reasonably and fairly.152 Lastly, the process of intervention must be 
guided by the partnership model envisaged by the Schools Act as well as the cooperative 
government scheme set out in the Constitution. The governing body, as well as the relevant 
government functionary, are under a duty to engage in good faith on disputes about policies, 
and the engagement must be aimed at furthering the interests of the learners.153 
 
5 The role of governing bodies in drafting rules on religious observances  
The case law on the policy-making powers of governing bodies provides a framework in 
which section 7 of the Schools Act, read with section 15 of the Constitution, must be 
understood. Although there is no case law dealing specifically with the power of governing 
bodies to issue rules on religious observances, the powers to determine the language policy, 
pregnancy policy or admission policy of a school are analogous to the power to issue a 
religious policy. Similar legal principles can be applied to determine the nature and extent of 
governing bodies’ powers. The first important consideration is the three-tiered partnership 
established by the Schools Act. The national government, provincial government, and parents 
and members of the community have certain powers and functions which are exercised 
through their duly appointed representatives. The governing body represents the learners, 
parents and the community in this partnership.  
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When considering the constitutionality of the rules on religious observances the purpose of 
delegating the power to school governing bodies must be taken into account. As has been 
mentioned, governing bodies were established to ensure democracy within the education 
system so that schooling is no longer controlled by a centralist state as was the case under 
apartheid. Affording governing bodies the power to decide their own religious policy is a 
manifestation of this democratic ideal. Questioning the exercise of this power must thus be 
done with circumspection. Completely depriving governing bodies of the power to determine 
their schools’ religious policies is arguably an infringement of the democratic rationale that 
underlies the concept of governing bodies. This will again centralise the power in the hands 
of the state, negating the power of school communities to regulate their own affairs. Allowing 
governing bodies an unfettered discretion in this regard would, however, leave the school 
community vulnerable to abuse by a body that might prefer a particular religion to the 
detriment of others.  
Governing bodies have an obligation towards the learners, parents and community to act 
reasonably and fairly in performing their functions. The process of formulating rules on 
religious observances must allow for the needs of all religions to be considered in a fair and 
balanced way that does not show prejudice on the side of the governing body. A governing 
body is the voice of the entire school community - not just the majority. The rule-making 
process must reflect this inclusivity. It calls for all religions represented in the school 
community to be afforded an opportunity to make representations on the specific needs of 
their religion and the manner in which their religious observances may be accommodated in 
the school context. This can be done at a special meeting at the beginning of every year 
where the rules on religious observances are discussed. It can also take the form of written 
representations to the governing body setting out the needs of different religious groups.  
It is also helpful for a school to determine the religious affiliation of learners when they 
commence their studies at the school. In this way a governing body can get a statistical 
perspective on the religious demographic of the school and decide how best to accommodate 
the learners. This must of course be done without prejudice to the learners, parents or 
teachers and without discrimination based on religion. A rule-making process that 
discriminates unfairly against a particular religion would be constitutionally impermissible 
and would affect the constitutionality of the resulting policy. Where some religions are not 
allowed an opportunity to be heard, or their representations are simply ignored, the policy 
would not meet the requirements of section 7 and section 15(2) and will violate the religious 
freedom of these learners, parents and teachers. 
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 The second consideration that has to be taken into account when evaluating the power of 
school governing bodies to issue rules on religious observances, is that this power is subject 
to the Constitution, as well as “any applicable provincial law”.154 The power to determine a 
language policy and the power to issue rules on religious observances are both derived from 
the Schools Act and are subject to the Schools Act, the Constitution and any provincial 
law.155 Similarly, the governing body’s power to determine the admission policy of a school, 
that formed the basis of the Rivonia and Fedsas judgments, is also subject to the Schools Act, 
the Constitution and any applicable provincial law.156  
As a point of departure, it is obvious that the rules on religious observances must comply 
with the Constitution. All law must comply with constitutional principles and section 15(2) 
has specific constitutional requirements that must be met when religious observances are 
conducted at state and state-aided institutions. The rules on religious observances are, 
however, also subject to any applicable provincial law as well as the provisions of the 
Schools Act itself. This means that, just as with the language policy, pregnancy policy and 
admission policy of the school, an HOD can in principle extend some measure of control over 
the way in which rules on religious observances are formulated and implemented. The first 
way in which this could be done is for the HOD to simply withdraw the function of the 
governing body through section 22(1) of the Schools Act. This must be done on reasonable 
grounds and by following the prescribed procedure set out in section 22(2)(a) - (c).157 
The court in Ermelo determined that the reasonableness of the decision would be 
influenced by factors like the nature of the function, the purpose for which it was revoked in 
light of the best interests of the children, and the impact of the withdrawal on the well-being 
of the school, learners, parents and educators.158 In the case of religious observances it would 
arguably be reasonable for the HOD to revoke the power of a governing body where it is 
clear that the governing body, through its policy, infringes on the religious rights of the 
learners, teachers and parents, and refuses to adjust its approach.  
If a school has a policy that allows only for religious observances in line with the 
convictions of the majority while arbitrarily subjecting the minority to these observances, it 
could form the basis for an intervention by the HOD. Although the function to determine the 
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religious rules of a school is an important one, the reason for revoking the power would 
weigh heavier in such a case. Religious rules that coerce learners towards a particular religion 
violate section 7 of the Schools Act and section 15 of the Constitution, as well as the right to 
dignity, the right to equality,  freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to a 
religious community, and the best interest of the child. The revocation is thus imperative to 
protect the best interests of the learners. What would constitute reasonableness would be 
dependent on the facts of each case, but as a matter of principle, governing bodies must 
realise that their power to determine rules on religious observances is not absolute.  
Secondly, the power of governing bodies to issue rules on religious observances may also 
be limited through the enactment of provincial legislation, as recognised in the Fedsas 
judgment. It would therefore be possible for an act or regulations to be published in a 
province prescribing the manner in which governing bodies must draft rules on religious 
observances. Such a law would be subject to judicial scrutiny if, for instance, it completely 
negates the role of the governing body. It would also have to comply with the specific 
provisions of section 15(2) and may not be in conflict with the Constitution. In principle it 
would, however, be possible for legislation to provide a guideline for governing bodies on 
religious observances, or determine a specific procedure that must be followed when 
formulating the rules. 
The third consideration is the importance of the best interests of the child. Although this 
has already been discussed in the previous chapter,159 the case law on governing bodies’ 
functions makes the best interests of the child a primary consideration. In Welkom, Rivonia 
and Fedsas the court emphasised that the function of the national government, provincial 
government and the governing body of a school is primarily to serve the needs of the 
learners. This must be understood against the background of the constitutional obligation to 
ensure that all learners receive a basic education. Any question about the exercise of a 
governing body’s power must thus place the best interests of the learners as the first 
consideration. It is the background against which all functions must be exercised.  
The best interests of the learners should influence all decisions made by governing bodies 
on the rules around religious observances. The Ermelo judgment even went as far as to 
suggest that this obligation extends beyond the current learner body, and might be applicable 
to the potential learners that form part of the community within which the school is 
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situated.160 Practically, this requires the governing body to engage with the learners in order 
to determine their specific needs. It also means that a governing body that does not serve the 
best interests of the learners might open itself up to have its power revoked by the HOD. This 
will allow learners to voice their needs, giving effect to section 28 of the Constitution and 
article 12 of the CRC that makes specific provision for the opinion of children in all matters 
affecting them. A governing body must also be mindful of the religious needs of the 
community within which the school is situated. If the religious demographic of the 
community is changing, religious observances must adapt to accommodate potential learners. 
Public schools that define themselves as having a particular religious character or ethos can 
alienate learners, parents and teachers who do not adhere to the religion at the school. This is 
not in the best interests of the community or the children that form part of the community and 
must be considered by schools when formulating their religious policy. 
The last consideration that emerged from the case law is the need for governing bodies and 
the state to cooperate and engage in a meaningful way on matters of school governance. 
Section 41(1)(h) of the Constitution requires that organs of state cooperate with each other in 
good faith and mutual trust. The Schools Act enshrines the principle of cooperative 
governance and foresees a process based on mutual cooperation and respect. Where the 
parties deal with a matter of common interest there is an obligation to consult, inform, assist 
and support the other party in executing the function.161 In both the Welkom case162 and the 
Fedsas judgment163 the court emphasised that governing bodies and HODs must refrain from 
litigating against each other on issues of common interest and rather engage meaningfully 
and in good faith. 
However, the case law discussed above illustrates a worrying trend of governing bodies 
and national and provincial government engaging in court action over the scope of their 
respective powers. Governing bodies seem to view their powers as absolute, while the 
Department of Education, through its various representatives, often ignore procedures and 
legislation to bully governing bodies into complying with its instructions. The principle of 
cooperative governance requires both parties to comply with the rule of law and attempt to 
address differences in a way that preserves the working relationship between them and 
provide an outcome that is in the best interests of the children they serve. Furthermore, 
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“meaningful engagement” has developed as a “participatory constitutional remedy” that 
ensures direct engagement between parties in socio-economic rights litigation.164  
Although it developed as a remedy within the sphere of housing and eviction law, the 
cases discussed above illustrate that courts are increasingly ordering parties in education 
litigation to engage with each other in an attempt to find their own solutions to the dispute. 
This remedy is usually accompanied by a structural order in terms of which the parties must 
provide feedback to the court on the progress that has been made. Liebenberg165 suggests that 
the court must set normative parameters within which the process of engagement must be 
conducted in order to ensure that some form of agreement is reached. 
It is submitted that meaningful engagement must form part of the interaction between 
governing bodies and the state from the moment a dispute arises.166 By the time a case 
reaches court, the relationship between the parties has usually broken down irrevocably and 
an order of meaningful engagement just frustrates the process.167 Litigation can be avoided if 
the parties cooperate in good faith, listen to each other’s arguments, and ensure that the best 
interests of the children remain the overarching principle that guides the engagement process. 
The power to issue rules on religious observances lies primarily with the governing body, but, 
as has already been mentioned, this is not an absolute and inflexible power. Where a dispute 
arises over the content of a religious policy or the manner in which it is implemented, there is 
an obligation on both the governing body and the state to cooperate in finding a solution to 
the problem. The crux should not be which of the parties is right or wrong, but rather what is 
in the best interests of the children affected by the dispute. An approach like this will go far 
in avoiding litigation and preserving the relationship between the parties. 
It is also important for the parties to engage meaningfully when formulating the rules. This 
does not necessarily mean that the Department of Education must send representatives when 
the rules are being drafted, but it does mean that the governing body must at least take 
cognisance of the state’s stance on religious observances in schools. Although the National 
Policy on Religion and Education is only a guideline, and is in itself problematic, it is worth 
the time of the governing body to at least take notice of the suggestions made in the Policy. 
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This is part of the process of cooperative governance and ensures that the governing body 
does not become a force distinct from any checks and balances. It is also submitted that the 
Department of Education might need to invest in the appointment of a body of overseers that 
review the religious policies of schools, and assist and train them on the process of 
formulating rules on religious observances. This should not result in the governing body 
losing autonomy over the rules they formulate, but must rather exist as a guiding hand that 
acts in good faith to ensure that the best interests of learners are promoted. 
A body like this can consist of representatives of various religions and religious 
organisations as well as representatives of the Department. It could evaluate the rules of a 
school for compliance with section 7 of the Schools Act, read with section 15(2) of the 
Constitution or any of the supporting rights in the Bill of Rights. It is also suggested that the 
Department of Education embark on a process of formulating a clearer policy on religion and 
education that determines a specific process for the drafting of the rules on religious 
observances. Many governing bodies exploit the lack of oversight and regulation to conduct 
religious observances in an arbitrary and unconstitutional manner. It is often not even 
conducted in line with specific rules, but is simply based on an overarching religious 
character or ethos. Stricter guidelines, proper oversight, and the training of governing bodies 
will go far to protect the rights of learners, teachers and parents in the school system.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Section 7 of the Schools Act, read with section 15(2) of the Constitution, establishes the 
framework for the drafting of rules on religious observances. As public schools constitute 
state-aided institutions governing bodies are subject to the requirements of section 15(2). The 
power of governing bodies to make rules on religious observances is not absolute. It is 
subject to the Constitution and legislation and, as is illustrated above, may be challenged in a 
court of law. The rules that they draft must comply with the rule of law and be clearly 
formulated and readily available for all parties to avail themselves of its content. The use of 
the term “rules” implies a formality of status that calls for the drafting of a proper policy on 
religious observances. This is imperative to ensure that religious observances are conducted 
in a legitimate and transparent manner.  
Furthermore, the case law on the powers of governing bodies provides guidelines for the 
manner in which the power under section 7 of the Schools Act must be exercised. It is a 
power that may be limited by legislation or even completely revoked. It must also be 
exercised in a manner that takes cognisance of the three-tiered school governance 
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relationship. Most importantly, the governing body is subject to the interest of the children 
that they serve. Governing bodies must always be guided by what would be in the best 
interest of the children in all decisions that they take and, when drafting the religious policy 
of the school, this should be their primary consideration. They represent all the learners and 
cannot act in a way that negates and undermines the religious rights of some of the learners 
over the religious rights of others. The rule-making process must be characterised by 
consultation, close cooperation and meaningful engagement with all relevant stakeholders in 
order to ensure the most equitable outcome for a particular school. This is both a 
constitutional obligation and a practical measure to ensure that disputes are limited and 
religious observances are in line with the needs of the pupil body. The next chapter will focus 
specifically on the requirement of voluntariness in section 7 of the Schools Act, read with 
section 15(2)(c) of the Constitution.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FREE AND VOLUNTARY 
1 Introduction  
Section 7 of the Schools Act and section 15(2)(c) of the Constitution require that the 
attendance of religious observances be free and voluntary. On the face of it this seems simple 
enough, allowing people to choose the religious observances they feel comfortable partaking 
in, so as to respect their individual autonomy and their personal religious convictions. “Free 
and voluntary” is, however, a more complex concept and may be read in one of two ways. On 
the first reading, voluntariness is the absence of direct coercion, where people are directly 
forced to participate in religious observances or practices that contravene their own religious 
beliefs. On the second reading, voluntariness further requires the absence of indirect coercive 
pressure. Here, it is assumed that, even where attendance and participation are formally 
voluntary, the collective social impact of the religious observances may nevertheless cause 
subtle pressure to conform to the norms of the prevailing religion. The Constitution fails to 
specify how widely this requirement must be read, but Chaskalson P in the Lawrence case 
found that, regardless of the form the pressure takes, coercion must be established to give rise 
to an infringement of religious freedom.1  
It is thus imperative to the application of section 15(2) that clarity is provided as to 
whether it is sufficient that the attendance of and/or participation in religious activities not be 
compulsory,2 or if something more is required. With the exception of a few brief remarks on 
indirect coercion in Lawrence, no South African court has pronounced on the correct 
approach to “free and voluntary.” It is clear that direct religious coercion would constitute an 
automatic infringement of section 15(1) as it would render the observance neither free nor 
voluntary. The Constitutional Court in Lawrence has, however, alluded to a broader reading 
of section 15(2) that takes cognisance of the subtle ways in which religious observances can 
impact on non-adherents. By authorising official religious observances and requiring them to 
be free and voluntary, the drafters of the Constitution have set the courts the difficult task of 
grappling with the constitutionality of observances that are free and voluntary in a formal 
sense, but that may nevertheless amount to a form of indirect coercion.3 
This chapter asks how the phrase “free and voluntary” in section 7 and section 15(2) must 
be understood, with specific reference to the challenges posed by indirect forms of coercion. 
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Firstly, the direct and indirect approaches will be discussed in order to determine their 
meaning and scope. Secondly, the focus will be on the way in which foreign jurisdictions 
have opted to interpret voluntariness in the context of religious freedom in public schools. 
The approaches of the American, Canadian and German courts will be analysed in order to 
discern the various rights and policy considerations that come into play when interpreting 
“free and voluntary.” Lastly, a model will be proposed for understanding “free and 
voluntary” in the context of the Constitution. Drawing on the experiences of comparative 
jurisdictions and considering the unique historic, social, religious and constitutional context 
of South Africa, the aim is to provide an understanding of voluntariness that ensures the 
protection of all stakeholders’ rights. 
 
2 Approaches to “free and voluntary” 
As has already been mentioned, there are two approaches to understanding “free and 
voluntary.” A narrow reading of this requirement prohibits direct forms of coercive pressure 
where it is blatantly obvious that the participation in religious observances is not the result of 
an unfettered and autonomous decision by the participating individual or group. This narrow 
interpretation fails to take into account subtle forms of coercion. A more nuanced reading of 
section 15(2)(c) of the Constitution and section 7 of the Schools Act takes cognisance of the 
factors that can interplay to render a seemingly voluntary observance or practice involuntary. 
What follows is a discussion on the definition of direct and indirect coercion, focussing on 
the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. 
 
2 1 Direct Coercion 
Direct coercion denotes overt, express, explicit or blatant pressure4 exercised by someone 
(usually in a position of authority) upon someone else to engage in or refrain from religious 
practices or observances. Non-compliance is usually met with some form of penalty, fine, 
sanction, or the loss of a benefit.5 This form of coercion is direct as the coercer, intentionally 
and openly, confronts the coerced individual or group with the choice of conforming to the 
religious activity in question or facing the adverse consequences.6 Most jurisdictions that 
protect citizens’ right to religious freedom prohibit direct religious coercion. On a narrow 
reading of section 15(2)(c) and section 7, voluntariness implies that learners, teachers and 
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parents are at least afforded the option of attending and partaking in religious observances, 
allowing for exemption for conscientious objectors.7 This reading eliminates the danger of 
learners, teachers and parents feeling directly pressured or coerced towards a particular 
religion and ensure their freedom to make an enlightened choice about the observances they 
are exposed to. 
In Lawrence, Chaskalson P stated that the compulsory attendance of school prayers would 
infringe the right to religious freedom8 and would consequently be unconstitutional. This 
prohibition is also recognised in international law: article 18(2) of the ICCPR states that “[n]o 
one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief 
of his choice.” Included in this prohibition is the use of threat or physical force or penal 
sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to certain religious beliefs and 
congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.9 Policies or practices that have a 
similar intention or effect would also amount to an infringement of the right to religious 
freedom, in violation of article 18(2).10 
The ICCPR refers to the deprivation of state educational or medical benefits for non-
compliance as examples of direct coercion.11 Other examples include an imposition of a tax-
penalty for non-adherents or detention for learners that refuse to participate in religious 
observances in school. The American case of Kerr v Farrey12 illustrates direct coercion well. 
In this case a prisoner at a Wisconsin minimum security facility was classified as a higher 
security risk for refusing to attend religious-based narcotics rehabilitation meetings. This 
affected his eligibility for parole and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
state had coerced him to participate in the religious programme. The lack of a secular 
alternative constituted an infringement of his right to religious freedom as the prisoner could 
not exercise this right without being severely penalised for his choice.13  
The advantage of adopting only this narrow understanding of coercion is that it is usually 
easily ascertainable by a court. Courts are not expected to delve into the realm of psychology 
or sociology in an attempt to discern the impact of a seemingly voluntary observance or 
practice on the psyche of an individual or group. This eliminates the danger of judges, 
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advocates, and lawyers attributing experiences or emotions to claimants without the 
necessary knowledge or training.14 Furthermore, this approach does not take cognisance of 
coercion of a de minimis character, giving effect to the principle that the law does not concern 
itself with trivialities.15 Consequently, the legal system is not burdened with eradicating every 
miniscule and insubstantial instance of coercion, but can rather focus on those instances 
where a clear infringement of religious freedom has occurred and a remedy is available.16 
The South African Constitutional Court has addressed this argument in the Lawrence case. 
Sachs J warns against a too ready application of the de minimis principle where decisions are 
made about “sensitive and not easily measurable questions such as freedom of conscience, 
belief and opinion.”17 He states that: 
 
“One of the functions of the Constitution is precisely to protect the fundamental rights of non-
majoritarian groups, who might well be tiny and hold beliefs considered bizarre by ordinary 
faithful. In constitutional terms, the quality of a belief cannot be dependent on the number of 
its adherents nor on how widespread or reduced the acceptance of its ideas might be, nor, in 
principle, should it matter how slight the intrusion by the State is.”18 
 
Sachs J seems to suggest that the de minimis principle will very rarely be considered a 
sufficient defence where even a slight form of coercion is present. From this it is quite clear 
that the right to religious freedom envisioned by the Constitution requires more than the mere 
absence of direct religious coercion. The crux of “free and voluntary” in section 7 of the 
Schools Act, read with 15(2), lies in how broadly indirect coercion is framed in the South 
African context, taking into account the wording of the section as well as the rights and 
policy considerations that underlie the right to religious freedom.   
 
2 2 Indirect coercion  
A broader understanding of coercion considers the psychological, social and peer pressure 
a person may experience19 when confronted with the choice of adhering to the observances of 
the prevailing religion or exercising the right to exemption. Indirect coercion is usually 
present in cases where attendance of or participation in religious activities is, in a strict 
                                                                 
14
 Ahdar “The nature of religious coercion” ExpressO 16. 
15
 De minimis non curat lex; Ahdar “The nature of religious coercion” ExpressO 22. 
16
 Edwards Books 34-35. 
17
 Lawrence para 160. 
18
 Para 160.  
19
 Ahdar “The nature of religious coercion” ExpressO 9. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
114 
 
formal sense,20 free and voluntary and allowance is made for exemption on grounds of 
conscience. On the face of it, individuals are thus afforded a choice to either adhere to or 
refrain from participation and the pressure to conform is not met with an official sanction or 
penalty as is the case with direct coercion. The pressure to conform is, however, the result of 
a collection of factors such as peer pressure, the fear of being ostracised or vilified for 
dissenting religious convictions, unattractive alternatives to the prevailing religious practice 
or observances, and a fear of embarrassment or stigmatisation for disregarding the norm. 
Chaskalson P points to the “pervasive peer pressure” that is often present in the school 
community, resulting in learners, teachers and parents feeling coerced to conform to the 
majority’s religion.21 In the absence of a direct penalty for non-adherence, these factors act as 
the subtle sanctions imposed on dissenters.22 
This is especially true in cases where the minority religions constitute a very small part of 
a state or state-aided institution’s religious demographic, making it more difficult for 
minorities to take an individual stand against a system that seems to favour the beliefs of the 
majority.23 In the Lawrence24 case, O’Regan J points to this phenomenon of “power, prestige 
and financial support” being placed behind a particular religious belief, indirectly putting 
coercive pressure on religious minorities to forego their personal beliefs. This is particularly 
concerning in the context of the public school system where children are affected. They are 
often too emotionally and intellectually immature to understand the complexities of religion, 
making them more vulnerable to the influences of religious coercion. Peer-pressure and the 
need to fit in can subtly force children to conform, at the expense of their personal religious 
convictions. 
Advocates for the indirect approach argue that it addresses the practical realities associated 
with religious activity.25 It avoids the “formalism” of the direct coercion approach,26 resulting 
in a more sensitive and nuanced model for assessing the possible impact on religious 
freedom. Furthermore, it allows for a more inclusive perspective on the role of religion in the 
public sphere, focussing not only on those pressures that are blatantly obvious, but casting the 
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net wider to include instances of coercion that can subtly infringe on the basic rights of 
religious minorities.27 
Critics, however, argue that the indirect coercion test is based on subjective and imprecise 
evaluations of intangible phenomena that make it difficult for courts, with a limited 
knowledge of psychology and sociology, to determine if coercion is present or not.28 Indirect 
coercion is a “manipulable label”29 that is, as a result of its subjective nature, unpredictable 
and open to abuse by claimants with a personal agenda. Regardless of this concern, courts in 
other jurisdictions have not been deterred from interpreting indirect coercion and detecting its 
existence in the cases brought before them. Secondly, it is often argued that indirect coercion 
is the result of religiously diverse societies and that being compelled to choose to participate 
in religious observances is not in itself unconstitutional.30 Furthermore, it is not the 
responsibility of the state to insulate children from every instance of religious peer pressure.31 
The pressure to conform is simply a consequence of living in a pluralist society and must be 
dealt with in the same way as all other social pressures, where social isolation is often the 
price of conscience or non-conformity.32  
Although this is a compelling argument, there is a distinct difference between religious 
coercion in the context of the public school system and other social pressure. The pressure a 
child may feel to participate in religious observances conducted at the school is the result of 
an institutionalised system of coercion bought about by the endorsement by the school of a 
particular religion. As a result of this endorsement a learner may feel pressured by the school, 
teachers, other learners, and parents to conform. This is different from the social pressure a 
child might experience from friends to use drugs or participate in illegal activities. In that 
instance, the pressure is usually only between peers and is not endorsed by the school 
community. Furthermore, the pressure to use illegal substances or to perform illegal acts is 
usually condemned by the school as morally and socially unacceptable.  
This is not necessarily the case with the pressure to conform to a particular religion, where 
adherents of the preferred religion and the school at large can view this type of coercion in a 
positive light as it is aimed at converting non-adherents. It is submitted that the state cannot 
protect children from religious coercion in every instance and a certain tolerance to religious 
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pressure must be fostered in children if they are to function as part of a pluralist society. A 
distinction must, however, be drawn between the potential seriousness of religious coercion 
in the school system and that of other social pressures that are simply a part of growing up 
and living in a social environment.  
The indirect coercion approach can also have the effect of completely removing religious 
practices, observances and symbolism from the public sphere that in itself can constitute a 
threat to religious freedom. This critique will be discussed below with reference to Canada 
where the indirect approach has inadvertently acted as an equivalent to the Establishment 
Clause in American law.33 In South Africa, this is an important concern, as a too wide 
interpretation of indirect coercion can negate the existence of section 15(2) altogether, 
rendering all religious activities in the public sphere unconstitutional. This can tilt the 
neutrality of the state disproportionately and unequally in favour of an atheistic understanding 
of the world. Unless it is the clear intent of a constitution to create a society where religion is 
exclusively part of the private sphere, indirect coercion must be interpreted to avoid this 
unintended consequence. 
Some jurisdictions have opted to remove all religious observances from the public school 
system as a result of the indirect coercive effect it can have on learners, teachers and parents. 
Especially in America and Canada, a vast body of case law has developed in response to 
religious activities in schools. These jurisdictions have repeatedly applied the indirect 
coercion test to invalidate all forms of religious practices in the public school system. In 
contrast, Germany’s Basic Law34 allows for religious education in schools in accordance with 
the tenets of the religious community, although no teacher may be obliged to give religious 
instruction against his will. Like the South African Constitution, the framers of the German 
Basic Law left the right to decide the content and the nature of religious observances to the 
school community, on the condition that participation be free and voluntary. The next section 
provides an overview of the ways in which these three jurisdictions have opted to interpret 
“free and voluntary.”  
 
3 Indirect coercion from a legal comparative perspective 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution states that, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, courts 
may take notice of foreign law. The American, Canadian and German jurisdictions have been 
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chosen for various reasons. Firstly, these countries represent different ways in which indirect 
coercion can be interpreted in the public school system. American courts have found indirect 
coercion to be an infringement of religious liberty, primarily because it violates the 
Establishment Clause that prohibits any interference by the state in religious matters. 
Canadian courts have reached a similar conclusion despite the clear absence of an 
Establishment Clause. The Canadian Charter of Human Rights (“The Charter”) does not 
contain any reference to religious observances in the public sphere, but courts have 
interpreted indirect religious coercion so widely that, as in America, any form of subtle 
coercion is considered to be a violation of religious freedom. Although the Charter did not 
necessarily foresee a wall of separation between the state and religion, the interpretation of 
indirect coercion has inadvertently resulted in such a separation. 
The German Basic Law provides for religious education in the public school system. 
Perhaps as a result of this provision, religious observances are commonplace in Germany’s 
inter-denominational schools. Unlike their American and Canadian counterparts, the German 
courts have found certain religious observances constitutional, despite the existence of 
indirect coercion. They have rather opted for a narrower reading of indirect coercion that is 
based on a balancing of competing rights and policy considerations. An analysis of these 
diverse approaches is aimed at enlightening the interpretation afforded to indirect coercion in 
South Africa. By examining the factors that informed the choices of other jurisdictions, 
similarities and differences can be pointed out to construct a unique South African model of 
indirect coercion in line with the Constitution. 
  
3 1 United States of America  
The right to religious freedom is addressed in the First Amendment of the American 
Constitution which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof […].” This right is two-fold. The first part of 
the Amendment is commonly known as the Establishment Clause, providing freedom from 
government interference in religious matters.35 The second part of the Amendment is referred 
to as the Free Exercise Clause that protects the individual’s right to religious freedom, belief 
and practice.36 The First Amendment consequently guarantees both government neutrality 
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towards religion and the individual’s liberty in choosing and practising a religion.37 The 
American courts’ jurisprudence on religious freedom, and especially religious observances 
and practices in schools, is extensive and complex. Many of the questions raised in the 
context of the Constitution after 1994, have been dealt with in America since the mid-1900s.  
As has already been mentioned, the American courts give a very wide interpretation to 
indirect coercion which regards almost every form of religious activity in schools as 
unconstitutional for its potentially coercive effect. Although it is quite clear that this extreme 
approach was not envisioned by the Constitution, it is still important to consider the 
American position in this regard to form a better understanding of the policy considerations, 
rights and values that underlie indirect coercion. Most of the American cases that dealt with 
religious activity in schools have been decided under the Establishment Clause, with indirect 
coercion considered to be an infringement of this constitutional principle.38 The most 
extensive interpretation of the Establishment Clause is provided by the Supreme Court in 
Everson v Board of Education.39 The court states that: 
 
“[n]either a state not the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force 
nor influence a person to go or remain away from church against his will or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of 
any religious organisations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment or religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between 
the church and the State.”40 
 
This section from the Everson judgment has become the cornerstone of Establishment 
jurisprudence. The attitude of strict separation and absolute government neutrality has 
informed almost all subsequent judgments related to religious activities in schools and the 
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impact of indirect coercion.41 It is, however, not within the scope of this study to discuss all 
of the case law dealing with religious practices in American schools. This section will rather 
aim to provide a brief overview of the manner in which American courts have opted to 
interpret indirect coercion and its relation to the Establishment Clause. 
Initially, the relationship between indirect coercion and the Establishment Clause was 
unclear.42 Engel dealt with the required daily recitation in New York public schools of a non-
denominational prayer composed by the State Board of Regent43 and was the first case to 
address the type of coercion that would constitute a violation of Establishment Clause 
guarantees. Although learners were afforded the option of absenting themselves from the 
room while the prayer was being recited,44 this observance was still found to be 
unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Black J referred to historical evidence to conclude 
that the First Amendment was enacted to try to end government control of religion and 
prayer.45 The official school prayer violated the fundamental purpose underlying the First 
Amendment.46 The court in Engel made it clear that the Establishment Clause is not 
dependent “upon the showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the 
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to 
coerce non-observing individuals or not.”47  
It was acknowledged that the recital of prayers placed non-adherents in a difficult position, 
having to choose between leaving at the risk of potential adverse consequences and staying to 
partake in observances that did not coincide with their own religious beliefs.48 The court 
rejected the claim that the danger of coercion was too trivial to constitute a true infringement, 
arguing that permitting this incursion on religious liberty might permit more serious 
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incursions in the future.49 The court, however, failed to make plain whether coercion was a 
necessary element to show that the Establishment Clause had been violated.50 It was also 
unclear how broadly coercion must be understood and if every instance of alleged coercion, 
direct and indirect, would be regarded as a threat to religious freedom.  
In 1963, shortly after the judgment in Engel, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of two school prayer statutes51 in School District of Abington Township v 
Schempp. In both cases the statutes made provision for the reading of at least ten verses from 
the Holy Bible at “the opening of each public school on each school day.”52 Upon the written 
request by their parents, children could be excused from participating in this religious 
observance.53 The court held that the First Amendment places the government in a position of 
neutrality that “stems from recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or 
groups might bring about a fusion of government and religious functions.”54 In order to 
establish whether government action is neutral, the court formulated a two-pronged test. 
Firstly, government action must have a secular purpose, and secondly it must create a primary 
neutral effect.55 This means that government action must neither advance nor discriminate 
against religion. The legislation allowing for compulsory Bible reading was found to advance 
religion, detracting from the secular purpose of government action and breaching the 
principle of neutrality.56  
In Schempp the court also clarified some of the uncertainty created by the Engel judgment 
with respect to the existence of coercion. A father of three minor children argued that his 
children felt coerced to participate in the reading of the Bible verses although it was free and 
voluntary. He refrained from seeking exemption for his children because he was afraid it 
would adversely affect their relationships with their teachers and the other learners.57 The 
court in Schempp suggested that the presence or absence of any form of coercion is irrelevant 
to questions arising under the Establishment Clause.58 As in the Engel case, it was also 
contended that the choice to participate freely and voluntarily meant that the observance did 
not violate any constitutional principles. This argument was rejected by the court, noting that 
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while proof of coercion could provide a basis for a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, it 
was not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause.59 From this case it 
seems as if religious observances in public schools are unconstitutional regardless of the 
existence of coercion or not. The focus rather seems to fall on the endorsement of religion by 
the state, which violates the principle of state neutrality that forms the core of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Before 1971 courts followed several approaches to assessing Establishment Clause 
challenges.60 In Lemon the Supreme Court tied all the criteria together for a newly formed 
three-part test that would form the basis of Establishment Clause jurisprudence until the early 
1990s.61 Although this case did not deal expressly with religious observances in the public 
school system, it raised the related concern of the state providing financial support to aid 
church-affiliated schools. Burger CJ formulated what would commonly become known as the 
Lemon test as follows: “Firstly, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; secondly, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”62 
The problem with the Lemon test was that it failed to properly address coercion and its place 
in Establishment Clause cases.63 The test was also developed in a somewhat different context 
than the cases dealing with religious observances, as coercion hardly featured on the facts of 
the Lemon case. Regardless of this obvious shortcoming the Lemon test was applied to 
religious observance cases until 1992.64 
In Wallace v Jaffree65 a father, on behalf of his minor children, challenged an Alabama 
statute that allowed public schools to begin each day with a period of silence for meditation 
or voluntary prayer.66 The particular school his children attended maintained regular prayer 
services and Jaffree alleged that “teachers had on a daily basis led their classes in saying 
prayers in unison.”67 This had subjected his children to “various acts of religious 
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indoctrination,”68 as well as exposing them to “ostracism from their peer group class 
members if they did not participate.”69 Applying the Lemon test, the court found the law 
unconstitutional as it had no clear secular purpose.70 A statute already existed that permitted 
for meditation and the new statute which provided for prayer as well was found to be an 
attempt to return prayer to the public schools.71  
In a concurring judgment, O’Connor J suggests obiter that there is a distinction between 
state-sponsored prayer and the state allowing for a moment of silence during which learners 
can pray or reflect.72 Unlike Engel and Schempp where the learners were afforded the choice 
to participate, thereby compromising the non-adherent’s beliefs or drawing attention to their 
non-conformity,73 the allowance for a moment of silence is not inherently religious.74 
O’Connor J argues that the time can be used for non-religious reflection or meditation.75 
Partaking in a moment of silence does not compromise the beliefs of the individual as they 
are left to their own thoughts and are not compelled to listen to the thoughts or prayers of 
others.76 This analysis touches on the notion that coercion can play a role in determining the 
constitutionality of religious observances, but fails to explain the interaction between 
coercion and the test in Lemon. 
In 1989, Kennedy J in his dissent in American Civil Liberties Union offered the first 
sustained defence of a coercion theory of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.77  The case 
dealt with the placement of two religious holiday displays outside the Allegheny County 
Courthouse and the City-County Building. The majority of the court followed the test laid 
down in Lemon, but in his dissenting opinion, Kennedy J offered his understanding of the 
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.78 He states that “government may not 
coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not […] 
give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact establishes a religion or religious 
faith, or tends to do so.”79 He further explains the relation between these conditions, 
suggesting that it would be difficult to “establish a religion without some measure of more or 
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less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply the substantial benefits that would 
sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental 
exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.”80 
Kennedy J seems to suggest that a broad approach to coercion could aid in establishing the 
limits imposed on the state by the Establishment Clause.81 This theory depends heavily on the 
interpretation afforded to coercion.82 In attempting to flesh out the meaning of coercion, he 
notes that the Court had “invalidated actions that further the interests of religion through the 
coercive power of government.”83 Citing examples from cases that had been decided by the 
Court, he identifies the following as potentially coercive practices: “compelling or coercing 
participation or attendance at a religious activity,”84 “requiring religious oaths to obtain 
government office or benefits,”85 and “delegating government power to religious groups.”86 
However, not all of these cases dealt with coercion, making his argument somewhat 
unconvincing.87 He also fails to formulate a sufficient coercion test. It would be left to the 
court in the watershed Lee to determine the parameters of such an approach.88 
The challenge in Lee involved a school policy in which local members of the clergy were 
invited to give invocations and benedictions at public school graduations.89 Attendance of 
this part of the graduation ceremony was free and voluntary90 and non-attending learners still 
received their diplomas. The court in Lee did not expressly reject the Lemon test, but the 
majority seemed to suggest that a coercion analysis should proceed before any application of 
Lemon.91 The court held that it need not consult the other tests for Establishment Clause 
violations because “at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not 
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”92 Kennedy J identified 
liberty as a central concern of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, 
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cautioning against “subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public 
schools”93 that could infringe on this liberty. The court found that prayer exercised in public 
schools carries a particular risk of indirect coercion and that although this pressure is not 
limited to the school context, it is most pronounced there.94 The majority explained that: 
 
“[r]esearch in psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often 
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest 
in matters of social convention.”95 
 
In light of the argument that the attendance of the prayer was free and voluntary, the court 
explained the meaning of coercion within the context of Establishment Clause violations as 
follows: 
 
“The school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places 
subtle and indirect public and peer pressure on attending students to stand as a group or 
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. A reasonable dissenter of 
high school age could believe that standing or remaining silent signified her own participation 
in, or approval of, the group exercise, rather than her respect for it. And the state may not 
place the student dissenter in the dilemma of participating or protesting. Since adolescents are 
often susceptible to peer pressure, especially in matters of social convention, the state may no 
more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use direct means. The 
embarrassment and intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing that the 
prayers are of a de minimis character, since that is an affront to the rabbi and those for whom 
the prayer have meaning, and since any intrusion was both real and a violation of the 
objectors’ rights.”96 “The pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt 
compulsion.”97 
 
At the core of this test is the “principle that government may accommodate the free 
exercise of religion,” but this does not “supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the 
Establishment Clause.”98 At a minimum, the American Constitution “guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or 
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otherwise act in a way which establishes a religion or religious faith or tends to do so.”99 The 
court also suggests that in determining coercion, the impact of the religious observance must 
be viewed from the perspective of the dissenter and not the adherents.100 Eight years after 
Lee, the coercion test was applied in Santa Fe Independent School District in which a Santa 
Fe high school provided for student-led prayer at the opening of their home football matches. 
The policy provided for an election to determine whether there would be a prayer before the 
football match and, if the majority voted in favour, a second election determined which 
student would deliver the prayer. Attendance of this part of the game was free and voluntary 
for all students. Stevens J found that the “student election does nothing to protect minority 
views but rather places the students who hold such views at the mercy of the majority.”101 
Furthermore, “fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote”102 and this practice failed to 
protect the fundamental rights of dissenters. 
The policy only allowed for non-sectarian and non-proselytising prayers,103 but the court 
found that there was a very clear bias towards prayers with a religious content and 
message.104 The fact that the football match, unlike the graduation ceremony in Lee that is an 
almost obligatory part of attending high school, was absolutely voluntary made no difference 
to the court. They noted that for some learners, such as cheerleaders, football players, and 
band members the attendance of the match is mandatory and may even be a prerequisite for 
class credits, while others have social obligations that require their presence at the match.105 It 
was consequently found to be “formalistic to the extreme” to assume that high school learners 
felt no social pressure to attend sport events, or have a genuine desire to participate in 
extracurricular activities where religion may be observed.106 In both Lee and Santa Fe 
Independent School District the court considered three important issues that played a role in 
the coercion analysis, namely, the institutional setting of the activity, the institution’s control 
over the activity, and the impressionability/vulnerability of those within the institution.107 The 
court suggested that the consideration of these factors and the determination of an 
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Establishment Clause violation must be conducted with reference to the particular social facts 
of the case before it.108 
Ward109 argues that the coercion test, as formulated in Lee and Santa Fe Independent 
School District, does not appear to require any intentional organisation by the school or the 
state to create peer pressure and, even in the absence of any intent, the actions will still be 
unconstitutional. The existence of coercive pressure is enough to constitute a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Since its formulation in Lee and refinement in Santa Fe Independent 
School District, the coercion test has been applied in subsequent cases in the lower courts, 
shedding further light on the nature and scope of the test. In Coles v Cleveland Board of 
Education110 the Sixth Circuit Court found the practice of praying before board education 
meetings to be a violation of the Establishment Clause.111 There was no indication that the 
teacher or the learner who had complained about the prayer were likely to change their 
religious beliefs.112 The court found that coercion was sufficient for a finding of 
unconstitutionality, but not a necessity.113 The state is seen to act coercively when the 
negative social impact of the religious observance is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
requiring the religious dissenter to make the choice between participating or not.114 It is thus 
possible to have a violation of the Establishment Clause without ever having shown any real 
direct or indirect coercion.  
The court in Coles also alluded to the idea that the number of learners potentially coerced 
by the religious observance is not important. There is consequently no need to show that 
several children were being coerced. The court stated that “the heightened review given to 
school-sponsored prayer does not turn on any particular children-to-adult ratio, above which 
prayers are prohibited, but below which they are constitutionally permissible.”115 It thus 
matters more that young minds are religiously coerced rather than that some threshold 
number of children are the victims of the coercion.116 This contrasts with some other 
jurisdictions like Germany that recognise the impact of religious coercion on learners, but are 
only willing to mitigate its effect when a threshold number of learners are affected. In cases 
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where the number of learners falls below the threshold, there seems to be an assumption that 
the learners must simply bear the burden.117 
In American law the concept of coercion, and especially indirect coercion, has developed 
over the years to form the primary basis on which a violation of the Establishment Clause is 
determined. The coercion test has effectively established the absence of coercion as a 
threshold for any religious practice, observance or activity in the public sphere and has 
determined the parameters of the Establishment Clause. Consequently, any religious activity 
that has the reasonably foreseeable potential of causing some form of coercive pressure is 
regarded as unconstitutional. This is very similar to the approach adopted by the Canadian 
Supreme Court which, despite the absence of an establishment clause in the Canadian 
Charter, has interpreted the right to religious freedom to preclude both direct and indirect 
coercion. 
 
3 2 Canada 
As a legal comparative counterpart for South Africa few jurisdictions are quite as well 
situated as that of Canada. Not only have the Canadian courts dealt with many of the 
uncertainties around religious observances in the 1980s already, but a shared history of 
colonial rule and the substantial influence of the Charter on the formulation of section 15 of 
the Constitution create a worthy foundation for a comparative analysis. Both Canada and 
South Africa share a history of British imperial rule in which their legislation, policies, 
governments, and especially school systems were considerably influenced by Christianity.118 
Like the promulgation of the Constitution, the enactment of the Charter in 1982 heralded a 
new societal and legal order characterised by a supreme constitution that guarantees basic 
human rights and freedoms.  
In terms of section 2(a) of the Charter everyone has the fundamental right of conscience 
and religion. The formulation of section 15 of the South African Constitution was 
substantially influenced by the right to religious freedom in the Charter.119 Unlike the 
Constitution, however, section 2(a) of the Charter only provided for the right to religious 
freedom, making no mention of religious observances in state or state-aided institutions. The 
right to religious freedom is, as in South Africa, not an absolute right and may be limited. 
Section 1 guarantees all rights and freedoms in the Charter, subject “to such reasonable limits 
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prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The 
Supreme Court of Canada in R v Oakes120 established a test for applying section 1 that is 
remarkably similar to the limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution. 
Firstly, the law limiting the fundamental right must have a pressing and substantial 
objective. The second part of the test is a proportionality analysis that requires that a 
proportionate balance be struck between the infringement of the right and the legitimate 
government purpose. This entails that the limitation must be rationally connected to the 
objective; there must be as little impairment of the right as possible, and it must be proven 
that the same objective cannot be achieved in some other way which would result in a less 
intrusive infringement of the right.121 The test also allows for a balancing of competing rights 
and policy considerations to determine if the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in a free 
and democratic society.122 
In Big M Drug Mart, the first case to interpret section 2(a), the Supreme Court discusses 
the parameters of religious freedom as follows: 
 
“The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious 
beliefs as a person chooses; the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of 
hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious beliefs by worship and practice or by 
teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that. Freedom can primarily be 
characterised by the absence of coercion or constraint. Coercion not only includes such 
blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of 
sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alternative 
courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence 
of coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices.”123 
 
The court here identifies the dual character of the right to religious freedom under the 
Charter. It entails the right to observe and participate in the religion of choice, as well as the 
right to be free from any direct or indirect compulsion in the making of this choice. The 
enactment of the Charter and the right to religious freedom had an inevitable impact on the 
way in which public schools conducted religious observances in Canada. In terms of the 
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Constitution Act, 1867,124 education is a provincial matter regulated by individual provincial 
acts.125 The first cases dealing with religious observances were heard in the province of 
Ontario, but they have become a reflection of the national approach to religion in the 
Canadian school system.126  
Zylberberg v Sudbury (Board of Education)127 was the first case to deal with the 
constitutionality of religious observances in public schools. Section 28(1) of Regulation 262 
(1980) under the Education Act (1980) required public schools to begin or end each school 
day with a reading of the Christian Lord’s Prayer, scripture readings, and the singing of 
hymns.128 Non-Christian and atheistic parents argued that section 28(1) violated section 2(a) 
of the Charter, regardless of the fact that attendance was free and voluntary. At the request of 
a parent(s), learners could be excused from the classroom during the observances, or if they 
remained in the classroom, they were not expected to participate. On the facts, none of the 
parents opted to have their children exempt from participation, because they feared their 
children would be singled out from their peers for their religious beliefs.129  
The Board argued that the purpose of the law was to teach moral values, and that Christian 
religious values were simply used as a vehicle to achieve this objective.130 Furthermore, they 
argued that if the law restricted section 2(a), the limitation of the rights of the religious 
minority was insubstantial and justifiable in an open and democratic society.  Applying the 
Oakes test, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that section 28(1) constituted a prima facie 
infringement of the right to religious freedom.131 On the question of whether this was a 
justifiable infringement, the court found that section 28(1) failed the proportionality element 
of the test. The court suggested that the denigration of minority rights was not insubstantial 
and did not impair “as little as possible” the right of the minority students.132 It stressed the 
importance of “freedom from conformity”133 and the fear that the practices of majority 
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religions are imposed on religious minorities, subjecting them to the “tyranny of the 
majority.”134  
The court found the argument that the Act served to teach moral values by way of 
Christianity unconvincing. Focussing on the last leg of the Oakes-test, the court held that 
there were less intrusive ways of imparting educational and moral values than those provided 
for in section 28(1).135 It was not necessary to give primacy to the Christian religion in school 
opening exercises and these observances could be more appropriately founded on the 
multicultural traditions of the Canadian society.136 The court out rightly rejected the argument 
that section 28(1) was constitutional because attendance was free and voluntary. While it 
sympathised with the majority standpoint, the court found that it did not reflect the reality of 
the situation faced by members of religious minorities.137 Just like in American law, the 
question whether there is pressure or compulsion must be approached from the perspective of 
the minority and especially from the standpoint of learners in a sensitive setting like a public 
school.138  
The court found that in reality the choice to participate in the observances or not, imposed 
on minorities a compulsion to conform to the religious practices of the majority.139 The peer 
pressure and the classroom norms were pervasive and operated to compel religious minorities 
to conform to majoritarian practices.140 This was illustrated by the fact that the applicants in 
this case were reluctant to request exemption from participation, fearing that their children 
may be ostracised or vilified.141 In the court’s view, children of school-going age are 
disinclined to step out of line or flout their “peer-group norms,”142 subjecting them to a cruel 
dilemma. Learners could avoid claiming an exemption and simply continue participating in 
exercises distasteful to them because of a reluctance to be stigmatised as atheists or non-
conformists.143 Consequently, the exemption procedure was found to have the “chilling 
effect” of discouraging the free exercise of religion144 and could not save section 28(1) from 
being declared unconstitutional. One of the arguments raised by the Board was that the 
Charter contained no establishment clause which meant that section 28(1) could not be 
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invalidated.145 The court rejected this contention, drawing a distinction between the American 
Establishment Clause and the right to religious freedom in the Charter.146 With reference to 
the decision in Big M Drug Mart,147 the court found that the applicability of the Charter 
guarantee of freedom of religion does not depend on the presence or absence of an “anti-
establishment principle.”148 While similar cases in America were decided under the 
Establishment Clause, the Canadian approach is centred on the right to religious freedom 
itself. Although these approaches overlap, the Canadian courts have opted to decide cases 
about religious observances by way of a balancing of competing rights and policy 
considerations.  
Two years after the Zylberberg decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal was as again 
confronted with a case on religion in public schools, although the focus was on religious 
education rather than observances. In Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Ontario 
(Minister of Education),149 commonly referred to as Elgin County, the constitutionality of 
section 28(4) of Regulation 262 was questioned. Section 28(4) made provision for two 
periods of one-half hour each per week to be devoted to religious education in Ontario public 
schools. In practice, the content of these classes was primarily based on the Christian faith, 
but provision was made for exemption on the ground of conscience.150 Attendance and 
participation in these classes were consequently free and voluntary. The Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association contended that this practice violated section 2(a) of the Charter, 
because it coerced children from minority religions to participate in religious education 
classes intended for members of the Christian faith.151 They also argued that the exemption 
clause stigmatised learners who opted to make use of it. 
In turn, the school board argued that religion was simply used as a vehicle for teaching 
moral lessons and Christianity was part of the curriculum, therefore the classes did not 
constitute indoctrination or coercion.152 Furthermore, any infringement of religious freedom 
was trivial and in the light of the importance of the teaching of morality, it could be justified 
under section 1 of the Charter.153 The court dismissed these arguments, finding that the 
purpose of the regulations was indoctrination and that they had the effect of pressurising 
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learners to conform to the religious practices and observances of Christianity. It found that 
the teaching of Christian doctrine as if it were the exclusive means through which to develop 
moral thinking amounted to religious coercion in the classroom.154 With reference to Edward 
Books, the court reaffirmed the notion that all coercive burdens pose a threat to section 2(a) 
regardless of whether they are direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or 
unforeseeable. 155 
In a sense, the decision in Elgin County was an inevitable consequence of the Zylberberg 
judgment and the very wide definition afforded to religious freedom in Big M Drug Mart and 
Edwards. As a result of these cases, the right to religious freedom comprises of the right to 
entertain the religious beliefs a person chooses and the right to be free from compulsion to 
conform to the religious practices of the majority.156 The interpretation of indirect coercion in 
Canadian law is similar to that of the American courts. Even in the absence of an 
establishment clause, a wide meaning has been ascribed to indirect coercion, that includes the 
most subtle forms of compulsion. As a result, the right to religious freedom has acted almost 
exactly like the Establishment Clause in American jurisprudence.  
Unlike the Constitution that makes specific provision for religious observances in public 
schools, the Charter is mute in this respect. In the absence of such a provision, the courts have 
interpreted religious freedom in much the same way as American courts have approached the 
Establishment Clause. In American law, indirect coercion violates the Establishment Clause, 
while in Canadian law indirect coercion violates the right to religious freedom. The 
approaches have similar outcomes, completely removing religious observances from the 
public sphere. Germany has a somewhat different take on religious observances in the public 
school system. German law provide for religious education while mitigating the potential 
coercive effect with rather strict rules as to the format and the content of the education and 
the accompanying observances.157 Case law dealing with religious observances in public 
schools has opted for an alternative interpretation of indirect coercion that does not have the 
diminishing effect of judgments of the American and Canadian courts.  
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3 3 Germany 
The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) was drafted by the Parliamentary Council and 
promulgated in 1949.158 The Parliamentary Council did not intend a strict separation between 
the state and the church and although these two entities are independent from each other, 
some religious communities are granted privileges which leads to cooperation between the 
state and the church.159 As a result of this cooperative relationship, the Basic Law contains a 
more complex system of provisions related to the protection of religious rights. The central 
provision is found in section 4(1) which reads as follow: “Freedom of faith and of 
conscience, and freedom to profess religion or a particular philosophy, is inviolable.” Section 
4(2) adds that “the undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.”  
Furthermore, article 140 incorporates by reference five articles of the Weimar Constitution 
providing, among other things, that “there shall be no state church”160 and that religious 
organisations shall enjoy the right to “regulate and administer [their] own affairs […] within 
the limits of the law that applies to everyone.”161 Protection is also afforded against the 
compulsion to disclose one’s religious convictions162 or to “perform any religious act or 
ceremony.”163 In addition, section 3(3) of the Basic Law states that “no one may be 
prejudiced or favoured because of […] his faith or his religious […] opinions.”164 From a 
legal comparative perspective, these are rather standard provisions, protecting the free 
exercise of religion while forbidding the establishment of an official state church. However, 
section 7(3) of the Basic Law creates an interesting provision related to religion in the public 
school system. It reads as follow:  
 
“Religious classes form part of the ordinary curriculum in state schools, except for secular 
schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right of supervision, religious instruction is given in 
accordance with the tenets of the religious communities. No teacher may be obliged against 
his will to give religious instruction.” 
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In Germany, the legislative power to regulate the public school system is vested in the 
Länder, which are the equivalent of the American states or the South African provinces.165 
Their regulatory powers are only limited by section 7 of the Basic Law which, along with 
setting out the principles around religion in schools, also provides other guidelines by which 
the schools must be administered.166 Germany allows for a variety of different schools. 
Firstly, section 7(3) excludes “non-denominational schools” from mandatory religious 
instruction. Non-denominational public schools are state schools that are neutral towards all 
religions.167 They neither provide for religious instruction nor show any affiliation to a 
religion, although some schools do provide a general and neutral instruction in different 
religions and ideological beliefs.168 These schools are, however, extremely rare in Germany 
and very few Länder have established their school system on a non-denominational basis.169  
Secondly, there are public denominational schools where the education in all subjects is 
closely related to a particular religion.170 As with the non-denominational schools, there are 
very few denominational schools in Germany. The majority of public schools in Germany fall 
within the third category, namely inter-denominational public schools.171 These schools admit 
learners of all religious beliefs although the schools themselves are affiliated with 
Christianity and are constitutionally required to provide religious instruction.172 In these 
schools, secular subjects may be taught with reference to Christianity as the main factor for 
cultural and educational development in Germany.173 An example from this type of 
curriculum would be the effect that the development of the Lutheran-Protestant religion had 
on Germany’s social development.174  
The emphasis is more on the Christian tradition and culture than the Christian faith and the 
purpose is educational rather than confessional.175 Consequently, proselytising learners 
towards Christianity or influencing them to believe in a certain religion is prohibited.176 The 
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schools may thus not convert to missionary schools177 and may not demand a commitment to 
Christian beliefs and values.178 A distinction must be drawn between religious observances, 
which are not expressly provided for in the German Basic Law and religious instruction 
which is enshrined in section 7(3) of the Basic Law. Importantly, religious instruction in 
German schools is not only presented in accordance with the Christian faith, but provision is 
also made for instruction in other faiths, provided that there are enough students to form a 
class.179 The cost of this is carried by the state and the right to receive religious instruction 
does not mandate that children be instructed contrary to their own beliefs.180 
As can be expected, some inter-denominational schools also provide for religious 
observances usually in line with the Christian faith, although attendance is free and voluntary. 
The constitutionality of these practices was first addressed in 1979. In the so-called “School 
prayer case,”181 a father of children in an inter-denominational school challenged the 
constitutionality of a practice to start every school day with an inter-denominational prayer 
that was recited by teachers and learners. He argued that this was a violation of the right to 
religious freedom as his children experienced pressure to participate in the observances, 
although they may be exempt from attendance. Unlike the American court that decided the 
question under the Establishment Clause, the German Constitutional Court elected to find a 
neutral solution by balancing competing rights against each other.182  
The court began by noting that both the parents’ right to inculcate their own values in their 
children and the power of the state to operate school systems are constitutionally 
established.183 It then differentiated between religious instruction and religious observances 
with the latter not necessarily guaranteed by the Constitution. According to the court, 
religious freedom has two components which are equally protected and restricted – the 
freedom not to have any religious belief and not to practice religion184 has the same 
protection as the freedom to believe and practise religion.185 The right not to be religious 
may, however, not prevent or violate the freedom of those that are religious.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
of Comparative Law 456. 
177
 Currie Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 253. 
178
 Meuelhoff “Freedom of religion in public schools in Germany and the United States” Georgian Journal 
of Comparative Law 457. 
179
 458; German religious instruction is discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
180
 458. 
181
 52 BVerfGE 223 (1979) (“School prayer case”). 
182
 52 BVerfBE 223. 
183
 English translation of 52 BVerfGE 223 in D Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (1989) 466-72. 
184
 This is called the negative character of religious freedom. 
185
 52 BVerfGE 224. This is called the positive character of religious freedom.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
136 
 
The court proceeded to balance the competing rights in an attempt to find an acceptable 
place for both. It stated that the complaining parents’ desire to have their children educated in 
a secular environment, free from religious influences, conflicted with the wishes of other 
parents to provide their children with a Christian upbringing.186  Firstly, the court felt that the 
elimination of all traces of religious thinking from the schoolroom would not be neutral with 
respect to religion. Secondly, parents who preferred a religious education for their children 
would be disadvantaged. Thirdly, the court held that the resolution of competing claims to 
religious liberty was entrusted to the democratic process and that, so long as public schools 
did not become missionary schools or attempt to preach the infallibility of Christian beliefs, a 
curricular affirmation of Christianity, more cultural than confessional, infringed no one’s 
religious freedom.187 
The court found that it would be possible for those pupils who did not wish to be a part of 
the religious observance to leave the classroom and avoid an encounter with religion. 
Alternatively, they could remain in the class and keep silent and not participate in the prayer. 
The possibility of a learner experiencing subtle social pressure to participate was not regarded 
as so crucial as to render the practice unconstitutional. The court did not dismiss the 
possibility of coercion out of hand, but rather found that this risk was reasonably outweighed 
by the rights of other learners to pray. Article 4 guarantees both the right to be religious and 
to express that belief in public. The authorisation of school prayer was merely a way of 
affording learners the opportunity to do so, and when balanced against the competing interest, 
the risk of embarrassment to a learner wishing to excuse himself is not excessive.188 The 
court felt that the likeliness of this occurring was minimal since the prayer was only held at 
the beginning of the day.189  
Furthermore, the teacher could explain to the class the reason why the learner is not 
participating in the prayer and that his behaviour must not be considered “strange.”190 The 
court also felt that the adverse consequences a learner may experience for electing not to 
participate were similar to the consequences for not participating in religious instruction. In 
the latter case the Basic Law makes specific provision for such non-participation and in a 
society that has become increasingly diverse, it is no longer strange for learners to excuse 
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themselves as the number of conscientious objectors has increased considerably.191 
Therefore, it was unlikely that only one learner would be placed in an outsider position. The 
court recognised that there may be rare cases where the religious observance could unfairly 
burden the learner – for example, if the student is emotionally weak or the teacher is unable 
to successfully explain and mediate the situation in the class.192 The court held that in these 
instances it may be necessary to prohibit school prayer in order to protect the right of the 
learner to be free from religious pressure.193 
The German approach to school prayer contrasts sharply with the approach adopted by 
courts in America and Canada. In Germany the general feeling seems to be that a policy of 
equal respect and concern for the religious values of each learner in the educational context 
requires not the suppression of a devotional exercise reflecting those values, but rather 
tolerance in the face of such expression, particularly when it is performed voluntarily and 
outside the sphere of the teaching curriculum.194 It is clear that directly coercing a learner to 
participate is unconstitutional, but, unlike the American and Canadian courts, Germany does 
not consider indirect coercion to be fatal to religious observances. The right of individuals to 
practise and manifest their religion in public is considered more important than the possible 
pressure a non-adhering learner might experience when confronted with a choice to 
participate or not. 
 It is an approach that is premised on a mutual tolerance of others’ beliefs with the non-
adherent respecting the right of his fellow learners to profess their religion in public, and the 
religious learners respecting the non-adherent’s decision to refrain from such an exercise. The 
effect of the coercion is also mitigated by the fact that learners receive instruction in 
accordance with their religious beliefs. In these classes they are allowed to associate with 
other learners of their own religions and given an opportunity to celebrate and observe their 
own religion. It is now necessary to determine the approach envisioned by the South African 
Constitution in view of the contrasting approaches followed in these jurisdictions. 
 
4 Understanding “free and voluntary” under the South African Constitution 
The point of departure in interpreting “free and voluntary” must be the text of the 
Constitution itself. As has been mentioned repeatedly, section 15(2) of the Constitution 
                                                                 
191
 252. 
192
 253. 
193
 253. 
194
 Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 461. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
138 
 
makes provision for religious observances in state and state-aided institutions. Du Plessis,195 
Smith,196 Currie and De Waal197 and Devenish198 agree that the point of departure must be 
that section 15(2), read with section 7 of the Schools Act, expressly provides for religious 
observances in public schools. Religious observances are thus consistent with the 
Constitution, as long as attendance is voluntary for both teachers and learners.199  
From the outset it is clear that any form of direct coercion would constitute an automatic 
infringement of religious freedom as it would render the observance neither free nor 
voluntary. It would thus be unconstitutional if non-adhering learners or teachers were met 
with some penalty for their refusal to partake in a school prayer or listen to a sermon of 
someone from a different faith. Schools are also prohibited from providing some form of 
incentive for participating learners. Examples could include rules only allowing Christian 
learners to be elected to the student representative body, or a system of evaluation whereby 
students are awarded marks in certain subjects for their participation in religious observances. 
This is similar to the approach adopted in the American case of Kerr v Ferray, where a 
system which allowed prisoners to obtain parole for attending Christian-based narcotics 
meetings was found to be unconstitutional.  
The Constitutional Court in Lawrence200 has, however, alluded to a broader reading of 
section 15(2). Chaskalson P states that “voluntary school prayer could also amount to 
coercion of pupils to participate in the prayers of the favoured religion.”201 O’Regan J also 
holds that “religious beliefs are a matter of personal faith and commitment which should not 
be the subject of coercion, whether direct or indirect.”202 She does, however, concede that 
observances can be allowed, but in absolutely equitable circumstances so as to diminish their 
coercive effect. Sachs J on the other hand approaches the question of coercion much like the 
American courts. He rejects Chaskalson P’s finding that coercion must be established before 
an act by the state is unconstitutional, stating that “[e]ven if there is no compulsory 
requirement to observe or not to observe a particular religious practice, the effect is to divide 
the nation into insiders who belong, and outsiders who are tolerated.”203 
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Sachs J’s interpretation illustrates the difficulty in discerning the meaning and scope of 
“free and voluntary”. It is respectfully submitted that his approach wrongly ignores the 
wording of the Constitution, by following an “establishment approach” within a context 
where no clear separation between the state and religion was envisioned. If section 15(2) is to 
be a functional part of the Constitution, a certain degree of endorsement will have to be 
tolerated otherwise it will negate the section in its entirety. The same must be said for indirect 
coercion. While there is general consensus that “free and voluntary” must exclude the danger 
of both direct and indirect coercion, it is clear that an approach similar to that of America and 
Canada would render section 15(2) nugatory.204 A too wide interpretation of indirect coercion 
that includes all potential forms of subtle pressure will ultimately result in a blanket ban on 
all religious observances in public schools. This was not the intention of the constitutional 
drafters, nor is it an interpretation that is reconcilable with the wording of section 15(2).  
Section 15(2) sets the difficult task of structuring observances in such a way that they are 
formally free and voluntary, while at the same time ensuring that subtle coercion does not 
negate their voluntariness.205 Mureinik206 concedes that it is seldom easy to structure a 
religious observance at a state or state-aided institution to meet this requirement. The 
comparative jurisdictions illustrate this difficulty, with most claimants arguing that, 
regardless of exemption procedures, the fear of being ostracised or vilified for their dissenting 
beliefs was a disincentive for seeking exemption from participation. Especially in the 
American and Canadian cases, the impact of peer pressure, the need to conform and the 
impressionableness of young children were recurring narratives that convinced the courts that 
religious observances had no place in public schools. These concerns are equally pressing in 
the South African context with its history of religious compulsion in schools and the 
constitutionally protected rights to religious freedom, human dignity, equality and the need to 
provide in the best interest of the child. This must, however, be weighed against the wording 
of section 15(2). 
It is therefore submitted that an approach somewhere between that of the German 
Constitutional Court and the American/Canadian courts would be the most appropriate way 
of balancing these competing rights and policy considerations in South Africa. A certain 
degree of compulsion will have to be tolerated by dissenting learners, parents and teachers. 
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If section 15(2) is to be a functional part of the Constitution, a certain measure of indirect 
coercion will be inevitable as religious observances can never be conducted to completely 
eliminate all forms of coercion. An approach as sensitive as that of the American and 
Canadian courts cannot be sustained, while there is definitely space for a more sensitive 
approach than that of the German court’s interpretation of coercion. The German court 
acknowledges the existence of indirect coercion, but seems to suggest that a learner must just 
make use of the exemption procedure while teachers can explain the reason for the learner’s 
non-adherence to the class.207 Taking into account the right to dignity and its link to religious 
freedom, the right to religious freedom itself, religious equality and the best interest of the 
child, it would probably be best if observances and exemption procedures are structured in 
such a way as to draw the least bit of attention to the dissenting learners. 
In Germany the effect of this compulsion is however somewhat mitigated by affording all 
religions an equitable place in the school system. Despite the fact that religious observances 
are allowed in German schools, there are rather strict rules concerning the accommodation of 
non-adhering learners. In various Länder there are rules that make provision for religious 
education and observances when a minimum number of dissenting students have been 
reached.208 In Lower Saxony for example a number of 12 learners from the same 
religion/confession are needed for the school to be obliged to establish religious education 
and the accompanying observances in accordance with that religion.209 In Bavaria, the state 
pays for the rabbi or minister to teach the children separately, even when the minimum 
number of students has not been reached.210 
In South Africa, the impact of coercion must also be mitigated. This can be done in a 
variety of ways. Firstly, the time and the place of religious observances must be chosen in 
such a way as to ensure that learners experience the least amount of pressure. Conducting a 
prayer during a graduation ceremony, as in the Lee case, or during a prize giving ceremony 
will increase the coercive burden on learners, teachers and parents who will, in exercising 
their right to be free from religious observances, be required to draw a lot of attention to 
themselves. Leaving the ceremony area or only entering after the prayer can be embarrassing 
and difficult, especially in the case of young children. If a prayer or reading scripts from the 
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Bible is allowed in class, it would be best to allow for this during the first administrative 
period of the day. Expecting a learner to leave the classroom in front of all of his peers would 
place a large amount of pressure on him to simply conform to the norm. By allowing for 
observances at the beginning of the day, the child can come to school a bit later and join the 
class when classes are being swapped and his appearance in class is as inconspicuous as 
possible.  
Keeping the effect of indirect coercion to a minimum will require sensitivity on the side of 
the teachers, learners, parents and school community. There is an obligation on the majority 
to respect the religious differences of non-adherents. This means that their right to practise 
religious observances in the public sphere will be somewhat inhibited. For example, when a 
rugby match is played and one of the players is Muslim, it would arguably not be appropriate 
to have one of the Christian players pray for the team’s success. It would be more appropriate 
to allow for a moment of silence where each player can observe in accordance with his own 
religion. In Wallace, O’Connor J suggests that this practice would not infringe religious 
freedom as there is no coercive pressure to conform to a particular religion. Should the entire 
team, however, be Christian, it would be permissible to allow one player to pray out loud.  
There is no blanket rule that can be applied in all circumstances and the approach followed 
in each school will depend on a wide variety of factors that are context specific. Indirect 
coercion cannot be eliminated completely, but it can be managed to mitigate its effect. The 
aim should be to foster an environment where religious dissenters are not vilified for their 
beliefs, but tolerated and even celebrated. One way of achieving this is to allow for religious 
observances to be conducted on an equitable basis. The correct interpretation of “equitable 
basis” has never been addressed in South African case law. Just like “free and voluntary”, it 
will have to be construed in the light of section 7 of the Schools Act and the Constitution. 
The next chapter will flesh out such an approach with reference to the rights and policy 
considerations that will interplay in deciding on the appropriate model of “equitable basis.” 
 
5 Conclusion 
 The effects of indirect religious coercion can be just as damaging as direct coercion. It 
labels learners as “different” which results in them being ostracised and vilified for their 
divergent beliefs. It is for this reason that religious observances must be structured in such a 
way as to ensure the least amount of coercive pressure on non-adhering learners or learners of 
minority religions. Children are especially vulnerable to religious coercion and may find it 
difficult to voice their beliefs in the face of a religiously homogenous majority. When 
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drafting rules on observances, governing bodies must always attempt to structure them in the 
least intrusive way and allow for learners to refrain from participation without drawing 
attention. They must always be aware of the potential impact their rules might have on 
learners and find practical ways to ensure that learners are not subjected to a situation where 
they are uncomfortable or judged for holding a different religious belief. 
In a religiously diverse society, it is inevitable that learners will on occasion feel pressured 
into participation, or experience adversity for not adhering to the norm. As South Africa’s 
democracy develops and the constitutional right to religious freedom becomes more 
entrenched in society, the focus must shift to ensuring that religious differences become a 
source for celebration, rather than being seen as something that must only be tolerated. Until 
then, the only way to mitigate the impact of religious coercion in public schools is to ensure 
that religions are treated, as far as reasonably possible, on an equitable basis.    
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CHAPTER 6 
EQUITABLE BASIS 
1 Introduction  
Section 15(2)(b) of the Constitution and section 7 of the Schools Act require religious 
observances to be conducted on an equitable basis. The appropriate interpretation of 
“equitable basis” in the context of religious observances has never been at the centre of any 
South African case law. Section 15(2)(b) was addressed obiter in the Lawrence case but, as 
will be shown in this chapter, there was no unanimity amongst the judges on the desired 
interpretation of this requirement. Construing an appropriate meaning for equitable basis is 
imperative for understanding the constitutional approach to religious observances in public 
schools. The purpose of this Chapter is to develop an interpretation of “equitable basis” that 
is compatible with the right to religious freedom and the supporting rights in the Constitution. 
This interpretation must be read together with the voluntariness requirement and must take 
cognisance of South Africa’s constitutional and social context. 
It is submitted that section 7 of the Schools Act, read with section 15(2)(b), calls for a 
rather generous interpretation as the equity requirement has the potential of addressing and 
mitigating the negative effects of religious coercion in the school context. While it is true that 
learners cannot be completely free of indirect religious coercion, the way in which schools 
accommodate the diversity of learners’ religious convictions can reduce the harmful effects 
of the coercion. This means that religious observances in public schools must be conducted in 
a way that ensures the equitable treatment of both majority and minority religions with 
schools taking active steps to accommodate the beliefs of a religiously diverse pupil body. 
What will qualify as equitable will be context specific and will be influenced by a number of 
considerations. It is however submitted that, in order to ensure that the negative impact of 
coercion on non-adhering learners is properly addressed, a high standard of equity is 
required. In this context the German approach to religious instruction is particularly helpful 
as it has succeeded in creating a structure that is fair and equitable to adherents of both 
majority and minority religions. 
This chapter will suggest an interpretation of equity that, together with voluntariness, will 
ensure that religious observances are conducted in a non-coercive manner that allows 
adherents an equitable opportunity to partake in religious observances associated with their 
faith. Firstly, the term “equitable” will be defined. The South African case law on section 
15(2)(b) will then be analysed with a focus on the conflicting approaches of the judges and 
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the implications of each interpretation. Thirdly, the focus will fall on the German model of 
religious instruction as an example of how religions may be treated equitably in the school 
system. Lastly, a model will be proposed for understanding equitable basis in the 
Constitution, focussing on the steps that schools can take to accommodate religious diversity. 
 
2 Defining “equitable” 
The Collins English Dictionary1 defines “equity” as the “quality of being impartial” or as 
“fairness.” “Equitable” is defined as “fair and reasonable.”2 It is important to note that equity 
is not the same as equality: while the two concepts are related, equity should not be read as 
requiring the absolute equal treatment of all religions.3 Section 7 and section 15(2)(b) require 
“equitableness” which is a weaker standard than equality.4 This requirement rather envisions 
the treatment of different religious observances in a way that is fair, just5 and reasonable, 
taking into account the particular circumstances of every school. Practically, equity 
sometimes requires that one religion be treated differently from another in order to achieve 
fairness.6 It can even result in one religion being afforded preferential treatment if it will 
result in the reasonable and fair treatment of that religion in the circumstances.  
Equity is an ethical imperative, associated with principles of social justice and human 
rights.7 What is equitable in a particular situation will depend on the facts and the context of 
the matter,8 as well as the human rights that are affected. The Lawrence judgment is the only 
case that has dealt with the interpretation of “equitable basis” in section 15(2)(b). 
Unfortunately, the court only discussed this requirement obiter and since the court was not 
unanimous in its interpretation, there is no absolute certainty on the meaning that must be 
afforded to equitableness in the context of religious observances in public schools. The next 
section will analyse the manner in which the court dealt with section 15(2)(b) and the 
differences in approach by the justices. 
 
                                                                 
1
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3 “Equitable basis” in South African case law 
The Lawrence judgment centred on the interpretation of section 14(1) of the interim 
Constitution and the remarks made by the court on the interpretation of section 14(2), which 
is similar to section 15(2) in the final Constitution, are merely obiter. It is, however, an 
indication of the way in which the court envisions the interpretation of the requirements for 
religious observances in public schools. Chaskalson P in Lawrence, states the following with 
reference to section 15(2): 
 
“Compulsory attendance at school prayers would infringe freedom of religion. In the context of the 
school community and the pervasive peer pressure that is often present in such communities, voluntary 
school prayer could also amount to the coercion of pupils to participate in the prayers of the favoured 
religion. To guard against this, and at the same time to permit school prayers, section 14(2) makes it clear 
that there should be no coercion. It is in this context that it requires the regulation of school prayers to be 
carried out on an equitable basis.”9 
 
From the above it is clear that there is a symbiotic relationship between the requirement of 
voluntariness and the requirement of equity. Chaskalson P seems to suggest that conducting 
religious observances on an equitable basis may have the effect of reducing the coercive 
burden on adherents of minority religions or non-believers. Providing for religious 
observances of the minority religions is likely to mitigate the negative psychological impact 
that the majority religion may have on the minority. Chaskalson P goes on to discuss the 
nature of the equity requirement: 
 
“I doubt whether this means that a school must make provision for prayers for as many denominations as  
there may be within the pupil body; rather it seems to me to require education authorities to allow 
schools to offer the prayers that may be most appropriate for a particular school, to have that decision 
taken in an equitable manner applicable to all schools, and to oblige them to do so in a way which does 
not give rise to indirect coercion of the ‘non-believers’.”10 
 
Chaskalson P makes the observation that “equitable basis” does not require the school to 
make provision for religious observances for as many denominations as may be present 
within the school community.11 This statement is somewhat problematic as it does not 
address the extent of schools’ obligation to ensure that religious observances comply with the 
equity requirement. Chaskalson P’s argument suggests that it would be sufficient if religious 
                                                                 
9
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observances are conducted in accordance with the beliefs of the majority of the school 
community. His approach does not make provision for the needs of minority religions in the 
school and does not suggest an alternative for those who do not adhere to the religion of the 
majority. It will not suffice for a governing body to present religious observances based 
purely on what the majority of the school community wants without attempting to 
accommodate those who do not adhere to the majority religion. This would allow the 
majority to ignore the religious needs of the minority,12 which falls short of the equity 
standard envisioned by section 15(2)(b).  
Such an approach also ignores one of the fundamental purposes of the Bill of Rights, 
namely the protection and advancement of minority rights.13 The Constitution, and especially 
the Bill of Rights, aims to mitigate the effect of majoritarian democracy by affording basic 
human rights to all, regardless of their religious convictions. Religious freedom therefore 
extends to the minority as well and is not only aimed at advancing the religious beliefs of the 
majority. The underlying principle of minority protection makes Chaskalson P’s 
interpretation of “equitable basis” problematic. This approach also has an unduly coercive 
impact on members of the minority religions as they will have no other choice but to adhere, 
or be branded as non-believers.  It is especially problematic in light of the importance of 
religious freedom and the best interest of the child. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, children are susceptible to peer pressure and can easily fall 
victim to religious coercion. To suggest that religious observances should be presented in 
accordance with the beliefs of the majority while ignoring the needs of the minority increases 
the pressure on learners to conform to the majority religion. This will not only infringe on the 
equitableness requirement in section 15(2), but also violate the voluntariness requirement. 
Furthermore, this approach infringes the supporting rights such as the dignity, equality and 
religious freedom of religious minorities.  
O’Regan J also comments on the nature of section 15(2) and states the following: 
 
“The stipulation of voluntariness is not the only precondition established by section 14(2). The 
subsection also requires that even where attendance is voluntary, the observance of such practice must 
still be equitable. In my view, this additional requirement of fairness or equity reflects an important 
component of the concept of freedom of religion contained in our Constitution. Our society possesses a 
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rich and diverse range of religions. Although the state is permitted to allow religious observances, it is 
not allowed to act inequitably.
14
  
In determining what is meant by inequity in this context, it must be remembered that the question of 
voluntary participation is a consideration separately identified in section 14(2). The requirement of 
equity must therefore be something in addition to the requirement of voluntariness. It seems to me that, 
at the least, the requirement of equity demands the state to act even -handedly in relation to different 
religions.”15 
 
She goes on to state that: 
 
“Requiring that the government act even-handedly does not demand a commitment to a scrupulous 
secularism, or a commitment to complete neutrality. Indeed, at times giving full protection to freedom 
of religion will require specific provisions to protect the adherents of a particular religion as has been 
recognised in both Canada and the United States of America. For example, in the context of religious 
observances at local schools, the requirement of equity may dictate that the religious observances held 
should reflect, if possible, the religious beliefs of that particular community or group. But for religious 
observances at national level, however, the effect of the requirement is to demand that such 
observances should not favour one religion to the exclusion of others.”16 
 
Similar to Chaskalson P, O’Regan J identifies the equitable treatment of religions as a 
requirement distinct from voluntariness. For her, the even-handed treatment of religions 
forms the crux of the equity requirement. She argues that “equity” does not require absolute 
neutrality towards religion or a commitment to “scrupulous secularism,”17 but rather an 
attempt by the state to treat different religions in a similar manner. O’Regan J recognises that 
equity and equality are not synonyms, stating that at times the full protection of religious 
freedom will require that specific steps be taken to protect the adherents of a particular 
religion.18 It would thus not violate the constitutional right to religious freedom if some 
religions are treated differently, as long as the differentiation does not constitute inequitable 
treatment.  Du Plessis19 refers to this as “proactive tolerance”, which means that the state can, 
without enjoining it, actively acknowledge religious sentiments and practices. A school 
would thus be able to equitably advance, accommodate and safeguard religious observances 
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in schools without being accused of bias towards a particular religion or of advancing a 
particular religious agenda.20  
O’Regan J attempts to interpret the equity requirement in the South African school context 
by suggesting that equity may dictate that the religious observances held should reflect, if 
possible, the religious beliefs of that particular community or group.21  The intention is thus 
not that each and every religion, no matter how big or small its following, must be equally 
represented at the school level. It would be irrational to present religious observances in 
accordance with the Muslim faith if there are no Muslim learners in the school. What is rather 
required is that religious observances reflect the religious composition of the particular school 
community.  
It is not clear what the practical implications would be of O’Regan J’s suggested approach. 
When she says that the religious observances should reflect the religious beliefs of the group, 
it is not clear whether she is referring to the religion of the majority of the group, or the 
religious observances of every single individual within the group. If she is referring to the 
larger school community, it can surely not be assumed that the entire community will adhere 
to a single religion and that religious observances will be conducted solely in accordance with 
that particular religion. If that is the case, her reasoning would be subject to the same 
criticism as Chaskalson P’s judgment.  
Alternatively, “community or group” could refer to the religious convictions of every 
individual that forms part of the community or group. The community is thus viewed as a 
compilation of religiously diverse individuals that require religious observances to be 
conducted in accordance with all the different represented religions. On this interpretation, 
the nature of the religious observances will not be determined by the majority, simply 
because they outnumber the minority. The community or group would refer to every 
individual member of the group and the diversity of religions represented within the group. 
This interpretation allows for religious observances to be conducted in an even-handed 
manner with the religious convictions of the minority not negated in favour of the majority.22 
It is an approach that takes cognisance of the needs of all the members of the school 
community and creates an environment that promotes religious equity. 
When considering O’Regan J’s judgment as a whole it seems appropriate that the latter 
understanding of “equitable” should prevail. In Lawrence she found that the purpose of 
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selecting Sundays, Christmas Day and Good Friday as closed days was not secular.23 Even if 
not intentional, the inevitable effect of choosing these days was to give a legislative 
endorsement to Christianity.24 She agreed with Chaskalson P that the state should not coerce, 
but added the important requirement that the state must act fairly and equitably in dealing 
with diverse religions in South Africa. O’Regan J also denounced the explicit endorsement by 
the state of one religion over another as this could threaten the free exercise of religion in a 
society with a diversity of religions.25 She argued that when the power and prestige of the 
state is placed behind a particular religion it could result in undue coercive pressure on 
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing religion.26 
In light of O’Regan J’s conclusion in Lawrence, and the addition of an equitableness 
inquiry into the right to religious freedom, she most likely intended “group or community” to 
refer to the individuals and the religions they represent. She has a more expansive and 
nuanced understanding of religious freedom than Chaskalson P and suggests an approach that 
pays close attention to the needs of minority religions. In terms of her approach religious 
observances must be arranged in such a way that both majority and minority religions are 
treated even-handedly and provided with equitable opportunities and resources to partake in 
observances of their choice.  
Similar to the requirement of indirect coercion discussed in Chapter 5, some foreign 
jurisdictions have also grappled with the fair and equitable treatment of different religions. 
Especially in Germany, where religious education is constitutionally permissible, there has 
been a concerted effort by the state to ensure that religions are treated as fairly and as 
equitably as can reasonably be expected. What follows is a discussion of the German model 
of religious education. There is a distinction between religious observances and religious 
education, and the South African Constitution only allows for the former and not the latter.27 
The purpose of this comparative analysis is not to suggest that religious observances in South 
African schools must be conducted in the formal and institutionalised manner religious 
education is treated in Germany. The purpose is to analyse the German system of religious 
education to understand how it has managed to balance the needs of the different religious 
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communities in an equitable manner. This will shed light on the South African approach to 
the equitable treatment of religions and religious observances in the public school system. 
 
4 Equitable basis from a legal comparative perspective 
4 1 Germany 
Article 7(2) of the German Basic Law states that “[p]arents and guardians shall have the 
right to decide whether children shall receive religious instruction.” Furthermore, Article 7(3) 
makes specific provision for religious instruction in state schools stating that “[r]eligious 
instruction shall form part of the regular curriculum in state schools, with the exception of 
non-denominational schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right of supervision, religious 
instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious community 
concerned.” Learners thus have the right to be taught according to the faith of their own 
religious community or denomination.28 
Article 7 applies to all public schools in all Länder (that is the various states comprising 
the German federation) and there is an obligation on the Länder, within their own legal 
systems, to ensure that statutes establish close cooperation between the state and religion in 
regard to the provision of confessional religious education in state schools.29 Religious 
education is offered as a school subject in public schools in Germany and is supported by the 
state.30 The German federal state provides funding for the teaching of religious education31 
and the Länder are empowered to make rules and regulations on the way in which religious 
education is conducted. The Länder do not, however, constitute the sole authority over the 
education of religious learners.32 They are rather assisted by established religious 
communities and the education of religious learners in public schools is conducted through 
joint governance.33 This joint relationship is constitutionally entrenched and places an 
obligation on both the state and religious communities to take positive steps to realise the 
right of learners to receive a religious education and to partake in religious activities within 
the public sphere. 
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The state can enter into a cooperative relationship with a religious association or a 
religious community if that association or community meets certain requirements.34 The first 
requirement is that the community must be able to show some form of permanency that is 
usually proven by the existence of a constitution or a sufficient number of members.35 
Secondly, the state requires that clear membership rosters be presented in order to determine 
which pupils are entitled to attend religious instruction.36 Thirdly, the community must have a 
representative who can define the religious principles and represent them to the learners.37 
Lastly, the religious community may not be subject to influence by state institutions, either in 
Germany or abroad.38 It is often difficult for religious communities to meet these 
requirements. As a matter of practicality it is however important that these requirements be 
met as it ensures that the quality of religious instruction is sufficient and has a prospect of 
longevity.  
The state does not assign learners to religious instruction classes and is not in control of 
the curricular content of these classes.39 Religious instruction is usually presented by a 
member of the relevant faith who, ideally, has to be a regular member of the public school 
faculty.40 Teachers teaching confessional religious education are trained primarily at relevant 
theological university departments and must be formally approved by the religious society of 
the religion they wish to teach.41 Classes are usually presented for about three hours a week 
and the learners are split into different venues together with fellow adherents. Twelve of the 
sixteen Länder have Protestant and Catholic Religious Education while Christian Orthodox 
Religious Education is presented in some places in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse and 
North Rhine-Westphalia.42 Jewish Religious Education is also presented in some Länder 
while New Apostolic instruction is available in Bavaria.43 Mennonite instruction is presented 
in Hesse, Old Catholic instruction in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Buddhist and humanistic 
education is available in Berlin.44  
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Registered religious communities are allowed to present religious instruction in public 
schools as long as there are a certain number of adherents per grade.45 Each of the Länder 
requires a different number of adherents.46 In Bavaria and Saarland five learners per school is 
required to present religious education in accordance with their religion.47 This number 
increases to eight in Hesse and eleven in Lower-Saxony.48 State funding is equitably divided 
amongst the different religions depending on the number of learners, teachers and the nature 
of the religious education.49 The Länder are however allowed to make exceptions to 
accommodate minorities. For example, in Bavaria the state has on occasion agreed to pay a 
rabbi or a minister to teach learners privately in a synagogue or a church.50 In these instances 
the minimum number of learners was not required as the need to accommodate these learners 
was more important than the need to follow formalistic rules. 
Confessional religious education is however not mandatory in Germany and learners and 
parents are provided with the option of opting out if they are not religious or simply do not 
want to partake in religious education. The Länder all offer an alternative to religious 
education. This subject is usually called “Ethik” (Ethics), “Ethikunterricht” (Ethics 
Education), “Werte und Normen” (Values and Norms) or “Philosophy”.51 The subject 
combines Philosophy, Social Science and the Study of Religion. Religion is thus not taught 
from a confessional perspective, but rather entails the historical and philosophical study of 
different religions.52 Parents are free to decide whether or not their children will participate in 
confessional religious education or be instructed in secular Ethics/Philosophy.53  
After the age of fourteen, children can decide for themselves whether they want to 
participate in the confessional religious education, and if so, decide on the religion of their 
choice. They are also allowed to opt out completely and make use of the secular option. 
Bavaria has even gone as far as to allow learners, upon turning fourteen, to opt in or out of 
religious education. Learners can elect to do so at any time after they turn fourteen. They then 
have to pass an exam on the work they were taught in religious education or the secular 
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Ethics/Philosophy during the rest of the year.54 Learners are thus not penalised for electing to 
exercise their right to religious freedom, but their choices are respected and accommodated. 
In recent years there has been a shift towards the introduction of Islamic religious 
education in German public schools. The number of Muslims in Germany is around 4 
million55 of which many are school-going children. Despite this fairly large Islamic 
community, religious education in line with the Islamic faith has not been wholly integrated 
into the German public schools system. The reason usually presented for this omission is that 
the Muslims in Germany do not have a common institution that can be treated as an 
educational partner to assist the state in presenting religious education.56 It is also argued that 
the Islamic community does not have clear cut membership rights, which makes it difficult to 
determine when learners belong to the Islamic faith and need to be instructed accordingly.57 
Since the beginning of 2013 Islamic religious education is offered at selected schools across 
Germany.58  
A lack of properly trained teachers has however slowed down the process of 
implementation and since its introduction the state has made a concerted effort to train 
enough teachers to meet the needs of Muslim learners. The first graduate class in Islamic 
religious education will be graduating in 2017 from the University of Münster59 and Islamic 
religious education courses have been introduced at five other universities in Germany. 
Furthermore, the state has, as an interim measure, developed a programme through which 
Muslim educators who are teaching other subjects can obtain a certificate allowing them to 
present Islamic religious education.60 The programme also allows Muslims enrolled in 
Islamic studies to be trained as teachers, enabling them to present religious education.61 The 
process of implementing Islamic religious education in German public schools is a joint 
undertaking between the state and members of the Islamic religious community with a view 
to ensure that the religious rights of Muslim learners, teachers and parents are 
accommodated. 
                                                                 
54
 Jensen & Kieldsen Baseline Study 13. 
55
 8.  
56
 DT Kucukcan “Looking at Religions and Religious Education in Secular National Contexts in Western 
Europe” (2016) Centre for Islamic Studies < http://www.cie.ugent.be/kucukcan2.htm> (accessed 04-04-2016) 2. 
57
 M Hunter-Henin Law, Religious Freedom and Education in Europe (2013) 178. 
58
 U Hummel “Bumpy start for Islam classes in Germany” (2016) <http://www.dw.com/en/bumpy-start-for 
islam-classes-in-germany/a-16648215> (accessed 04-04-2016). 
59
 P Morris, W Shepard & P Trebilco The Teaching and Study of Islam in Western Universities (2013) 178. 
60
 Hummel “Bumpy start for Is lamic classes in Germany” <www.dm.com>. 
61
 Hummel “Bumpy start for Islamic classes in Germany” <www.dm.com>.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
 
The German model of religious education is not perfect and the system is often presented 
with difficulties. The requirement that a minimum number of learners must be members of a 
particular religious community before religious instruction will be provided in accordance 
with their faith has the potential of excluding members of smaller or less organised 
religions.62 Religious communities are also not homogenous in their beliefs and it may be that 
the content of religious instruction is contrary to the views of certain members of the 
religious community. It is impossible to design the curriculum in such a way that it satisfies 
every member of the religious community. There may be instances where instruction in a 
particular religion offends the religious or personal beliefs of some of the learners who adhere 
to that religion.  
This is often the case where the personal views of the learner do not accord with the 
depiction of gender roles, sexuality or political positions.63 The parents or learner may be 
either more religiously liberal or conservative. In these instances the option does exist to opt 
out of the religious education in favour of Ethics/Philosophy, but inevitably, this situation 
infringes on the learner’s right in terms of article 7(3) of the German Basic Law. His/her right 
to religious instruction in the public school system is effectively negated by the curricular 
content. It is however not a complete deprivation of religious freedom as the learner is not 
forced to participate in instruction contrary to his beliefs and may still receive religious 
instruction outside of the school environment.  
Regardless of these difficulties, the model of religious education that has developed in 
Germany is often hailed as an example of the role the state can play to accommodate and 
protect the religious rights of its inhabitants. It is regularly referred to as a model of “positive 
neutrality” in terms of which the state is forbidden to express a preference or a dislike for one 
particular religion or for religion in general, but is allowed to accommodate religious persons 
and communities who wish to manifest their religious beliefs in public.64 The state is not 
allowed to support religious communities or denominations unless other religious 
communities and denominations are supported in a similar way.65 Religious instruction can 
be viewed as an attempt by the state to allow for the exercise of religious freedom in the 
public sphere in a manner that does not lead to inequality or unfair treatment of certain 
religions over others.  
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Shachar66 argues that the institutional setting of religious education in Germany means 
that learners are not a “captive audience” as they often are where religious education or 
observances are presented in schools without rules and guidelines. Learners are therefore not 
subjected to direct religious coercion and the effect of indirect religious coercion is 
significantly reduced. This is ascribed to the fact that even minority religions are celebrated 
and accommodated in a constructive manner that does not single out those who do not 
subscribe to the majority religion. Because the different religions are treated fairly, religious 
minorities do not feel shunned by the majority as their religion is viewed as equally 
important.67 The fact that religious education is conducted within a public setting also means 
that members of different religious communities interact and intermingle.68 Although learners 
are separated during their religious education classes, the fact that religions are treated on an 
equal footing creates an environment in which learners feel more comfortable exchanging 
ideas about their respective religions.69  
This model does not treat religious differences as something to be shunned or artificially 
omitted from the public sphere simply because they are controversial and complicated.70 It 
rather allows religious differences to be part of the everyday life of learners in state schools 
and encourages inclusion in common spaces.71 It permits and fosters accommodation, but in a 
non-exclusivist setting.72 The different religions are not treated equally as they do not receive 
the same funding or resources. Religions are however treated equitably. It would be absurd to 
award the exact same funding and resources to the majority and the minority religions as it 
would place the minority religion in a privileged position. Resources are rather distributed 
based on the number of learners in the class, the number of teachers, the nature of the 
curricular materials and any special requirements to enable the school and the community to 
adequately teach the subject.73 Religions are thus treated equitably, fairly and even-handedly 
and learners and parents are all placed in a position where they are able to enjoy religious 
freedom in the public sphere. The success of the German system is the result of the state’s 
accommodative attitude and the joint state-religion relationship.  
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As has already been mentioned, the South African Constitution does not make provision 
for religious education, but rather for religious observances in public institutions. There are 
however similarities between the way in which the German Basic Law views religious 
education in the school system and the way in which the Constitution envisions religious 
observances. The manner in which religious education is treated in Germany can provide 
insight into the way in which section 15(2) of the Constitution, and especially the equity 
requirement, must be interpreted.  
 
5 Understanding “equitable basis” under the South African Constitution 
As has already been mentioned, the requirement of equity in section 7 of the Schools Act, 
read with 15(2)(b) of the Constitution, envisions a fair and even-handed treatment of different 
religions within the school environment. This means that one religion must not be advantaged 
or disadvantaged in a way that may benefit one religion over another.74 Religions do not have 
to be treated in exactly the same way, but schools are prohibited from exclusively advancing 
the beliefs or teachings of a specific religion or religions over other religions represented in 
the school community.75  
The aim of this section is to determine how the requirement of “equitable basis” must be 
dealt with practically by governing bodies and the school community. Drawing on the 
German model of religious education, the Policy on Religion and Education, case law, and 
legislative and constitutional provisions, suggestions will be made on what considerations 
should inform the framing of religious observances in public schools. It will be argued that 
the rules around religious observances must ultimately be guided by an accommodation 
approach that reflects the model of state-religion interaction envisioned by the Constitution. 
 
5 1 General guidelines for drafting rules 
As a point of departure it is clear that the needs and preferences of the learners and parents 
are decisive when making a choice about the religious observances that will be conducted at a 
particular school.76 It would be irrational to present religious observances in accordance with 
all the different religions represented in South Africa, as it is unlikely for a school to have a 
learner from every religion in the country. A religion that is not practised cannot receive the 
same recognition and treatment as the religions that are represented in the pupil body. 
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Accordingly, a school governing body making rules about religious observances must have 
information on the religious affiliations of the learners that attend the school. This 
information must be used for the sole purpose of facilitating and fostering equitable 
opportunities for religious observances and may not be used to victimize or vilify learners 
based on their religious convictions. A school is thus restricted to the religions of learners in 
the school and must find a way to balance and accommodate the needs of these religions. 
Once the governing body has access to this information, it must consult with learners, 
parents and teachers on the exact content of the rules. As has already been mentioned, the 
coercive impact of religious observances in the school context can be mitigated by affording 
a wide interpretation to the equity requirement. During the drafting process, governing bodies 
must continuously question whether the rules on religious observances have the potential of 
directly or indirectly coercing learners towards one religion at the expense of other religions. 
If the rules are directly coercive they amount to an unconstitutional violation of section 15 of 
the Constitution and cannot form part of the school’s religious policy. If the rules have an 
indirect coercive effect the governing body must determine what rules could be made to 
ensure the equitable and fair treatment of religions in a way that mitigates the coercive impact 
and protects the learners’ right to dignity, equality, religious freedom, and is in the best 
interest of the child. It is submitted that religious observances must be limited to a set time of 
the day or the week. In this way parents and learners can be informed at the beginning of the 
school year when religious observances will be conducted and what options are available for 
their children. 
The equity requirement does not mean that all religions in the school must be treated in 
exactly the same way. There is thus no need for all the religions to have the same sized venue 
or the exact same resources such as books or technological equipment. What would constitute 
equitable treatment will be context-specific and will be determined by the needs of the 
relevant religion as well as the number of adherents. In Chapter 4 it was suggested that 
governing bodies must embark on a process of consultation and meaningful engagement with 
the various role players affected by the rules on religious observances. The purpose of this 
engagement is to determine the specific needs of adherents of every represented religion so as 
to ensure that the rules adequately provide for their needs. Sometimes it might be enough to 
provide adherents of a minority religion with a classroom to conduct their religious 
observances. Another religion might require a classroom and access to certain religious texts, 
or simply a quiet space where they can gather for a moment of silence. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the National Policy on Religion and Education attempted to address the equity 
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requirement by making suggestions on how equity can practically be achieved in the school 
system. 
 
5 2 National Policy on Religion and Education and “equitable basis” 
Section 61 of the Policy suggests that “equitable means of acknowledging the multi-
religious nature of a school community may include […] [the] rotation of opportunities for 
observance, in proportion to the representation of different religions in the school.” Consider 
the following example: a school has a hundred learners of which eighty are Christian, ten are 
Jewish and ten are Muslim.77 According to the Policy it would be equitable for the school to 
have religious observances in accordance with the Christian faith for sixteen of the twenty 
school days in a month while Jewish observances are conducted for two of the twenty days 
and Muslim observances for the remaining two days. 
This suggestion in the Policy gives rise to certain constitutional difficulties. I would argue 
that the suggested arrangement does not meet the requirement of equity in the Constitution as 
it still allows the majority religion to be afforded disproportionately more time and resources 
than the minority religions. It also increases the coercive pressure on all the learners in the 
school. When Christian observances are being conducted, dissenting learners will have to ask 
to be excused from participating. The Christian learners will be placed in a similar position 
when religious observances are conducted in accordance with the minority religions. A 
system of proportionate representation does not mitigate the impact of religious coercion, but 
rather enhances the coercive burden. 
 The “use of a universal prayer” is also mentioned in section 61 of the Policy as an option 
to achieve equity. Smith78 argues that equity will not be achieved by the use of a bland prayer 
which makes no mention of any particular religion or denomination. A prayer of this kind 
would discriminate against the religious rights of those whose religion requires very specific 
religious practices or phrasing. All religious adherents will be subjected to a prayer that does 
not accord with their beliefs while being denied the right to pray in a manner that reflects 
their religion. The Policy does however suggest the separation of learners according to their 
religion, with equitably supported opportunities for observances by all faiths, and appropriate 
use of the time for those holding secular and humanist beliefs.79 Section 61 also mentions “a 
period of silence” as a mechanism to achieve equity amongst religions in the school.  
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A “period of silence” is a very effective and equitable way of complying with section 7 of 
the Schools Act and section 15(2) of the Constitution in that it gives every learner, parent and 
teacher an opportunity to use the time to pray or observe in accordance with their own 
religion, without subjecting themselves to possible coercive pressure. It also makes provision 
for non-believers as they are allowed to simply observe the moment of silence without feeling 
pressured to attach any religious meaning to it. It is an easy way for a school governing body 
to ensure that religious observances are conducted without running the risk of being accused 
of coercing learners towards a specific religion or treating religions unfairly. Only allowing 
for a moment of silence is however a very limited interpretation of section 15(2) of the 
Constitution as it simply creates a brief opportunity for religious observances without the 
school really taking active steps to facilitate and accommodate different faiths.  
The Policy’s suggestion that learners be separated according to religion, with equitably 
supported opportunities for observances by all faiths, requires a much more active role by the 
school governing body and is arguably more in line with the equitable basis requirement in 
the Constitution.80 It is in this context that the German approach to religious education is 
particularly interesting as it also entails the separate teaching of learners according to their 
faith. Although religious observances in the South African context and German religious 
education are not the same, the German model of religious education does provide an 
example of how to deal with different religions in an equitable manner. The German 
approach requires the school and the state to consider the religious composition of its school 
community and take active and equitable steps to realise the religious rights of the learners.  
If a school has a minority of Jewish learners, and they meet the minimum numerical 
threshold, there is an obligation on the school to make provision for Jewish religious 
education. The same is true for any other religious community represented within the learner 
body. The school may not just shirk its responsibility toward the minority and only allow for 
religious instruction for the majority religion. The recent introduction of Islamic religious 
education is a result of the schools and the state identifying the need for a religious 
community to be accommodated within the school context and taking active steps to realise 
the community’s right to religious freedom.  
Religious instruction in the German context is part of the official curriculum and places a 
substantial burden on schools and the state to fulfil their obligation towards parents and 
learners. Section 15(2) does not place as big a burden on South African public schools and 
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the state. Religious observances are not part of the official curriculum and do not have to be 
conducted by a teacher that is specifically trained to perform the observances. Religious 
observances in South African public schools are typically also conducted for shorter periods 
of time than the religious instruction classes in Germany. A public school must not shirk its 
responsibility in terms of section 15(2) because it perceives the equitable treatment of 
religions as too burdensome. The Constitution requires the school to be proactive in 
facilitating and accommodating religious observances, but it does not expect schools to 
conduct the observances themselves or to incur any curricular burden. It simply expects 
governing bodies to make rules to accommodate the different religions in the school and to 
foster an environment where religious differences are accepted and celebrated.   
 
5 3 “Accommodation” as a guiding principle for the formulation of rules 
Chapter 2 dealt extensively with the accommodation model of state-religion interaction that is 
envisioned by the Constitution. It is a model of interaction that requires the state to positively 
recognise all religious identities and adopt an even-handed approach between religions.81 It is 
also the model that must guide and inform the equitable treatment of different religious 
observances in the public school sector. The court in the Pillay case formulated the concept 
of “reasonable accommodation” as a way of addressing religious diversity in the school 
context. “Reasonable accommodation” as a legal norm contains something of the 
Constitution’s accommodation model and can be used as a guiding principle to underpin the 
drafting of rules on religious observances. Reasonable accommodation is the notion that the 
state, community or a school must sometimes “take positive measures and possibly incur 
additional hardship or expense in order to allow all people to participate and enjoy all their 
rights equally.”82  
Reasonable accommodation is an exercise in proportionality that will ultimately depend on 
the facts.83 In the Pillay case the court ordered the school to provide in its code of conduct for 
the reasonable accommodation of deviations from the code on religious or cultural grounds.84 
The court had to weigh the relative importance of the religious practice of wearing a nose 
stud with the hardship that permitting the learner to wear the stud would cause to the 
school.85 The concept of reasonable accommodation has the ability to foster tolerance and 
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encourage the accommodation of religious and cultural diversity.86 As it has already been 
incorporated into the law of religious freedom in Pillay, it can arguably be applied within the 
context of religious observances in public schools.  
The role of reasonable accommodation is to underpin the equity requirement. The rules 
made by a governing body must ensure that religious observances are conducted on an 
equitable basis, and members of different religions are reasonably accommodated within the 
school environment.87 Fair opportunity must be given to all to organise and attend their own 
religious observances while non-believers must be reasonably accommodated and may not be 
unfairly discriminated against.88 In determining what would be equitable in the circumstances 
the governing body must therefore consider whether reasonable accommodation can be made 
for minority religions.  
The governing body must weigh up the relative importance of the learner’s right to 
religious observances as well as the impact the denial of religious observances will have on 
the learner’s right to religious freedom, dignity and equality, with the hardship the school has 
to endure to accommodate the learner. If the impact on the school is marginal, while the 
impact on the learner is disproportionately coercive and burdensome, the governing body 
must accommodate the learner’s religious observances. This will require it to take positive 
action to ensure equity towards the religions of the minorities.89 Furthermore, a governing 
body cannot make rules to accommodate the majority religion while only making allowance 
for the minority to abstain from participation. This falls short of the school’s constitutional 
obligation to treat religions equitably. 
One of the reasons the German model of religious instruction is so successful is the close 
working relationship between religious institutions and the state. Religious instruction is 
usually presented by a member of the religious community while the curriculum is also 
determined by the different religious institutions. Smith90 suggests that a similar approach 
should be adopted in respect of religious observances in South African public schools. 
Ideally, the religious observances should not be run by the school itself, but by religious 
leaders of the various represented faiths.91 It is common for schools to arrange members of 
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faith communities to present a religious message during school assemblies or address the 
school in anticipation of religious holidays like Christmas or Ramadan.  
Unfortunately, there is often a tendency in South African public schools to invite only 
members of the majority religion. Learners from religious minorities are either subjected to 
observances of the majority or, if they select to abstain from participation, are not provided 
with a constructive alternative. Learners are either left alone in a classroom or, if they are 
under the supervision of an adult, that person is usually not charged with providing an 
alternative, constructive way of passing the time.92 This approach negates the religious rights 
of minority religions and does not reasonably accommodate their religious needs. It is a 
blatant violation of the equity requirement in section 7 and section 15(2) as the school makes 
no attempt to provide for the even-handed treatment of religions.  
A school can only truly comply with the equity requirement if it makes a concerted effort 
to ensure that religious alternatives are available to learners of minority religions. This means 
inviting leaders or members of the minority religious community to conduct observances for 
the learners who do not conform to the majority religion. While a minister is thus reading 
from the Bible and praying with the Christian learners, an Imam can discuss the Koran with 
the Muslim learners, and a Rabbi can address scriptures of the Torah with the Jewish 
learners. Cognisance must also be taken of intra-denominational religious differences. For 
example, Christianity must not be viewed as a homogenous religion, but schools must take 
into account the differences in belief, practice and observance within the faith. There is a 
difference between a learner adhering to Catholicism and a learner belonging to the Dutch-
Reformed Church and their observances must be accommodated accordingly.   
A constructive alternative should also be available for the non-believers. In Germany, 
Ethics/Philosophy caters for the non-religious learners. It is not suggested that a school must 
necessarily develop a similar subject for learners to study while their religious counterparts 
partake in religious observances. It is however not enough to expect these learners to do 
nothing. They must be allowed to participate in some activity that expresses their secular 
word-view.93 This could take the form of a discussion class where various societal issues, 
including religious diversity, are discussed. It can also take the form of readings about ethics, 
philosophy or the practices of different religions. There may also be a need to engage with 
learners about the content of these classes. If there is a particular world event dominating the 
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news that week, learners might want to use this opportunity to engage in a discussion about 
the event.  
While it is important for governing bodies to have clear rules about religious observances, 
it is submitted that they must guard against a too formalistic approach. The German model of 
religious instruction requires a certain number of adherents in a school to present instruction 
in a particular religion. In South Africa, rules that require a minimum number of learners 
have the potential to unduly restrict the equity requirement and are open to abuse by a 
governing body that does not have an interest in protecting the religious rights of minorities. 
If a learner is the only Jehovah’s Witness in the school, the governing body cannot simply 
say that there are too few adherents to require the school to arrange for religious observances 
in line with his faith.  
The governing body must determine whether the needs of this learner can be reasonably 
accommodated within the school environment. The school needs to contact the learner’s 
parents and inquire if they know of someone who might be available to conduct religious 
observances for the learner at the school. If this possibility exists the school must make a 
classroom available for the learner to observe his religion while the majority participate in 
their religious observances. If there is a minority of Muslim learners in the school, these 
learners must be given a fair opportunity to conduct religious observances in accordance with 
their faith. This means that the school must engage with the parents, learners and religious 
leaders to find a way to accommodate the learners’ religious observances. The learners could 
be accommodated in a separate venue where observances are presented by a member of their 
faith community. The learners could also be provided with copies of the Koran or other 
Muslim texts which they can read and engage with during this time.  
Schools must also be mindful of treating religions equitably at events where there is a 
captured audience like graduation ceremonies and school assemblies. In these circumstances 
it would not be appropriate to observe only the majority religion by way of a prayer or a 
reading from scripture. This will not only create coercive pressure as discussed in the 
previous chapter, but will also fail under the equity requirement. If a school wants to observe 
religion at these events accommodation must be made for members of minority religions. 
This could essentially mean that, instead of praying aloud, a moment of silence is observed 
where parents, learners and teachers can silently observe their religion. 
Depending on the nature of the different religions represented at these ceremonies it would 
also be equitable to allow a representative of each represented faith community a brief 
opportunity to observe their religion at the event. If half of the learners are Muslim and the 
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other half is Christian, it would only be fair to allow for both a Christian and a Muslim 
prayer. Alternatively, a message on ethics can be delivered that is neutral towards religion, 
but promotes important societal values such as dignity, respect and equality. The same 
approach should be followed where religious observances are conducted in the classroom 
setting. If the governing body makes rules allowing for religious observances in the 
administrative period at the beginning of the day, they must reasonably accommodate the 
different religions represented in the class.  
If a school has a majority of Muslim learners and some classes comprise only Muslim 
learners, the teacher of such a class can start the day with an observance in line with the 
Muslim faith as she would not be infringing on the rights of any learner in the class. If there 
are however three Christian learners in the class the rules of the governing body must make 
provision for these learners. If the rules state that religious observances are conducted 
between 07:45 and 08:00 in the mornings, the school can make a separate classroom 
available for all the Christian learners in the school where they can read from the Bible and 
pray together. The learners can then go to this separate classroom at the beginning of the day, 
saving them the embarrassment and undue coercive pressure of having to leave the class in 
front of all the Muslim learners. Depending on the age of the learners the school can make a 
Christian teacher or parent available to facilitate the observance, or simply supervise in the 
case of older learners. At the start of the first period the learners can join the class without too 
much attention being drawn to them.  
It is, however, important for schools not to artificially manufacture the composition of 
their classes so as to create religiously homogenous classrooms. It would not be appropriate 
for a school to segregate the learners according to their religious convictions during the 
normal course of the day, simply because it is more convenient to manage the religious 
observances. This will be tantamount to an apartheid-style approach to religious differences 
and will be constitutionally suspect. The separation of learners during the religious 
observance itself serves an important purpose as it prevents undue coercion and the 
infringement of religious freedom. A similar separation during the course of the day will 
however foster religious intolerance and discrimination amongst the learners in the school. 
The Constitution requires religions to be treated equitably, which is a weaker standard 
than equality. Equitable basis does not mean that a school must go above and beyond what is 
reasonable in the circumstances. Consider the following example. A learner, in a school with 
predominantly Muslim learners, is a Jehovah’s Witness. The school is situated in a small 
town which does not have a large following of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The parents, as well as 
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the religious leaders, have indicated that there is nobody who is willing to come to the school 
on a Wednesday morning, when religious observances are conducted, to assist the school in 
accommodating the learner’s religious needs. The school is not obliged, on their own 
initiative and cost, to transport a Jehovah’s Witness from another town who is willing to 
conduct the observances. When weighing the burden on the school against the impact on the 
learner it is clear that in accommodating the learner the school will have to incur a 
disproportionate and undue hardship.  
In these instances the school must consult with the learner and the parents to find a 
solution. If the parents are willing and able, they can conduct religious observances at home 
on a Wednesday morning and only bring the learner to school once the first period starts. 
They can also provide the school with readings for the learner that he can engage with in a 
separate classroom while the Muslim learners participate in their religious observances. 
Although this learner might not be treated in exactly the same way as the Muslim learners in 
the school, it is the most equitable arrangement in the circumstances. A situation like this 
might often occur where learners adhere to very small minority religions and it is difficult for 
the school to make equitable arrangements.  
There is also much argument as to whether a public school can be a single-faith based 
school where observances are conducted only in accordance with a particular religion.94 The 
Schools Act, the Constitution and the Policy do not explicitly preclude this possibility and it 
would arguably be allowed in certain contexts. Where a school has a religiously homogenous 
learner body, as sometimes happens in smaller schools or schools located within a religiously 
homogenous community, it would arguably be acceptable for the school to conduct religious 
observances in accordance with only one faith.  This model would not violate religious 
freedom as it is the most equitable outcome in the particular instance.  
The burden on governing bodies may also be different if learners and parents do not care 
about being exposed to religions other than their own. Parents often allow their children to go 
to schools where they are fully aware that the majority of the school adhere to a religion other 
than their own. In this instance it would be possible for a learner to elect to partake in the 
observances of the majority, precluding the need for the school to take steps to accommodate 
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the learner. In these cases the learners might simply be indifferent to religion altogether and a 
school will not be acting unconstitutionally if it does not take steps to accommodate these 
learners and their observances. Schools must, however, make very sure that parents and 
learners are accepting of and comfortable with such an arrangement and not simply assume 
this to be the case. 
The success of ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of religions in the public school 
system lies in the making of clear rules around the time and the place of religious 
observances. Although the school may not prohibit learners from engaging in religious 
observances on their own accord, the governing body must be mindful to formulate proper 
rules around religious observances facilitated at the school itself. Where the school actively 
creates an opportunity for religious observances, either as an event during the school week or 
at special occasions and assemblies, it must be clear exactly when the observances will occur, 
by whom they will be presented and what form they will take. This allows the governing 
body to facilitate the practical effect of equitably accommodating the minorities. They will be 
able to give parents, learners and religious leaders clear information on when, where and how 
the minority religions can be accommodated.  
The equitable treatment of religions in the public school system also requires that 
governing bodies must revise their religious rules or code on a yearly basis. It should be a 
living document that must be adjusted to the changing needs of the pupil body. Although 
section 7 of the Schools Act identifies governing bodies as the “appropriate public authority” 
to draft rules on religious observances, the drafting process must be one of proper 
consultation with parents, learners and teachers, with some input by the Department of 
Education. The rules must be a reflection of the most equitable model of religious 
observances for a particular school, with clear evidence that religious minorities have been 
reasonably accommodated. 
 
6 Conclusion  
The requirement of “equitable basis” purports to strike a balance between the damaging 
effect of religious coercion and the right to conduct religious observances in the public school 
setting. Its purpose is to ensure that religious freedom is protected, despite the existence of a 
diversity of religions. Schools, and especially governing bodies, have an obligation to take 
positive steps to facilitate and accommodate religious minorities. The principle of reasonable 
accommodation must guide and underscore the equity requirement as it creates a standard to 
which schools must aspire in making arrangements for those who do not adhere to the 
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majority religion. Learners can never be completely free of at least some form of indirect 
coercion. The effects of the coercion can however be mitigated by allowing a wide 
interpretation of the equity requirement. Minority religions must be treated fairly and 
equitably. This strikes a balance between the impact of the coercion and the protection of 
religious freedom, equality, dignity and the best interest of the child. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
1 Introduction 
This study set out to explore how the requirements for religious observances in state and 
state-aided institutions must be interpreted within the context of public schools, to strike a 
constitutionally appropriate balance between the powers of school governing bodies and the 
right of learners to be free from religious coercion. During the course of the study it became 
clear that there are multiple factors that influence the way in which religious observances in 
public schools must be structured. The Constitution envisioned a model of state-religion 
interaction centred on the accommodation of religious diversity; however, the practicality of 
conducting observances in schools is more challenging.  
As a point of departure, section 15(2), read with section 7 of the Schools Act, is not a 
stand-alone provision but functions within a complex constitutional, legislative, policy and 
international law framework. The impact of and the precise weight that is attached to 
different constitutional rights and freedoms, legislative provisions and policy documents, is 
context specific and depends on factors that are unique to a particular school. It thus became 
clear that section 15(2) cannot be afforded a blanket-interpretation, but will be influenced by 
considerations such as the religious demographic of the school, the practicality of alternative 
accommodation for minority religions, the impact of religious coercion on the learners and 
the wishes of learners and parents not to be subject to observances.  
It also became clear that the Constitution requires governing bodies to act much more 
vigilantly in making rules on religious observances than simply assigning the school a 
religious character or ethos. Section 15(2) of the Constitution and section 7 of the Schools 
Act require “rules” that adhere to the rule of law, and set out the nature and the content of 
religious observances in a discernible and accessible way. Governing bodies are also obliged 
to consult and engage during the rule-making process, taking into account the needs of the 
school community, and being guided by the overarching obligation to serve the best interest 
of the children who will partake in the observances.  
An analysis of the way in which foreign jurisdictions approach religious coercion suggests 
that a too strict interpretation of “free and voluntary” would negate the existence of section 
15(2) in its entirety. It was thus argued that a measure of indirect religious coercion must be 
tolerated under the Constitution, but that the effect of this could be mitigated by requiring a 
high standard of equitable treatment amongst the different religions represented in the school 
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community. This means that schools and governing bodies must take active steps to 
reasonably accommodate and facilitate religious observances. It must be done in a way that 
ensures the least amount of coercive pressure on learners, while providing every represented 
religion with an opportunity, as far as reasonably possible, to conduct observances in 
accordance with their faith. 
 
2 Recommendations 
This section will reflect on some of the conclusions that were drawn at different points in 
this study and the recommendations that have emerged from the various chapters. Chapter 2 
focussed on the relationship between the state and religion in South Africa. Various models 
of state-religion interaction were discussed, as well as the colonial and apartheid histories of 
the relationship between religion and the state in South Africa. It was found that the role of 
religion in South Africa has historically been characterised by racial discrimination, social 
exclusion and political disempowerment.  This history has informed and shaped the current 
constitutional provisions on religious freedom and must inform any interpretation of section 
15 and the supporting rights in the Bill of Rights.  
The Constitution did not envision a complete separation of religion from the state, but 
rather opted for the accommodation model in which the state accommodates and facilitates 
religious diversity. This model is rooted in the idea of the equal worth of every individual, 
regardless of their religious convictions. It protects persons from religious coercion by the 
state and places an obligation on the state to create enabling conditions for the positive 
expression of religious identity. The state is thus required to treat religions in an even-handed 
manner, positively recognising the different religions present within the state. It requires the 
state to be an active role-player in matters of religion and not a neutral presence that 
completely withdraws religion from the public sphere. It is recommended that the 
constitutionality of religious observances be construed against the background of the 
accommodation model as it lays the foundation for the way in which state and state-aided 
schools must engage with religion. Any interpretation must also be informed by South 
Africa’s particular history and aim to ensure that religion is never again used as a means to 
divide our society. 
Chapter 3 focussed on the constitutional, legislative and policy framework that currently 
governs religious observances in South Africa. This chapter illustrated the complexity of the 
various rights and freedoms that have to be balanced in order to determine how religious 
observances must be structured in the school environment. The right to religious freedom, the 
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right to equality, the right to human dignity, freedom of expression, the right to assemble, 
demonstrate, picket and petition, freedom of association, the right to a religious community 
and the best interest of the child are all constitutional rights that have to be weighed and 
balanced when making rules around religious observances. The general limitation clause 
provides further guidance on how the tensions between these rights are to be negotiated. 
Religious freedom thus does not function in isolation, but interacts with these supporting 
rights and provisions in a variety of ways. The supporting rights can either enhance the right 
to religious freedom or conflict with it. In cases where conflict occurs, the competing rights 
have to be balanced, taking into account the nature and the importance of the right in order to 
find an equitable outcome. 
Central to this balancing inquiry is the best interest of the child. The Constitution, as well 
as the CRC, requires the best interest of the child to be the overarching principle guiding any 
decision that could impact on the child. One way of giving effect to this provision is by 
allowing children’s voices to be heard. In South Africa there is a serious need for the 
opinions of children to be taken more seriously in matters concerning them. There is no 
legislation regulating the religious autonomy of children. Moreover, in neither the Pillay nor 
the Christian Education cases, the only cases to date dealing with the religious and cultural 
rights of children, were the children in question given an opportunity to speak. It is 
recommended that the legislature consider enacting legislation that allows children religious 
autonomy upon reaching a certain age. They can then legally make their own choice on 
whether they want to participate in observances or not.  
The constitutional framework that governs religious observances is vague and fails to 
provide governing bodies with clear guidelines for the drafting of rules. This has led to 
schools abusing religious observances to further a very specific religious ethos or character, 
or simply refraining from drafting rules. The Schools Act and the Policy on Religion and 
Education were meant to address this difficulty, but have failed to provide a clear and binding 
guideline that can properly assist schools. The Schools Act simply reiterates section 15(2) of 
the Constitution, while the Policy makes suggestions that are themselves constitutionally 
problematic and infringe the right to religious freedom.  
The Policy is also not a binding document, allowing schools to ignore its provisions in 
favour of their own approach. It is therefore recommended that the Department of Education 
embark on a review of the Policy to bring it in line with the Constitution and, possibly, 
consolidate it into legislation. The review must allow for consultation with various 
stakeholders, most notably learners. Cognisance must be taken of international law 
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instruments that regulate religious freedom and the rights of children. These documents 
contain important guidelines that can provide insight into the way in which section 15(2) of 
the Constitution must be interpreted. 
Chapter 4 set out to interpret certain parts of section 15(2) and section 7 of the Schools 
Act. Firstly, the meaning of the word “rules” was addressed. It was found that governing 
bodies are organs of state that perform a public function when making rules on religious 
observances. These rules must ensure parity of treatment, be enforced in terms of a 
discernible standard to ensure that there is no arbitrary abuse of power, be precise, and be 
accessible to all the affected individuals. It is recommended that schools formulate written 
rules that are clear and allow for an exemption procedure. These rules must be made available 
to all existing parents, as well as prospective parents to inform them of the religious policy of 
the school. A poorly drafted religious policy can form the basis for a finding of 
unconstitutionality as it does not comply with the rule of law. 
Furthermore, Chapter 4 analysed the powers of governing bodies as the “appropriate 
public authorities.” Although no case has specifically dealt with section 15(2) or section 7 of 
the Schools Act, the drafting of language, pregnancy and admission policies is analogous to 
the power to formulate rules on religious observances. From the case law, various 
considerations emerged that must guide governing bodies when making rules about the nature 
and the form of religious observances in their respective schools. Firstly, governing bodies 
are obliged to consider the needs of all the learners, parents and teachers within the school 
community. They represent the interests of these stakeholders and must objectively and 
without any prejudice act in the best interest of all their learners – not just the majority. 
Secondly, the powers of governing bodies are subject to the Constitution, the Schools Act 
and any applicable provincial law. The Schools Act allows an HOD to intervene in the 
powers of the governing body where it is clear that the latter infringes on the rights of 
learners, parents and teachers. Provincial legislation can also be enacted to limit the powers 
of governing bodies. Thirdly, the best interest of the child must guide the exercise of power. 
The processes followed and rules made by the governing bodies, must make the best interest 
of the child the primary consideration. Lastly, there is an obligation on governing bodies and 
the state to cooperate and engage with each other in a meaningful way. It is recommended 
that this process of engagement commence at the start of a dispute and that it must be guided 
by the best interest of the children. In this way the worrying trend of litigious disputes 
between governing bodies and the state can be minimised. It is also recommended that the 
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Department appoint a committee to oversee the religious policies of schools and train them 
on how to comply with section 15(2).  
Chapter 5 dealt with the interpretation of “free and voluntary. The chapter provided an 
overview of direct and indirect coercion. It was found that, while direct religious coercion is 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution, indirect coercion might also have an impact on the 
voluntariness of the decision to participate in religious observances. The chapter set out to 
determine how indirect religious coercion should be interpreted in South Africa so as to 
ensure that observances do not place an undue burden on learners to participate in 
observances they do not subscribe to. By analysing the American, Canadian, and German 
approaches to indirect coercion the following could be discerned.  
The American courts have completely outlawed any form of religious coercion, including 
indirect religious coercion, in their public schools. This is ascribed to the existence of the 
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which does 
not allow for state-religion interaction. Their Canadian counterparts opted for the same 
approach, albeit by different means. The courts found that any form of indirect religious 
coercion in the school context violated the right to religious freedom. By interpreting 
religious coercion very strictly to include even the mere suggestion of indirect coercive 
pressure, the courts effectively outlawed religious observances without the existence of an 
Establishment Clause. Germany has in turn adopted a much more lenient approach, in terms 
of which the risk of indirect religious coercion can be outweighed by the rights of other 
learners and parents to partake in religious observances. By weighing competing rights, the 
German courts found that indirect coercion did not place such a strenuous burden on the 
dissenting learners as is the case in the American and Canadian courts. 
It is recommended that the South African courts must refrain from a too strict 
interpretation of indirect coercion as this can have the unintended consequence of completely 
negating the existence of section 15(2). The Canadian approach illustrates this danger by 
erecting a wall of separation between religion and the state that was never meant to exist. A 
too strict interpretation of indirect coercion that includes all potential forms of subtle pressure 
will ultimately result in a blanket ban on all religious observances in public schools. This was 
not the intention of the constitutional drafters, nor is it an interpretation that is reconcilable 
with the wording of section 15(2).  
It is recommended that South Africa follow an approach somewhere between that of 
Germany and the United States/Canada, where competing rights and freedoms are weighted 
and balanced to determine if religious coercion is unduly burdensome. The South African 
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approach must, however, be a bit more sensitive to the effects of indirect coercion than the 
German courts and must refrain from simply assuming that learners do not experience 
coercion or that the existence of an exemption completely remedies any coercive pressure. 
The aim must be to structure observances in such a way that the negative effects of coercion 
are minimised as far as possible. An approach like this will not completely eliminate indirect 
coercion, but can ensure that the effect on learners is not too damaging. Another way of 
achieving this purpose is by ensuring that a high standard of equity is required when 
interpreting “equitable basis” in section 15(2). 
Chapter 6 addressed the interpretation that must be afforded to the equity requirement. As 
a point of departure it was submitted that equity is not the same as equality. Although the two 
concepts are related, equity should not be read as requiring the absolute equal treatment of all 
religions. Equity is an ethical imperative, associated with principles of social justice and 
human rights. What is equitable in a particular situation will depend on the facts and the 
contexts of the matter, as well as the human rights that are affected. An analysis of the case 
law dealing with the interpretation of “equitable basis” makes it clear that this section 
requires the even-handed treatment of religions and allows for religions to be treated 
differently, as long as it does not constitute inequitable treatment. It is recommended, on the 
basis of O’Regan J’s approach to religious equity in the Lawrence case, that religious 
observances should reflect, as far as possible, the religious beliefs of the particular 
community or group, with “community or group” referring to all individual members and not 
just the majority. 
It is recommended that South Africa approach the equitable treatment of religious 
observances in a way that is similar to the way in which Germany approaches religious 
instruction. Rules must allow learners of all religions to be treated in a fair and equitable 
manner and schools are under an obligation to accommodate minority religions. The 
Constitution requires schools and governing bodies to be proactive in facilitating and 
accommodating religious observances. If the rules have an indirect coercive effect the 
governing body must determine what rules could be made to ensure the equitable and fair 
treatment of religions in a way that mitigates the coercive impact and protects the learners’ 
right to dignity, equality, and religious freedom and is in the best interest of the child. 
It is recommended that schools avail themselves of the religious affiliation of their learners 
and work together with parents, religious leaders, learners and the larger school community 
to determine the best way to accommodate the differences. It is also recommended that 
schools not carry the burden of religious observances alone, but actively engage with the 
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leaders of represented faiths to assist them in this task. Schools are expected to make 
provision for constructive alternatives for learners who do not adhere to any religion at all. 
Simply letting these learners sit idly is not sufficient – schools must engage with leaners and 
parents to find a way to allow these learners to express their secular world-views. 
In making rules on religious observances schools must refrain from a too formalistic 
approach and must rather be guided by the concept of “reasonable accommodation.” This 
requires them to take positive measures, and possibly incur hardship and expense in order to 
allow learners to practise their religions in an equitable manner. Reasonable accommodation 
is an exercise in proportionality and what would be equitable in a particular case would 
depend on various context-specific considerations. It does not require the school to go above 
and beyond the call of duty to accommodate learners, but expects schools to at least attempt 
to address the religious needs of those learners that do not adhere to the majority religion. 
Sometimes equity requires the school to arrange for a Rabbi to come to the school for the 
Jewish learners, while in other instances it could simply mean allowing parents to bring their 
child to school after the observances had already been conducted. 
A model like this can only be successful in cases where schools actively engage with the 
learners, parents, teachers and larger school community. It is recommended that schools must 
revise their religious policy at least once a year and adjust it to the changing needs of the 
pupil body.  The rule-drafting process must allow input from all the different role-players in 
the school and must allow for their voices to be heard. This must be done in a non-
discriminative way that celebrates religious differences rather than simply tolerating it as a 
necessary burden that the school has to bear.  
 
3 Concluding remarks 
The right to religious freedom is one of the oldest and most sacred of human rights. It 
speaks to the most personal part of human experience and provides the moral compass by 
which many guide their existence. South Africa’s past is marred by racial exclusion and 
discrimination, political disempowerment and religious oppression. It is a fractured history 
that left many disillusioned and marginalised.   
The Constitution is a transformative document. It speaks to the change that democracy 
brings and recognises the inherent humanity of every individual. Religious freedom is central 
to this vision of a humane society. The accommodation model envisioned by the Constitution 
reflects this understanding and allows for religion to form part of the public sphere. The right 
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to conduct religious observances in section 15(2) is a manifestation of religious freedom and 
allows an all-encompassing human experience.  
It is against this background that religious observances in public schools must be 
interpreted. There are many instances where this right is being abused by schools that force 
learners to participate in observances against their will. Similarly, there are schools that 
completely refrain from religious observances as it is viewed as too heavy a burden, or 
simply not part of their public duty. The language of abuse and the language of apathy kept 
colonialism and apartheid alive and should not be allowed to become the language of 
democracy. Schools must not only allow learners who want to participate in religious 
observances to do so, but must take steps to facilitate observances that reflect the diversity of 
religions represented in the school community.  
The right to conduct religious observances is not something that must be tolerated as a 
necessary evil. It is a right that allows for the celebration of diversity, for the understanding 
of the “Other”, and for the building of a more inclusive society. Schools are in a position to 
influence and shape the minds that will lead this democracy. The way in which they 
experience religious diversity and the way in which schools address this diversity will set the 
tone for the way in which South Africa will deal with religious freedom in the years to come. 
Religious observances in the public school context create an opportunity to celebrate the 
diversity that the Constitution professes and to ensure that religious intolerance and 
oppression remain remnants of a distant past.  
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